

HOBBS's TRIPOS,
In Three
DISCOURSES:

THE FIRST,
HUMANE NATURE,

Or the Fundamental Elements of POLICY. Being a Discovery of the *Faculties, Acts and Passions* of the Soul of Man, from their Original Causes, according to such *Philosophical Principles* as are not commonly known, or asserted.

THE SECOND,
De CORPORE POLITICO.

Or the Elements of LAW, Moral and Politick, with Discourses upon several Heads, as of the *Law of Nature, Oaths and Covenants; several kinds of Governments,* with the Changes and Revolutions of them.

THE THIRD,
Of Liberty and Necessity;

Wherein all Controversie, concerning *Predestination, Election, Free will, Grace, Merits, Reprobation,* is fully decided and cleared.

The Third Edition.

By *Tho. Hobbs* of *Malmsbury.*

1583 — 1579

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1684

HOBBES TRIPS

1872

DISCOVERIES

THE FIRST

NUMBERS

OF THE DISCOVERIES
IN THE
ARTS AND SCIENCES
AND
THE HISTORY OF
THE HUMAN MIND

THE SECOND

NUMBERS

OF THE DISCOVERIES
IN THE
ARTS AND SCIENCES
AND
THE HISTORY OF
THE HUMAN MIND

THE THIRD

NUMBERS

OF THE DISCOVERIES
IN THE
ARTS AND SCIENCES
AND
THE HISTORY OF
THE HUMAN MIND

THE FOURTH

NUMBERS

OF THE DISCOVERIES
IN THE
ARTS AND SCIENCES
AND
THE HISTORY OF
THE HUMAN MIND

OF THE DISCOVERIES
IN THE
ARTS AND SCIENCES
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THE HISTORY OF
THE HUMAN MIND

Humane Nature:
O R
The Fundamental Elements
O F
POLICY.
B E I N G
A Discovery of the *Faculties*
Acts and *Passions* of the
S O U L of M A N,
From their Original causes;
According to such
Philosophical Principles
As are not commonly known or asserted.

The *Third Edition*, Augmented and much
corrected by the Authors own hand.

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Hall. MDCLXXXIV.

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To the Right Honourable,

W I L L I A M
EARL OF
NEW-CASTLE,

Governour to the Prince his Highness,
One of His Majesties Most Honourable
Privy Council.

My most Honour'd Lord,

From the principal parts of
Nature, Reason and Passi-
on, have proceeded two
kinds of Learning, *Mathe-*
matical and *Dogmatical* : the former is
A 4 free

The Epistle Dedicatory.

free from Controversie and Dispute, because it consisteth in comparing Figure and Motion only ; in which things, *Truth*, and *the Interest of Men*, oppose not each other : but in the other there is nothing undisputable , because it compareth Men , and medleth with their Right and Profit ; in which, as oft as Reason is against a Man, so oft will a Man be against Reason. And from hence it cometh, that they who have written of Justice and Policy in General, do all invade each other and themselves with Contradictions. To reduce this Doctrine to the Rules and Infallibility of Reason, there is no way but , first, put such Principles down for a Foundation, as Passion, not mistrusting, may not seek to displace ; and afterwards to build

A

The Epistle Dedicatory.

build thereon the Truth of Cases in the Law of Nature (which hitherto have been built in the Air) by degrees, till the whole have been inexpugnable. Now, my Lord, the Principles fit for such a Foundation, are those which heretofore I have acquainted your Lordship withal in private Discourse, and which by your Command I have here put into a Method. To examine Cases thereby between *Sovereign* and *Sovereign*, or between *Sovereign* and *Subject*, I leave to them that shall find Leasure and Encouragement thereto: For my part, I present this to your Lordship for the true and only Foundation of such Science. For the Stile, it is therefore the worse, because, whilst I was writing, I consulted more with Logick than with Rhetorick: But
for

The Epistle Dedicatory.

for the Doctrine, it is not slightly proved ; and the Conclusions thereof of such Nature , as, for want of them , Government and Peace have been nothing else , to this day, but mutual Fears : And it would be an incomparable benefit to Commonwealth, that every one held the Opinion concerning *Law* and *Policy* here delivered. The ambition therefore of this Book , in seeking by your Lordships countenance to insinuate it self with those whom the matter it containeth most nearly concerneth , is to be excused. For my self, I desire no greater honour than I enjoy already in your Lordship's favour, unless it be that you would be pleased, in Continuance thereof, to give me more Exercise in your commands ; which, as I am bound by your many

ny

The Epistle Dedicatory.

ny great Favours, I shall obey,
being,

My most honoured Lord,

Your most humble,

and most obliged

Servant,

May 9. 1640.

THO. HOBBS.

Oct. 1679

I N

The Bible Dictionary

By Rev. James A. Easton, D.D., LL.D.,

Professor of Semitic Languages,

University of Chicago,


Chicago, Ill.

London:

1892.

THE LONDON

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I N

Libellum præstantissimi

T H O. H O B B I I

Veri verè Philosophi, de Naturâ
Hominis.

Qua magna Coeli mœnia, & tracta Maris,
Terræq; fines siquid aut ultra est, capit
Mens ipsa, tandem capitur: Omnia hætenus
Que nôsse potuit, nota jam primùm est Sibi.

Accede, Lector, disce quis demùm sis;
Tranquillinam jecoris agnoscas tui,
Quî propiùs hæret nil tibi, & nil tam procul.

Non

*Non hic Scholarum frivola, aut cassi loga,
Quales per annos forte plus septem legit ;
Ut folle pleno prodeat, Rixa Artifex ;
Vanasque merces futile lingua crepet :
Sed sancta Rerum pondera, & sensus graves
Quales parari decuit, ipsa cum fuit
Pingenda Ratio, & vindici suo adstitit.*

*Panduntur omnes Machina gyri tnae,
Animaeque Veſtes, Trochlea, Cunei, Rota ;
Qua concitatur arte, quo sufflamine
Sistatur illa rursus, & constet sibi :
Nec, si Fenestram pectori humano suam
Apſaſſet ipse Momus, inspiceret magis.
Hic cerno levia Affectuum vestigia,
Gracilesque Sensus lineas ; video quibus
Vehantur alis blanduli Cupidines,
Quibusque stimulis urgeant Ira graves.
Hic & Dolores, & Voluptates suos
Produnt recessus ; ipse nec Timor latet.*

*Has novit artes quisquis in foro velit
Animarum habenas flectere, & populos cupit
Aptis ligatos nexibus jungi sibi.
Hic Archimedes publicus figat podem,
Siquando regna machinis politicis
Urgeri satagit, & feras gentes ciet,
Imisque motuum sedibus mundum quatit :
Facile domabit cuncta, qui Menti imperat.*

*Consultor audax, & Promethei potens
Facinoris Anime ! quis tibi dedit Deus
Hac intneri saculis longè abdita,*

Oculosque

*Oculosque luce tinxit ambrosiâ tuos ?
Tu mentis omnis, at Tua nulla est capax.
Hâc laude Solus frui : Divinum est opus
Animam Creare ; proximum huic, Ostendere.*

RAD. BATHURST, A. M.

Col. Trin. Oxon.

Humane

Humane Nature:

OR THE
Fundamental Elements

OF
POLICY.

THE true and perspicuous Explication of the Elements of *Laws Natural and Politick* (*which is my present Scope*) dependeth upon the Knowledge of what is *Humane Nature* , what is *Body Politick* , and what it is we call a *Law* ; concerning which Points , as the *Writings* of Men from Antiquity down wards have still increased, so also have the *Doubts* and *Controversies* concerning the same : And seeing that true Knowledge begetteth not Doubt nor Controversie, but Knowledge, it is manifest from the present Controversies, That they which have *heretofore* written

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ten thereof, have not well understood their own Subject.

2. *Harm.* I can do none, though I err no less than they; for I shall leave Men but as they are, in Doubt and Dispute: but, intending not to take any Principle upon *Trust*, but only to put Men in Mind of what they *know already*, or *may know* by their own Experience, I hope to erre the less; and when I do, it must proceed from too *hasty Concluding*, which I will endeavour as much as I can to avoid.

3. On the other side, if *Reasoning aright* win not *Consent*, which may very easily happen, from them that being confident of their own Knowledge weigh not what is said, the *Fault* is not mine, but theirs; for as it is my Part to *shew* my Reasons, so it is theirs to bring *Attention*.

4. Mans Nature is the *Summ* of his natural *Faculties and Powers*, as the Faculties of *Nutrition, Motion, Generation, Sense, Reason, &c.* These Powers we do unanimously call *Natural*, and are contained in the Definition of Man, under these words, *Animal and Rational*.

5. According to the two principal Parts of Man, I divide his Faculties into two sorts, Faculties of the *Body*, and Faculties of the *Mind*.

6. Since the minute and distinct Anatomy of the Powers of the *Body* is nothing necessary to the present Purpose, I will only summ them up in these Three Heads, Power *Nutritive*, Power *Motive*, and Power *Generative*.

7. Of the Powers of the *Mind* there be two Sorts, *Cognitive, Imaginative, or Conceptive* and *Motive*; and first of *Cognitive*.

For

For the understanding of what I mean by the Power *Cognitive*, we must remember and acknowledge that there be in our Minds continually certain *Images* or Conceptions of the Things without us, insomuch that if a Man could be alive, and all the rest of the World annihilated, he should nevertheless retain the *Image* thereof; and all those Things which he had before seen or perceived in it; every one by his own Experience knowing, that the *Absence* or *Destruction* of things once imagined doth not cause the *Absence* or *Destruction* of the *Imagination* it self; This *Imagery* and *Representations* of the Qualities of the Thing without, is that we call our *Conception*, *Imagination*, *Ideas*, *Notice* or *Knowledg* of them; and the *Faculty* or Power by which we are capable of such Knowledge, is that I here call *Cognitive Power*, or *Conceptive*, the Power of Knowing or Conceiving.

CHAP. II.

2. *Definition of Sense.*
4. *Four Propositions concerning the nature of Conceptions.*
5. *The First proved.*
6. *The Second proved.*
- 7,8. *The Third proved.*
9. *The Fourth proved.*
10. *The main Deception of Sense.*

1. **H**AVING declared what I mean by the Word *Conception*, and other Words equivalent thereunto, I come to the *Conceptions* themselves, to shew their *Differences*, their *Causes*, and the *Manner of the Production*, so far as is necessary for this Place.

2. Originally all *Conceptions* proceed from the *Action* of the thing it self, whereof it is the *Conception*: Now when the *Action* is *present*, the *Conception* it produceth is also called *Sense*; and the Thing by whose *Action* the same is produced, is called the *Object of the Sense*.

3 By our several *Organs* we have several *Conceptions* of several *Qualities* in the *Objects*; for by *Sight* we have a *Conception* or *Image* composed of *Colour* and *Figure*, which is all the *Notice* and *Knowledge* the *Object* imparteth to us of its *Nature* by the *Eye*. By *Hearing* we have a *Conception* called *Sound*, which is all the *Knowledge* we have of the *Quality* of the *Object*

ject from the Ear. And so the rest of the Senses are also Conceptions of several Qualities, or Natures of their Objects.

4. Because the *Image* in Vision consisting of *Colour* and *Shape* is the Knowledge we have of the Qualities of the Object of that Sense; it is no hard matter for a Man to fall into this Opinion, that the same *Colour* and *Shape* are the very *Qualities themselves*; And for the same cause, that *Sound* and *Noise* are the *Qualities of the Bell*, or of the Air. And this Opinion hath been so long received, that the *contrary* must needs appear a great Paradox; and yet the Introduction of *Species visibile* and *intelligible* (which is necessary for the Maintenance of that Opinion) passing to and fro from the *Object*, is worse than any Paradox, as being a plain *Impossibility*. I shall therefore endeavour to make plain these Points:

That the Subject wherein *Colour* and *Image* are inherent, is *not* the *Object* or thing seen.

That there is nothing *without us* (really) which we call an *Image* or *Colour*.

That the said *Image* or *Colour* is but an *apparition* unto us of the *Motion*, Agitation, or Alteration, which the *Object* worketh in the *Brain*, or *Spirits*, or some internal Substance of the Head.

That as in *Vision*, so also in Conceptions that arise from the *other Senses*, the Subject of their *inherence* is not the *Object*, but the *Sentient*.

5. Every Man hath so much Experience as to have seen the *Sun* and the other visible Objects by Reflection in the *Water* and *Glasses*; and this alone is sufficient for this Conclusion, that *Colour* and *Image* may be there where the *Thing seen* is *not*. But because it may be said that notwithstanding the *Image* in the *Water* be not in the Object, but a Thing meerly *Phantastical*, yet there may be *Colour* really in the Thing it self: I will urge further this Experience, that divers Times Men see directly the *same* Object *double*, as *two Candles* for *one*, which may happen from Distemper or otherwise without Distemper if a Man will, the Organs being either in their right Temper, or equally distempered, the *Colours* and *Figures* in two such Images of the *same* Thing *cannot be inherent* therein, because the Thing seen cannot be in *two Places*.

One of these Images therefore is *not inherent* in the Object: but seeing the Organs of the Sight are then in equal Temper or Distemper, the *one* of them is no more inherent than the *other*; and consequently *neither* of them both are in the Object; which is the First Proposition, mentioned in the precedent Number.

6. Secondly, that the Image of any Thing by Reflection in a *Glass* or *Water* or the like, is *not* any Thing *in* or *behind* the *Glass*, or *in* or *under* the *Water*, every Man may grant to himself; which is the Second Proposition.

7. For the Third, we are to consider, First that every great *Agitation* or *Concussion* of the *Brain* (as it happeneth from a *Stroak*, especially if the *Stroak* be upon the *Eye*)^e whereby the
Optick

Optick Nerve suffereth any great Violence, there appeareth before the *Eyes* a certain *Light*, which *Light* is *nothing without*, but an Apparition only, all that is real being the Concussion or Motion of the Parts of that Nerve, from which Experience we may conclude, That *Apparition of Light* is really *nothing but Motion* within. If therefore from *lucid Bodies* there can be derived *Motion*, so as to affect the Optick Nerve in such manner as is proper thereunto, there will follow an *Image* of *Light* somewhere in that Line by which the Motion was last derived to the Eye; That is to say, In the Object, if we look directly on it, and in the Glass or Water, when we look upon it in the Line of Reflection, which in Effect is the Third Proposition; namely, That Image and Colour is but an Apparition to us of that Motion, Agitation, or Alteration which the Object worketh in the Brain or Spirits, or some *internal Substance* in the Head.

8. But that *from all lucid*, shining and illuminate Bodies, there is a *Motion produced* to the Eye, and, through the Eye, to the *Optick Nerve*, and so into the *Brain*, by which that Apparition of *Light* or *Colour* is affected, is not hard to prove. And first, it is evident that the *Fire*, the only *lucid Body* here upon Earth, worketh by *Motion* equally every Way; inso much as the Motion thereof *stopped* or inclosed, it is presently *extinguished*, and no more *Fire*. And further, that that Motion whereby the *Fire* worketh, is *Dilation*, and *Contraction* of it self *alternately*, commonly called *Scintillation* or *Glowing*, is manifest also by Experience. From such *Motion* in the *Fire*

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must

must needs arise a *Rejection* or casting from it self of that part of the *Medium* which is *contiguous* to it, whereby that part also rejecteth the next, and so successively one part beateth back another to the very *Eye*; and in the same manner the *exterior* part of the *Eye* presseth the *interiour*, (the *Laws of Refraction* still observed.) Now the *interiour* coat of the *Eye* is nothing else but a piece of the *Optick Nerve*; and therefore the *Motion* is still continued thereby into the *Brain*, and by *Resistance* or *Re-action* of the *Brain*, is also a *Rebound* into the *Optick Nerve* again; which we not conceiving as *Motion* or *Rebound* from *within*, do think it is *without*, and call it *Light*; as hath been already shewed by the *Experience* of a *Stroke*. We have no *Reason* to doubt, that the *Fountain* of *Light*, the *Sun*, worketh by any other *Ways* than the *Fire*, at least in this *Matter*. And thus all *Vision* hath its *Original* from such *Motion* as is here described: for where there is no *Light*, there is no *Sight*; and therefore *Colour* also must be the same *Thing* with *Light*, as being the *Effect* of the *lucid Bodies*: their *Difference* being only this, that when the *Light* cometh directly from the *Fountain* to the *Eye*, or indirectly by *Reflection* from *clean* and *polite* *Bodies*, and such as have not any particular *Motion* internal to alter it, we call it *Light*; but when it cometh to the *Eye* by *Reflection* from *uneven*, *rough*, and *coarse* *Bodies*, (or such as are affected with internal *Motion* of their own that may alter it) then we call it *Colour*; *Colour* and *Light* differing only in this, that the one is *pure*, and the

the other *perturbed* Light. By that which hath been said, not only the Truth of the Third Proposition, but also the whole Manner of producing Light and Colour, is apparent.

9. As Colour is not inherent in the Object, but an Effect thereof upon us, caused by such Motion in the Object, as hath been described: so neither is *Sound* in the Thing we hear, but in our selves. One manifest Sign thereof, is, that as a Man may see, so also he may hear double or treble, by Multiplication of *Echoes*, which Echoes are Sounds as well as the Original; and *not* being in one and the same Place, cannot be *inherent* in the Body that maketh them: Nothing can make any Thing which is not in it self: the *Clapper* hath no *Sound* in it, but *Motion*, and maketh Motion in the internal Parts of the Bell; so the *Bell* hath Motion, and not Sound, that imparteth *Motion* to the *Air*; and the *Air* hath Motion, but not Sound; the *Air* imparteth Motion by the *Ear* and *Nerve* unto the *Brain*; and the *Brain* hath Motion, but not Sound: from the *Brain*, it reboundeth back into the Nerves outward, and thence it becometh an *Apparition without*, which we call *Sound*. And to proceed to the rest of the *Senses*, it is apparent enough, that the *Smell* and *Taste* of the same Thing, are not the same to every Man; and therefore are *not* in the Thing *smelt* or *tasted*, but in the *Men*. So likewise the *Heat* we feel from the *Fire* is manifestly in *us*, and is quite different from the Heat which is in the *Fire*: for our Heat is *Pleasure* or *Pain*, according as it is great or moderate; but in the *Coal* there is no such

Such Thing. By this the Fourth and last Proposition is proved, *viz.* That as in Vision, so also in Conceptions that arise from *other* Senses, the Subject of their Inherence is not in the Object, but in the Sentient.

10. And from hence also it followeth, that *whatsoever* Accidents or Qualities our Senses make us think there be in the *World*, they be *not* there, but are *Seeming* and *Apparitions* only: the Things that really *are* in the World without us, are those *Motions* by which these Seemings are caused. And this is the *great Deception of Sense*, which also is to be by *Sense corrected*: for as Sense telleth me, when I see *directly*, that the Colour seemeth to be in the Object; so also Sense telleth me, when I see by *Reflection*, that Colour is in the Object.

CHAP.

C H A P. III.

1. *Imagination defined.*
2. *Sleep and Dreams defined.*
3. *Causes of Dreams.*
4. *Fiction defined.*
5. *Phantasms defined.*
6. *Remembrances defined.*
7. *Wherein Remembrance consisteth.*
8. *Why in a Dream a Man never thinks he dreams.*
9. *Why few Things seem strange in Dreams.*
10. *That a Dream may be taken for Reality and Vision.*

1. **A**S standing Water put into Motion by the Stroak of a Stone, or blast of Wind, doth not presently give over moving as soon as the Wind ceaseth, or the Stone setleth: so neither doth the Effect cease which the Object hath wrought upon the Brain, so soon as ever, by turning aside of the Organs the Object ceaseth to work; that is to say, Though the Sense be past, the Image or Conception remaineth; but more obscure while we are awake, because some Object or other continually plieth and solliciteth our Eyes, and Ears, keeping the Mind in a stronger Motion, whereby the weaker doth not easily appear. And this obscure Conception is that we call *Phantasie*, or *Imagination*: *Imagination* being (to define it) *Conception remaining,*

maining, and by little and little decaying from and after the Act of Sense.

2. But when *present* Sense is *not*, as in *Sleep*, there the *Images* remaining after Sense (when there be many) as in *Dreams*, are *not obscure*, but *strong* and *clear*, as in *Sense* it self. The Reason is, That which obscured and made the Conceptions weak, namely *Sense*, and *present Operation* of the Object, is *removed*: for *Sleep* is the *Privation* of the *Act of Sense*, (the Power remaining) and *Dreams* are the *Imagination* of them that *sleep*.

3. The *Causes* of *Dreams* (if they be natural) are the *Actions* or *Violence* of the *inward* Parts of a man upon his *Brain*, by which the *Passages* of *Sense* by *Sleep benumbed*, are *restored* to their *Motion*. The *Signs* by which this appeareth to be so, are the *Differences* of *Dreams* (old Men commonly dream oftener, and have their *Dreams* more painful than young) proceeding from the *different* Accidents of Mans Body; as *Dreams* of *Lust*, as *Dreams* of *Anger*, according as the *Heart*, or other Parts within, work more or less upon the *Brain*, by more or less *Heat*; so also the *Descents* of *different sorts* of *Flegm* maketh us a *Dream* of *different Tastes* of *Meats* and *Drinks*; and I believe there is a *Reciprocation* of *Motion* from the *Brain* to the *Vital* Parts, and back from the *Vital* Parts to the *Brain*; whereby not only *Imagination* begetteth *Motion* in those Parts; but also *Motion* in those Parts begetteth *Imagination* like to that by which it was begotten. If this be true, and that *fixed* *Imaginations* nourish the *Spleen*, then we see

see also a Cause, why a strong *Spleen* reciprocally causeth *fearful Dreams*, and why the Effects of *Lasciviousness* may in a Dream produce the Image of some person that had caused them. Another Sign that Dreams are caused by the Action of the inward Parts, is the *Disorder* and casual Consequence of one Conception or Image to another: for when we are *waking*, the *Antecedent* thought or Conception introduceth, and is cause of the *Consequent*, (as the Water followeth a mans Finger upon a dry and level Table (but in *Dreams* there is commonly *no Coherence*, (and when there is, it is by Chance) which must needs proceed from this, That the *Brain* in Dreams is *not restored* to its Motion in every Part alike; whereby it cometh to pass, that our Thoughts appear like the Stars between the flying Clouds, not in the Order which a Man would chuse to observe them, but as the uncertain Flight of broken Clouds permits.

+ As when the *Water*, or any liquid Thing moved at once by *divers* Movents, receiveth *one* Motion compounded of them all; so also the *Brain* or Spirit therein, having been stirred by *divers* Objects, composeth an Imagination of *divers* Conceptions that appeared single to the Sense. As for Example, the Sense sheweth at one Time the Figure of a *Mountain*, and at another Time the Colour of *Gold*; but the Imagination afterwards hath them both at once in a *golden Mountain*. From the same Cause it is, there appear unto us *Castles* in the *Air*, *Chimera's*, and other Monsters which are *not* in *Rerum Natura*, but have been conceived by the Sense in Pieces

Pieces at several Times. And this Composition is that which we commonly call *Fiction* of the Mind.

5. There is yet another Kind of Imagination, which for *Clearness* contendeth with *Sense*, as well as a *Dream*; and that is, when the *Action* of *Sense* hath been *long* or *vehement*: and the Experience thereof is more frequent in the *Sense* of *Seeing*, than the rest. An Example whereof is, the *Image* remaining before the *Eye* after looking upon the *Sun*. Also, those little Images that appear before the Eyes in the *dark*; whereof I think every Man hath Experience, (but they most of all, who are *timorous* or *superstitious*) are Examples of the same. And these, for Distinction-sake, may be called *Phantasms*.

6. By the *Senses*, which are numbred according to the *Organs* to be *five*, we take Notice (as hath been said already) of the Objects *without* us; and that Notice is our *Conception* thereof: but we take Notice also some Way or other of *our Conceptions*: for when the Conception of the same Thing cometh *again*, we take Notice that is *again*; that is to say, that we have had the same Conception *before*; which is as much as to imagine a Thing *past*; which is impossible to the *Sense*, which is only of Things *present*. This therefore may be accounted a *Sixth Sense*, but *internal*, (not *external*, as the rest) and is commonly called *Remembrance*.

7. For the *Manner* by which we take Notice of a Conception *past*, we are to remember, that in the *Definition* of *Imagination*, it is said to be a Conception by *little* and *little* *decaying*, or growing

growing more *obscure*. An *obscure* Conception is that which representeth the *whole Object* together, but *none* of the *smaller Parts* by themselves; and as *more* or *fewer* Parts be represented, so is the Conception or Representation said to be *more* or *less* clear. Seeing then the *Conception*, which when it was *first* produced by Sense, was *clear*, and represented the *Parts* of the Object *distinctly*; and when it cometh *again* is *obscure*, we find *missing* somewhat that we expected; by which we judge it *past* and *decayed*. For Example, a Man that is present in a Foreign City, seeth not only *whole* Streets, but can also distinguish particular *Houses*, and *Parts* of Houses; but departed thence, he cannot distinguish them so particularly in his Mind as he did, some *House* or *Turning* escaping him: yet is this to *remember*; when *afterwards* there escape him *more* Particulars, this is also to *remember*, but *not* so well. In Process of Time, the *Image* of the City *returneth* but as a *Mass* of Building *only*, which is *almost* to have *forgotten* it. Seeing then Remembrance is *more* or *less*, as we find more or less *Obscurity*, Why may not we well think *Remembrance* to be nothing else but the *missing* of *Parts*, which every man expecteth should succeed after they have a Conception of the Whole? To see at a great Distance of Place, and to remember at great Distance of Time, is to have like Conceptions of the Thing: for there wanteth Distinction of Parts in both; the one Conception being weak by Operation at Distance, the other by Decay.

8. And from this that hath been said, there followeth, That a Man can *never know* he *dreameth*; he *may* dream he *doubteth*, whether it be a Dream or no: but the Clearness of the Imagination representeth every Thing with as many Parts as doth Sense it self, and consequently, he can take Notice of nothing but as present; whereas to think he dreameth, is to think those his Conceptions, that is to say, obscurer than they were in the Sense: so that he must think them both as clear, and not as clear as Sense; which is impossible.

9. From the same Ground it proceedeth, that Men *wonder not* in their Dreams at Place and Persons, as they would do waking: for waking, a Man would think it strange to be in a Place where he never was before, and remember nothing of how he came there; but in a Dream, there cometh little of that kind into Consideration. The *Clearness* of Conception in a Dream, taketh away *Distrust*, unless the *Strangeness* be *excessive*, as to think himself fallen from on high without hurt, and then most commonly he *waketh*.

10. Nor is it *possible* for a Man to be so far deceived, as when his Dream is *past*, to think it real: for if he dream of such Things as are ordinarily in his Mind, and in such Order as he useth to do waking, and withal that he laid him down to sleep in the Place where he findeth himself when he awaketh; all which may happen: I know no *Keimark* or Mark by which he can discern whether it were a Dream or not, and therefore do the less wonder to hear a Man sometimes to tell his Dream for a Truth, or to take it for a Vision.

CHAP. IV.

1. *Discourse.*
2. *The Cause of Coherence of Thoughts.*
3. *Ranging.*
4. *Sagacity.*
5. *Reminiscence.*
6. *Experience.*
7. *Expectation.*
8. *Conjecture.*
9. *Signs.*
10. *Prudence.*
11. *Caveats of concluding from Experience.*

1. **T**HE *Succession* of Conceptions in the Mind; Series or Consequence of one after another, may be *casual* and incoherent, as in Dreams for the most part; and it may be *orderly*, as when the former Thought introduceth the latter; and this is *Discourse* of the Mind. But because the Word *Discourse* is commonly taken for the *Coherence* and Consequence of Words; I will, to avoid *Aequivocation*, call it *Discursion*.

2. The *Cause* of the *Coherence* or Consequence of one Conception to another, is their first *Coherence* or Consequence at that *Time* when they are produced by Sense: As for Example; from St. *Andrew* the Mind runneth to St. *Peter*, because their Names are read together; from

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S. *Peter* to a *Stone*, for the same Cause; from *Stone* to *Foundation*, because we see them together; and for the same Cause, from *Foundation* to *Church*, and from *Church* to *People*, and from *People* to *Formula*; and according to this Example, the Mind may run almost from any Thing to any Thing. But as in the *Sense* the Conception of Cause and Effect may succeed one another; so may they after *Sense* in the *Imagination*: And for the most part they do so; the Cause whereof is the *Appetite* of them, who, having a Conception of the *End*, have next unto it a Conception of the next *Means* to that *End*; As, when a Man, from a Thought of *Honour* to which he hath an *Appetite*, cometh to the Thought of *Wisdom*, which is the next *Means* thereunto; and from thence to the Thought of *Study*, which is the next *Means* to *Wisdom*.

3. To omit that kind of *Discurfion* by which we proceed from any Thing to any Thing, there are of the other Kind divers Sorts: As first, in the *Senses* there are certain Coherences of Conceptions, which we may call *ranging*: Examples whereof are; A Man casteth his *Eye* upon the *Ground*, to look about for some small Thing lost; the *Hounds* casting about at a Fault in hunting; and the *Ranging* of *Spaniels*: and herein we take a Beginning arbitrary.

4. Another sort of *Discurfion* is, when the *Appetite* giveth a Man his Beginning, as in the Example before, where *Honour* to which a Man hath *Appetite*, maketh him think upon the next *Means* of attaining it, and that again of the next, &c. And this the Latines call *Sagacitas*, and

and We may call *Hunting* or *Tracing* ; as Dogs trace Beasts by the Smell, and Men hunt them by their Footsteps ; or as Men hunt after Riches, Place, or Knowledge.

5. There is yet another Kind of Discursion beginning with the Appetite to *recover* something lost, proceeding from the *present backward*, from Thought of the Place where we *miss* at, to the Thought of the Place from whence we came *last* ; and from the Thought of that , to the Thought of a Place *before*, till we have in our Mind some Place, wherein we had the Thing we miss : and this is called *Reminiscence*.

6. The *Remembrance* of Succession of one Thing to another, that is, of what was *antecedent*, and what *consequent* , and what *concomitant* , is called an *Experiment* ; whether the same be made by us *voluntarily*, as when a Man putteth any Thing into the Fire, to see what Effect the Fire will produce upon it : or *not* made by us, as when we remember a fair Morning after a red Evening. To have had many *Experiments*, is that we call *Experience*, which is nothing else but *Remembrance* of what Antecedents have been followed by what Consequents.

7. No man can have in his Mind a Conception of the *future* ; for the future is *not yet* : but of our Conceptions of the *past*, we make a *future* ; or rather, call *past*, *future* relatively. Thus after a Man hath been accustomed to see like Antecedents follow by like Consequents , whensoever he seeth the like come to pass to any Thing he had seen before, he looks there should follow it the same that followed then :

As for Example, because a Man hath often seen Offences followed by Punishment, when he seeth an Offence in present, he thinketh Punishment to be consequent thereto; but consequent unto that which is present, Men call future: And thus we make *Remembrance* to be the *Prevision* of Things to come, or *Expectation* or *Presumption* of the future.

8. In the same Manner, if a Man seeth in present that which he hath seen before, he thinks that that which was antecedent to that which he saw before, is also antecedent to that he presently seeth: As for Example, He that hath seen the Ashes remain after the Fire, and now again seeth ashes, concludeth again there hath been Fire: And this is called again *Conjecture* of the past, or *Presumption* of the Fact.

9. When a Man hath so often observed like Antecedents to be followed by like Consequents, that *whenever* he seeth the Antecedent, he looketh again for the Consequent; or when he seeth the Consequent, maketh account there hath been the like Antecedent; then he calleth both the Antecedent and the Consequent, *Signs* one of another, as Clouds are Signs of Rain to come, and Rain of Clouds past.

10. This taking of Signs by *Experience*, is that wherein Men do ordinarily think, the Difference stands between Man and Man in *Wisdom*, by which they commonly understand a Mans whole Ability or *Power cognitive*; but this is an *Error*: for the Signs are but *conjectural*; and according as they have often or seldom failed, so their *Assurance* is more or less; but *never full* and *evident*: for though a Man have always seen the

the Day and Night to follow one another hitherto; yet can he not thence conclude they shall do so, or that they have done so eternally: *Experience concludeth nothing universally.* If the Signs hit twenty times for one missing, a Man may lay a Wager of Twenty to One of the Event; but may not conclude it for a Truth. But by this it is plain, that they shall *conjecture best*, that have *most Experience*, because they have most Signs to conjecture by; which is the Reason *old Men* are *more prudent*, that is, conjecture better, *ceteris paribus*, than young: for, being old, they remember more; and Experience is but remembrance. And *men of quick* imagination, *ceteris paribus*, are *more prudent* than those whose Imaginations are flow: for they observe *more* in *less* Time. Prudence is nothing but Conjecture from Experience, or taking of Signs from Experience warily, that is, that the Experiments from which he taketh such Signs be all remembered; for else the Cases are not alike that seem so.

11. As in Conjecture concerning things past and future, it is Prudence to conclude from Experience, what is like to come to pass, or to have passed already; so it is an error to conclude from it, that *it is* so or so *called*; that is to say, We cannot from Experience conclude, that any Thing is to be called *just* or *unjust*, *true* or *false*, or any Proposition *universal* whatsoever, except it be from Remembrance of the Use of Names imposed arbitrarily by Men: For Example, to have heard a Sentence given in the like Case, the like Sentence a thousand times is

not enough to conclude that the Sentence is just; though most Men have no other Means to conclude by: But it is *necessary*, for the drawing of such Conclusion, to *trace* and *find out*, by many Experiences, what Men do mean by calling Things just and unjust. Further, there is another *Caveat* to be taken in concluding by Experience, from the tenth Section of the second Chapter; that is, That we conclude such Things to be without, that are within us.

CHAP.

CHAP. V.

1. *Of Marks.*
2. *Names or Appellations.*
3. *Names positive and privative.*
4. *Advantage of Names maketh us capable of Science.*
5. *Names universal and singular.*
6. *Universals not in Rerum Natura.*
7. *Equivocal Names.*
8. *Understanding.*
9. *Affirmation, Negation, Proposition.*
10. *Truth, Falsity.*
11. *Ratiocination.*
12. *According to Reason, against Reason.*
13. *Names Causes of Knowledge, so of Error.*
14. *Translation of the Discourse of the Mind into the Discourse of the Tongue, and of the Errors thence proceeding.*

1. **S**EEING the *Succession* of Conceptions in the *Mind* are caused, as hath been said before, by the *Succession* they *had* one to another when they were produced by the *Senses*, and that there is no Conception that hath not bin produced immediately before or after innumerable others, by the innumerable Acts of Sense; it must needs follow, that one Conception followeth *not* another, according to our *Election*, and the need we have of them, *but* as it *chanceth* us to hear or see such Things as shall bring them to our Mind.

The Experience we have hereof, is in such Brute Beasts, which, having the providence to hide the Remains and Superfluity of their Meat, do nevertheless want the Remembrance of the Place where they hide it, and thereby make no Benefit thereof in their Hunger: but Man, who in this Point beginneth to rank himself somewhat above the Nature of Beasts, hath observed and remembered the Cause of this Defect, and to amend the same, hath imagined or devised to set up a visible or other sensible Mark, the which, when he seeth it again, may bring to his Mind the Thought he had when he set it up. A *Mark* therefore is a *sensible Object* which a Man erecteth voluntarily to himself, to the End to remember thereby somewhat past, when the same is objected to his Sense again: As men that have past by a Rock at Sea, set up some Mark, thereby to remember their former Danger, and avoid it.

2. In the Number of these *Marks*, are those *Humane Voices*, which we call the *Names* or Appellations of Things sensible by the Ear, by which we recall into our Mind some Conceptions of the Things to which we gave those Names or Appellations; as the Appellation *White* bringeth to remembrance the Quality of such Objects as produce that Colour or Conception in us. A *Name* or Appellation therefore is the *Voice* of a Man arbitrary, imposed for a *Mark* to bring into his Mind some Conception concerning the thing on which it is imposed.

3. Things named, are either the *Objects* themselves, as a Man; or the *Conception* it self that we have

have of Man, as Shape and Motion: or some Privation, which is when we conceive that there is something which we conceive not, in him; as when we conceive he is not just, not finite, we give him the Name of unjust, of infinite, which signifie Privation or Defect; and to the Privations themselves we give the Names of Injustice and Infiniteness: so that here be *Two Sorts* of Names; One of *Things*, in which we conceive something; or of the Conceptions themselves, which are called *positive*: the other of Things wherein we conceive *Privation* or Defect, and those Names are called *Privative*.

4. By the Advantage of *Names* it is that we are capable of *Science*, which Beasts, for want of them are not; nor Man, without the Use of them: for as a Beast misseeth not one or two out of many her young Ones, for want of those Names of order, One, Two, and Three, and which we call *Number*; so neither would a Man, without repeating orally or mentally the Words of Number, know how many Pieces of Money or other Things lie before him.

5. Seeing there be *many* Conceptions of *one* and the same Thing, and for *every* Conception we give it a *several* Name; it followeth that for one and the same Thing, we have many Names or Attributes; as to the same Man we give the Appellations of *Just*, *Valiant*, &c. for divers *Vertues*; of *Strong*, *Comely*, &c. for divers *Qualities* of the *Body*. And again, because from divers Things we receive like Conceptions, many Things must needs have the same Appellation: as to all Things we see, we give the same Name of *Visible*; and

to all Things we see moveable, we give the Appellation of *Moveable*: and those Names we give to many, are called *universal* to them all; as the Name of Man to every particular of Mankind: such Appellation as we give to one only Thing, we call *individual*, or *singular*; as *Socrates*, and other proper Names: or, by Circumlocution, he that writ the *Iliads*, for *Homer*.

6. The Universality of one Name to many Things, hath been the Cause that Men think the Things are themselves universal; and so seriously contend, that besides *Peter* and *John*, and all the rest of the Men that are, have been, or shall be in the World, there is yet something else that we call *Man*, viz. *Man in general*, deceiving themselves, by taking the universal, or general Appellation, for the thing it signifieth: For if one should desire the Painter to make him the Picture of a Man, which is as much as to say, of a Man in general; he meaneth no more, but that the Painter should chuse what Man he pleaseth to draw, which must needs be some of them that are, or have been, or may be, none of which are *universal*. But when he would have him to draw the Picture of the King, or any particular Person, he limiteth the Painter to that one Person he chuseth. It is plain therefore, that there is nothing *universal* but Names; which are therefore called *indefinite*; because we limit them not ourselves, but leave them to be applied by the Hearer: whereas a singular Name is limited and restrained to one of the many Things it signifieth; as when we say, This Man, pointing to him, or giving him his proper Name, or by some such other Way.

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7. The Appellations that be *universal*, and common to many Things, are *not* always given to all the *particulars*, (as they ought to be) for like Conceptions, and like Considerations in them all; which is the Cause that many of them are *not* of *constant* Signification, but bring into our Mind other Thoughts than these for which they were ordained, and those are called *equivocal*. As for Example, the Word Faith signifieth the same with Belief; sometimes it signifieth particularly that Belief which maketh a Christian; and sometime it signifieth the keeping of a Promise. Also all *Metaphors* are by Profession *equivocal*: and there is scarce any Word that is not made *equivocal* by divers Contextures of Speech, or by Diversity of Pronunciation and Gesture.

8. This *Equivocation* of Names maketh it *difficult* to recover those Conceptions for which the Name was ordained; and that not only in the Language of other Men, wherein we are to consider the *Drift* and *Occasion*, and *Contexture* of the Speech, as well as the *Words* themselves; but also in our Discourse, which being derived from the Custom and common Use of Speech, representeth unto us not our own Conceptions. It is therefore a great Ability in a Man, out of the Words, Contexture, and other Circumstances of Language, to deliver himself from *Equivocation*, and to find out the true Meaning of what it said: And this is it we call *Understanding*.

9. Of two *Appellations*, by the Help of this little Verb *is*, or something equivalent, we make
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an *Affirmation* or *Negation*, either of which in the Schools we call also a *Proposition*, and consisteth of two Appellations joyned together by the said Verb *is*: As for Example, Man is a living creature; or thus, Man is not righteous: whereof the former is called an *Affirmation*, because the Appellation, Living Creature is *Positive*; the latter a *Negative*, because not righteous is *Privative*.

10. In every *Proposition*, be it Affirmative or Negative, the latter Appellation either comprehendeth the former, as in this Proposition, Charity is a Vertue, the Name of Vertue comprehendeth the Name of Charity, and many other Vertues beside; and then is the Proposition said to be *true*, or *Truth*: For, *Truth*, and a *true Proposition*, is all one. Or *else* the latter Appellation comprehendeth *not* the former: as in this Proposition, Every Man is just; the name of Just comprehendeth not Every Man; for Unjust is the Name of the far greater Part of Men: And the Proposition is said to be *false*, or *Falsity*: *Falsity* and a *false Proposition* being also the same Thing.

11. In what manner of two Propositions, whether *both* Affirmative, or *one* Affirmative, the *other* Negative, is made a *Syllogism*, I forbear to write. All this that hath been said of Names or Propositions, though *necessary*, is but *dry* Discourse: and this Place is not for the whole Art of Logick, which if I enter further into, I ought to pursue: Besides, it is not needfull; for there be few Men which have not so much natural Logick,

Logick, as thereby to discern well enough, whether any Conclusion I shall make in this Discourse hereafter, be well or ill collected: Only thus much I say in this Place, that *Making of Syllogisms* is that we call *Ratiocination* or *Reasoning*.

12. Now when a man *reasoneth* from *Principles* that are *found* indubitable by Experience, all Deceptions of Sense and Equivocation of Words avoided, the Conclusion he maketh is said to be *according to right Reason*: But when from his Conclusion a Man may, by good Ratiocination, derive that which is *contradictory* to any evident Truth whatsoever, then he is said to have concluded *against Reason*: And such a Conclusion is called *Absurdity*.

13. As the *Invention* of *Names* hath been necessary for the drawing Men out of Ignorance, by calling to their Remembrance the necessary *Coherence* of one Conception to another; so also hath it on the other side precipitated Men into *Error*: Inasmuch, that whereas by the Benefit of *Words* and Ratiocination they exceed *brute Beasts* in Knowledge, and the Commodities that accompany the same; so they exceed them also in *Error*: For, *true* and *false* are Things not incident to Beasts, because they adhere not to Propositions and Language; nor have they Ratiocination, whereby to multiply one Untruth by another, as Men have.

14. It is the *Nature* almost of every *Corporal* Thing, being often moved in one and the same Manner, to receive continually a *greater* and *greater Easiness* and Aptitude to the same Motion, in-
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ſomuch as in Time the ſame becometh ſo *habitual*, that, to *beget* it, there needs no more than to *begin* it. The *Paſſions* of Man, as they are the Beginning of *voluntary* Motions; ſo are they the Beginning of *Speech*, which is the Motion of the Tongue. And Men deſiring to ſhew others the Knowledge, Opinions, Conceptions and Paſſions which are in themſelves, and to that End having invented *Language*, have by that Means transferred all that *Diſcuſſion* of their *Mind* mentioned in the former Chapter, by the *Motion* of their *Tongues*, into *Diſcourſe* of *Words*: And *Ratio* now is but *Oratio*, for the moſt part, wherein Cuſtom hath ſo great a Power, that the Mind ſuggeſteth only the firſt Word; the reſt follow *habitually*, and are not followed by the Mind; as it is with Beggars, when they ſaw their *Pater noſter*, putting together ſuch Words, and in ſuch manner, as in their Education they have learned from their Nurſes, from their Companies, or from their Teachers, having *no Images* or *Conceptions* in their Mind, answering to the Words they ſpeak: and as they have learned themſelves, ſo they teach Poſterity. Now if we conſider the Power of thoſe *Deceptions* of the Senſe, mentioned Chap. 2. Sect. 10 and alſo how *unconſtantly* Names have been ſetled, and how ſubject they are to *Equivocation*, and how *diverſified* by *Paſſion*, (ſcarce two Men agreeing what is to be called Good, and what Evil; what Liberality, what Prodigality; what Valour, what Temerity) and how ſubject Men are to Paralogiſm or Fallacy in Reasoning, I may in a Manner conclude, that

that it is impossible to *rectifie* so many Errours of any one Man, as must needs proceed from those Causes, without beginning *a-new* from the very first Grounds of all our Knowledge and Sense; and instead of Books, reading over orderly ones own Conceptions: In which Meaning, I take *Nosce teipsum* for a Precept worthy the Reputation it hath gotten.

CHAP.

CHAP. VI

1. *Of the two Kinds of Knowledge*
2. *Truth and Evidence necessary to Knowledge.*
3. *Evidence defined.*
4. *Science defined.*
5. *Supposition defined.*
6. *Opinion defined.*
7. *Belief defined.*
8. *Conscience defined.*
9. *Belief, in some Cases, no less from Doubt than Knowledge.*

1. **T**HERE is a Story somewhere, of one that pretends to have been miraculously cured of Blindness (wherewith he was born) by St. *Albane* or other Saints, at the Town of St. *Albans*; and that the Duke of *Glocester* being there, to be satisfied of the Truth of the Miracle, asked the Man, What Colour is this? Who, by answering, It was Green, discovered himself, and was punished for a Counterfeit: for though by his Sight newly received he might distinguish between Green, and Red, and all other Colours, as well as any that should interrogate him, yet he could not possibly know at first Sight which of them was called Green, or Red, or by any other Name. By this we may understand, there be *two Kinds* of Knowledge, whereof the *one* is nothing else but

but *Sense*, or Knowledge *original*, as I have said in the Beginning of the second Chapter, and *Remembrance* of the same; the *other* is called *Science* or Knowledge of the *Truth of Propositions*, and how Things are called; and is derived from *Understanding*. Both of these Sorts are but *Experience*; The former being the Experience of the Effects of Things that work upon us from *without*; and the latter Experience Men have from the proper Use of *Names* in Language: and all Experience being, as I have said, but Remembrance, all Knowledge is Remembrance: and of the *former*, the Register we keep in Books, is called *History*; But the Registers of the *latter* are called the *Sciences*.

2. There are *two Things* necessarily implied in this Word *Knowledge*; the one is *Truth*, the other *Evidence*: for what is not Truth, can never be known. For, let a Man say he knoweth a Thing never so well, if the same shall afterwards appear false, he is driven to Confession, that it was not Knowledge, but Opinion. Likewise, if the Truth be not evident, though a Man holdeth it, yet is his Knowledge thereof no more than theirs who hold the contrary: for if Truth were enough to make it Knowledge, all Truth were known; which is not so.

3. What *Truth* is, hath been defined in the *precedent* Chapter; What *Evidence* is, I now set down: and it is the Concomitance of a Mans *Conception* with the *Words* that signify such Conception in the Act of Ratiocination: for when a Man reasoneth with his Lips only, to which the

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Mind suggesteth only the Beginning, and followeth not the Words of his Mouth with the Conceptions of his Mind, out of Custom of so speaking; though he begin his Ratiocination with True Propositions, and proceed with certain Syllogisms, and thereby make always true Conclusions; yet are not his Conclusions *evident* to him, for Want of the *Concomitance* of *Conception* with his Words: for if the Words alone were sufficient, a *Parrot* might be taught as well to know Truth, as to speak it. Evidence is to Truth, as the Sap to the Tree, which, so far as it creepeth along with Body and Branches, keepeth them alive; where it forsaketh them, they die: for this Evidence, which is Meaning with our Words, is the Life of Truth.

4. Knowledge therefore which we call *Science*, I define to be *Evidence of Truth*, from some Beginning or Principle of *Sense*: for the Truth of a Proposition is never evident, until we conceive the Meaning of the Words or Terms whereof it consisteth, which are always Conceptions of the Mind: Nor can we remember those Conceptions, without the Thing that produced the same by our Senses. The *first* Principle of Knowledge is, that we have such and such *Conceptions*; the *second*, that we have thus and thus *named* the Things whereof they are Conceptions; the *third* is, that we have *joyned* those *Names* in such Manner as to make true Propositions; the *fourth* and last is, that we have *joyned* those *Propositions* in such Manner as they be concluding, and the Truth of the Conclusion said to be known. And of these two Kinds of Knowledge, where-
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of the former is *Experience of Faish*, and the later of *Evidence of Truth*; as the former, if it be great, is called *Prudence*; so the latter, if it be much, hath usually been called, both by Ancient and Modern Writers, *Sapience* or *Wisdom*: and of this latter, *Man* only is capable; of the former, *brute Beasts* also participate.

5. A Proposition is said to be *supposed*, when, being *not evident*, it is nevertheless *admitted for a Time*, to the End, that, joyning to it other Propositions, we may *conclude* something; and to *proceed* from Conclusion to Conclusion, for a *Trial* whether the same will lead us into any *absurd* or impossible Conclusion; which if it *do*, then we know such Supposition to have been false.

6. But if, running thorow *many* Conclusions, we come to *none* that are *absurd*, then we think the Proposition *probable*: likewise we think probable whatsoever Proposition we *admit* for Truth by Error of Reasoning, or from trusting to other Men: And all such Propositions as are admitted by *Trust* or error, we are not said to *know*, but *think* them to be true; and the Admittance of them is called *Opinion*.

7. And particularly, when the Opinion is admitted out of *Trust* to other Men, they are said to *believe* it; and their Admittance of it is called *Belief*, and sometimes *Faish*.

8. It is either *Science* or *Opinion* which we commonly mean by the Word *Conscience*: for Men say that such and such a thing is true in or upon their Conscience; which they *never* do, when they think it *doubtful*; and therefore they *know*, or *think* they know it to be true. But Men, when

they say Things upon their Conscience, are not therefore presumed certainly to know the Truth of what they say: It remaineth then, that that Word is used by them that have an *Opinion*, not only of the *Truth* of the Thing, but also of their *Knowledge* of it, to which the *Truth* of the Proposition is consequent. *Conscience* I therefore define to be *Opinion of Evidence*.

9. *Belief*, which is the admitting of Propositions upon *Trust*, in many Cases is no less free from *Doubt*, than perfect and manifest *Knowledge*: for as there is nothing whereof there is not some Cause; so, when there is *Doubt*, there must be some Cause thereof conceived. Now there be many Things which we receive from *Report of others*, of which it is impossible to imagine any Cause of *Doubt*: for what can be opposed against the Consent of all Men, in Things they can know, and have no Cause to report otherwise than they are, (such as is great Part of our *Histories*) unless a Man would say that all the World had conspired to deceive him. And thus much of *Sense*, *Imagination*, *Discursion*, *Ratiocination*, and *Knowledge*, which are the Acts of our *Power cognitive*, or *conceptive*. That Power of the *Mind* which we call *motive*, differeth from the Power *motive* of the *Body*: for the Power *motive* of the *Body* is that by which it *moveth other Bodies*, and we call *Strength*; but the Power *motive* of the *Mind*, is that by which the *Mind* giveth *animal Motion* to that *Body* wherein it existeth: the Acts hereof are our *Affections* and *Passions*, of which I am to speak in general.

C H A P. VII.

*Of Delight, Pain, Love, Hatred.**Appetite, Aversion, Fear.**Good, Evil, Pulchritude, Turpitude.**End, Fruition.**Profitable, Use, Vain.**Felicity.**Good and Evil mixt**Sensual Delight, and Pain; Joy and Grief.*

IN the eighth Section of the second Chapter is shewed, that *Conceptions* and *Apparitions* are nothing really, but *Motion* in some internal Substance of the *Head*; which Motion *not stopping* there, but proceeding to the *Heart*, of Necessity must there either *help* or *hinder* the Motion which is called *Vital*: when it *helpeth*, it is called *Delight*, *Contentment*, or *Pleasure*, which is nothing really but Motion about the *Heart*, as *Conception* is nothing but Motion in the *Head*; and the *Objects* that cause it are called *pleasant* or *delightful*, or by some Name equivalent; The *Latines* have *Jucundum*, à *juvando*, from helping; and the same *Delight*, with Reference to the *Object*, is called *Love*: but when such Motion *weakeneth* or *hindereth* the vital Motion, then it is called *Pain*; and in Relation to that which causeth it, *Hatred*, which the *Latines* express

sometimes by *Odium*, and sometimes by *Tadium*.

2. This Motion in which consisteth *Pleasure* or *Pain*, is also a *Solicitation* or Provocation either to draw *near* to the Thing that pleaseth, or to *retire* from the Thing that displeaseth; and this Solicitation is the *Endeavour* or internal Beginning of *animal* Motion, which when the Object *delighteth*, is called *Appetite*; when it *displeaseth*, it is called *Aversion*, in Respect of the Displeasure *present*; but in Respect of the Displeasure *expected*, *Fear*. So that *Pleasure*, *Love*, and *Appetite*, which is also called *Desire*, are *divers Names* for divers Considerations of the *same Thing*.

3. Every Man, for his own Part, calleth that which *pleaseth*, and is delightful to himself, *Good*; and that *Evil* which *displeaseth* him: inasmuch that while every Man *differeth* from other in *Constitution*, they differ also from one another concerning the common Distinction of Good and Evil. Nor is there any such Thing as Absolute Goodness, considered without Relation: for even the Goodness which we apprehend in God Almighty, is *his Goodness to us*. And as we call *Good* and *Evil* the *Things* that please and displease; so call we *Goodness* and *Badness*, the *Qualities* or Powers whereby they do it: And the Signs of that Goodness are called by the *Latines* in one Word *Pulchritudo*, and the Signs of Evil, *Turpitude*; to which we have no Words precisely answerable.

4. As all Conceptions we have immediately by the *Sense*, are, *Delight*, or *Pain*, or *Appetite*, or *Fear*; so are all the *Imaginations* after *Sense*. But as they are weaker *Imaginations*, so are they also weaker *Pleasures*, or weaker *Pain*.

5. As

5. As *Appetite* is the Beginning of *animal* Motions towards something that pleaseth us; so is the *attaining* thereof, the *End* of that Motion, which we also call the *Scope*, and *Aim*, and final Cause of the same: and when we attain that End, the Delight we have thereby is called the *Fruition*: So that *Bonnum* and *Finis* are different Names, but for different Considerations of the same Thing.

6. And of *Ends*, some of them are called *pro-pinqui*, that is, near at hand; others *remoti*, far off: but when the Ends that be nearer attaining, be compared with those that be further off, they are called not Ends, but *Means*, and the *Way* to those. But for an *utmost* End, in which the ancient *Philosophers* have placed *Felicity*, and disputed much concerning the Way thereto, there is no such Thing in this World, nor Way to it, more than to *Utopia*: for while we live, we have Desires, and Desire presupposeth a further End. Those Things which please us, as the Way or *Means* to a further End, we call *profitable*; and the *Fruition* of them, *Use*; and those Things that profit not, *vain*.

7. Seeing all *Delight* is *Appetite*, and presupposeth a further End, there can be no Contentment but in *proceeding*: and therefore we are not to marvel, when we see, that as Men attain to more Riches, Honour, or other Power; so their Appetite continually groweth more and more; and when they are come to the utmost Degree of some Kind of Power, they pursue some other, as long as in any Kind they think themselves behind any other: of those therefore that have attained to

the highest Degree of Honour and Riches, some have affected Mastery in some Art; as *Nero* in Musick and Poetry, *Commodus* in the Art of a Gladiator; and such as affect not some such Thing, must find Diversion and Recreation of their Thoughts in the Contention either of Play or Business: and Men justly complain of a great Grief, that they know not what to do. *Felicity* therefore, by which we mean continual Delight, consisteth not in *having prospered*, but in *prospering*.

8. There are few Things in this World, but either have *Mixture* of Good and Evil, or there is a Chain of them so necessarily linked together, that the one cannot be taken without the other: As for Example, the Pleasures of Sin, and the Bitterness of Punishment, are inseparable; as is also Labour and Honour, for the most part. Now when in the *whole Chain*, the *greater Part* is good, the *Whole* is called *Good*; and when the *Evil* overweigheth, the *Whole* is called *Evil*.

9. There are two Sorts of Pleasure, whereof the *one* seemeth to affect the *corporeal* Organ of the Sense, and that I call *sensual*; the *greatest Part* whereof, is that by which we are invited to give Continuance to our *Species*; and the *next*, by which a Man is invited to Meat, for the Preservation of his *individual* Person: The *other Sort* of Delight is not particular to any Part of the Body, and is called The Delight of the *Mind*, and is that which we call *joy*. Likewise of *Pains*, some affect the *Body*, and are therefore called the *Pains* of the Body; and some *not*, and those are called *Grief*.

C H A P. VIII.

- 1, 2. *Wherein consist the Pleasures of Sense.*
- 3, 4. *Of the Imagination, or Conception of Power in Man.*
5. *Honour, honourable, Worth.*
6. *Signs of Honour.*
7. *Reverence.*

1. **H**AVING in the first Section of the precedent Chapter presupposed, that Motion and *Agitation of the Brain* which we call Conception, to be continued to the *Heart*, and there to be called *Passion*; I have therefore obliged my self, as far forth as I am able, to search out and declare from what Conception proceedeth every one of those *Passions* which we commonly take notice of: for, seeing the Things that please and displease, are innumerable, and work innumerable Ways, Men have not taken notice but of a very few, which also are many of them without Name.

2. And first, we are to consider, that of Conceptions there are *three Sorts*, whereof one is of that which is *present*, which is *Sense*; another, of that which is *past*, which is *Remembrance*; and the third, of that which is *future*, which we call *Expectation*: all which have been manifestly declared in the second and third Chapters; and every

every of these Conceptions is *Pleasure* or *Pain present*. And first for the Pleasures of the *Body* which affect the Sense of *Touch* and *Taft*, as far forth as they be *Organical*, their Conceptions are *Sense*: so also is the Pleasure of all *Exonerations* of *Nature*: All which Passions I have before named, *Sensual Pleasures*; and their contrary, *Sensual Pains*: to which also may be added the Pleasures and Displeasures of *Odours*, if any of them shall be found *Organical*, which for the most Part they are not, as appeareth by this Experience which every Man hath, that the same Smells, when they seem to proceed from others, displease, though they proceed from our selves; but when we think they proceed from our selves, they displease not, though they come from others: the Displeasure of this is a Conception of Hurt thereby from those Odours, as being unwholesom, and is therefore a Conception of Evil to come, and not present. Concerning the Delight of *Hearing*, it is diverse, and the Organ it self not affected thereby: *Simple Sounds* please by *Equality*, as the Sound of a Bell or Lute: inso much as it seems, an Equality continued by the Percussion of the Object upon the Ear, is Pleasure; the Contrary is called *Harshness*, such as is Grating, and some other Sounds, which do not always affect the Body, but only sometime, and that with a Kind of Horrour beginning at the Teeth. *Harmony*, or many Sounds together agreeing, please by the same Reason as the *Unison*, which is the Sound of equal Strings equally stretched. Sounds that differ in any *Height*, please by *Inequality* and *Equality alternate*, that is to say, the higher

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Note striketh twice, for one Stroke of the other, whereby they strike together every second Time ; as is well proved by *Galileo*, in the first Dialogue concerning local Motion : where he also sheweth, that two Sounds differing a *fifth*, delight the Ear by an *Equality* of striking *after two Inequalities* ; for the higher Note striketh the Ear thrice, while the other strikes but twice. In like Manner he sheweth wherein consisteth the Pleasure of Concord, and the Displeasure of Discord, in other Difference of Notes. There is yet *another* Pleasure and Displeasure of Sounds, which consisteth in *Consequence of one Note after another, diversified* both by *Accent* and *Measure* ; whereof that which pleaseth is called *Air* ; but for what Reason Succession in Tone and Measure is more Air than another, I confess I know not ; but I conjecture the Reason to be, for that some of them imitate and revive some Passion which otherwise we take no Notice of, and the other not ; for *no Air pleaseth but for a time*, no more doth Imitation. Also the Pleasures of the *Eye* consist in a certain *Equality of Colour* : for *Light*, the most glorious of all Colours, is made by *equal* Operation of the Object ; whereas *Colour* is *perturbed*, that is to say, unequal Light, as hath been said, *Chap. 2. Sect. 8.* And therefore Colours, the more Equality is in them, the more resplendent they are : and as *Harmony* is pleasurable to the *Ear*, which consisteth of *divers Sounds* ; so perhaps may some Mixture of *divers Colours* be *Harmony* to the *Eye*, more than another Mixture. There is yet another Delight by the *Ear*, which happeneth onely to Men of skill in Musick, which is of another Nature, (and
not

not as these) Conception of the present, but rejoycing of their own Skill; of which nature are the Passions of which I am to speak next.

3. Conception of the *future*, is but a *Supposition* of the *same*, proceeding from *Remembrance* of what is past; and we so far *conceive* that any Thing *will be hereafter*, as we *know* there is *something at the present* that hath Power to produce it: and that any Thing hath Power now to produce another Thing hereafter, we cannot conceive, but by Remembrance that it hath produced the like heretofore. Wherefore all Conception of future, is Conception of Power able to produce something. Whosoever therefore expecteth Pleasure to come, must conceive withal some Power in himself by which the same may be attained. And because the Passions, whereof I am to speak next, consist in Conception of the future, that is to say, in Conception of Power past, and the Act to come; before I go any further, I must in the next Place speak somewhat concerning this Power.

4. By this Power I mean the same with the Faculties of the *Body*, *Nutritive*, *Generative*, *Motive*, and of the *Mind*, *Knowledge*; and besides these, such *further* Power as by them is acquired, *viz.* *Riches*, *Place of Authority*, *Friendship* or *Favour*, and *Good Fortune*; which last is really nothing else but the Favour of God Almighty. The *Contraries* of these are *Impotencies*, *Infirmities*, or *Defects* of the said Powers respectively. And because the Power of one Man resisteth and hindereth the Effects of the Power of another, *Power* simply is no more, but the *Excess* of the Power of one above that of another: for equal Powers opposed,

posed, destroy one another; and such their Opposition is called Contention.

5. The *Signs* by which we know our own *Power*, are those *Actions* which proceed from the same; and the *Signs* by which *other Men* know it, are such *Actions*, *Gesture*, *Countenance* and *Speech*, as usually such *Powers* produce: and the *Acknowledgements* of *Power* is called *Honour*; and to honour a *Man* inwardly, is to conceive or acknowledge that that *Man* hath the odds or Excess of that *Power* above him with whom he contendeth or compareth himself. And honourable are those *Signs* for which one *Man* acknowledgeth *Power* or Excess above his Concurrent in another: As for Example, *Beauty* of *Person*, consisting in a lively Aspect of the *Countenance*, and other *Signs* of *Natural Heat*, are honourable, being *Signs* precedent of *Power generative*, and much Issue; as also, general Reputation among those of the other Sex, because *Signs* consequent of the same. And *Actions* proceeding from *Strength of Body*, and open Force, are honourable, as *Signs* consequent of *Power motive*, such as are *Victory* in *Battel* or *Duel*; *A d'avoir tué son homme*. Also to adventure upon great *Exploits* and *Danger*, as being a *Sign* consequent of *Opinion* of our own *Strength*, and that *Opinion* a *Sign* of the *Strength* it self. And to teach or perswade are honourable, because they be *Signs* of *Knowledge*. And *Riches* are honourable; as *Signs* of the *Power* that acquired them: And *Gifts*, *Cost*, and *Magnificence* of *Houses*, *Apparel*, and the like, are honourable, as *Signs* of *Riches*. And *Nobility* is honourable
by

by Reflection, as a Sign of Power in the Ancestors: And *Authority*, because a Sign of the Strength, Wisdom, Favour or Riches by which it is attained. And *Good Fortune* or casual Prosperity is honourable, because a Sign of the Favour of God, to whom is to be ascribed all that cometh to us by Fortune, no less than that we attain unto by Industry. And the Contraries and Defects of these Signs are dishonourable; and according to the Signs of Honour and Dishonour, so we estimate and make the Value or Worth of a Man: for so much worth is every Thing, as a Man will give for the Use of all it can do.

6. The *Signs of Honour* are those by which we perceive that one Man acknowledgeth the Power and Worth of another; such as these, to *praise*, to *magnifie*, to *bless*, to call happy, to pray or supplicate to, to thank, to offer unto or present, to obey, to hearken unto with Attention, to speak to with Consideration, to approach unto in decent Manner, to keep Distance from, to give way to, and the like, which are the Honour the Inferiour giveth to the Superiour.

But the *Signs of Honour* from the Superiour to the Inferiour, are such as these; to *praise* or prefer him before his Concurrent, to hear more willingly, to speak to him more familiarly, to admit him nearer, to employ him rather, to ask his advice rather, to take his opinions, and to give him *any Gifts rather than Money*; or if Money, so much as may *not* imply his Need of a little: for Need of a little is greater Poverty than Need of much. And this is enough for Examples of the Signs of Honour and Power.

7. *Reverence* is the Conception we have concerning another, that he hath the *Power* to do unto us both *Good* and *Hurt*, but *not* the *Will* to do us *Hurt*.

8. In the Pleasure men have, or Displeasure from the Signs of Honour or Dishonour done unto them, consisteth the Nature of the Passions, whereof we are to speak in the next Chapter.

CHAP.

CHAP. IX.

1. *Glory aspiring, false Glory, vain Glory.*
2. *Humility and Dejection.*
3. *Shame.*
4. *Courage.*
5. *Anger.*
6. *Revengefulness.*
7. *Hope, Despair, Diffidence.*
8. *Trust.*
9. *Pity and Hardness of Heart.*
10. *Indignation.*
11. *Emulation and Envie.*
12. *Laughter.*
13. *Weeping.*
14. *Lust.*
15. *Love.*
16. *Charity,*
17. *Admiration and Curiosity.*
18. *Of the Passion of them that flock to see Danger.*
19. *Of Magnanimity and Pusillanimity.*
20. *A View of the Passions represented in a Race.*

Glory, or internal Gloriation or Triumph of the Mind, is the Passion which proceedeth from the Imagination or Conception of our *own Power* above the Power of him that contendeth with us; the *Signs* whereof, besides those in the Countenance, and other Gestures of the Body which

which cannot be described, are, *Ostentation* in Words, and *Insolency* in Actions: and this Passion, of them whom it displeaseth, is called *Pride*; by them whom it pleaseth, it is termed a *just Valuation* of himself. This Imagination of our Power or Worth, may be from an assured and certain *Experience* of our own Actions; and then is that *Glory just*, and well grounded, and begetteth an Opinion of *increasing* the same by other Actions to follow; in which consisteth the Appetite which we call *Aspiring*, or Proceeding from one Degree of Power to another. The same Passion may proceed *not* from any *Conscience* of our own Actions, but from Fame and Trust of *others*, whereby one may think well of himself, and yet be deceived; and this is *false Glory*, and the *Aspiring* consequent thereto procureth ill Success. Further, the *Fiction* (which is also Imagination) of Actions done by our selves, which never were done, is *Glorying*; but because it begetteth no Appetite nor endeavour to any further Attempt, it is merely *vain* and unprofitable; as when a Man imagineth himself to do the Actions whereof he readeth in some *Romance*, or to be like unto some other Man whose Acts he admireth: And this is called *Vain Glory*; and is exemplified in the Fable, by the Fly sitting on the Axletree, and saying to himself, What a Dust do I make rise! The expression of *Vain Glory* is that Wish, which some of the School mistaking for some Appetite distinct from all the rest, have called *Velleity*, making a new Word, as they made a new Passion which was not before. *Signs of Vain Glory* in

the *Gesture*; are, *Imitation* of others, *Counterfeiting* and *Usurping* the Signs of Vertue they have not; *Affectation* of Fashions, *Captation* of Honour from their Dreams, and other little Stories of themselves, from their Country, from their Names, and from the like.

2. The Passion *contrary to Glory*, proceeding from Apprehension of our own Infirmary, is called *Humility* by those by whom it is approved; by the rest, *Dejection* and *Poornefs*: which Conception may be well or ill grounded; if well, it produceth Fear to attempt any Thing rashly; if ill, it utterly crows a Man, that he neither dares speak publickly, nor expect good Success in any Action.

3. It happeneth sometimes, that he that hath a good Opinion of himself, and upon good ground, may nevertheless, by Reason of the *Forwardness* which that Passion begetteth, discover in himself some *Defect* or Infirmary, the Remembrance whereof dejecteth him; and this Passion is called *Shame*; by which being cooled and checked in his Forwardness, he is more wary for the Time to come. This Passion, as it is a Sign of *Infirmary*, which is *Disbonour*; so also it is a Sign of *Knowledge*, which is *Honour*. The Sign of it is *Blushing*, which appeareth less in Men conscious of their own Defect, because they less betray the Infirmary they acknowledge.

4. *Courage*, in a large Signification, is the *Absence* of Fear in the Presence of any evil whatsoever: but in a *Strict* and more common Meaning, it is *Contempt* of Wounds and Death, when they oppose a Man in the Way to his End.

5. *Anger* or sudden Courage is nothing but the

the *Appetite* or desire of *overcoming present Opposition*. It hath been defined commonly to be Grief proceeding from an Opinion of Contempt; which is confuted by the often Experience which we have of being moved to anger by things inanimate, and without Sense, and consequently incapable of contemning us.

6. *Revengefulness* is that Passion which ariseth from an Expectation or *Imagination* of making him that hath hurt us, find his own *Action* hurtful to himself, and to acknowledge the same; and this is the Height of Revenge: for though it be not hard, by returning Evil for Evil, to make ones Adversary displeased with his own Fact; yet to make him acknowledge the same, is so difficult, that many a Man had rather die than do it. Revenge aimeth not at the Death, but at the Captivity or Subjection of an Enemy; which was well expressed in the Exclamation of *Tiberius Caesar*, concerning one, that, to frustrate his Revenge, had killed himself in Prison; *Hath he escaped me?* To kill, is the aim of them that hate, to rid themselves out of Fear: *Revenge* aimeth at *Triumph*, which over the Dead is not.

7. *Repentance* is the Passion which proceedeth from *Opinion* or Knowledge that the *Action* they have done is *out of the Way* to the *End* they would attain: the Effect whereof is, to pursue that Way no longer, but, by the Consideration of the End, to direct themselves into a better. The first Motion therefore in this Passion is *Grief*; but the Expectation or Conception of returning again into the Way, is *Joy*; and consequently, the Passion of *Repentance* is compounded

and allayed of both: but the *predominant* is Joy; else were the Whole Grief, which cannot be, forasmuch as he that proceedeth towards the End, he conceiveth Good, proceedeth with Appetite; and Appetite is Joy, as hath been said, Chap. 7. Sect. 2.

8. *Hope* is *Expectation* of Good to come, as Fear is the Expectation of Evil: But when there be Causes, some that make us expect Good, and some that make us expect Evil, alternately working in our Mind; if the Causes that make us expect Good, be greater than those that make us expect Evil, the whole Passion is Hope; if contrarily the Whole is Fear. Absolute Privation of hope is *Despair*, a degree whereof is *Diffidence*.

9. *Trust* is a Passion proceeding from the *Belief* of him from whom we *expect* or *hope* for Good, so free from *Doubts* that upon the same we pursue no other Way to attain the same Good: as *Distrust* or *Diffidence* is *Doubt* that maketh him endeavour to provide himself by other Means. And that this is the Meaning of the Words Trust and Distrust, is manifest from this, that a Man never provideth himself by a second Way, but when he mistrusteth that the first will not hold.

10. *Pity* is *Imagination* or *Fiction* of future Calamity to our selves, proceeding from the Sense of another Mans Calamity. But when it lighteth on such as we think have not deserved the same, the Compassion is greater, because then there appeareth more Probability that the same may happen to us: for, the Evil that
happeneth

happeneth to an innocent Man, may happen to every Man. But when we see a Man suffer for great Crimes, which we cannot easily think will fall upon our selves, the Pity is the less. And therefore Men are apt to pity those whom they love: for, whom they love, they think worthy of Good, and therefore not worthy of Calamity. Thence it is also, that Men pity the Vices of some Persons at the first Sight only, out of Love to their Aspect. The Contrary of Pity is *Hardness of Heart*, proceeding either from *Slowness* of Imagination, or some extreme great *Opinion* of their own *Exemption* from the like Calamity, or from hatred of all or most Men.

11. *Indignation* is that *Grief* which consisteth in the Conception of *good Success* happening to them whom they think *unworthy* thereof. Seeing therefore Men think all those unworthy whom they hate, they think them not only unworthy of the good Fortune they have, but also of their own Vertues. And of all the Passions of the Mind, these two, Indignation and Pity, are most raised and increased by Eloquence: for, the *Aggravation* of the Calamity, and *Extenuation* of the Fault, augmenteth Pity; and the *Extenuation* of the Worth of the Person, together with the magnifying of his Success, which are the Parts of an Orator, are able to turn these two Passions into *Fury*.

12. *Emulation* is *Grief* arising from seeing *ones self* exceeded or excelled by his *Concurrent*, together with *Hope* to equal or exceed him in Time to come, by his own Ability. But, *Envy* is the same *Grief* joyned with *Pleasure* conceiv-

ed in the Imagination of some *ill* Fortune that may befall him.

13. There is a Passion that hath *no Name*; but the Sign of it is that Distortion of the Countenance which we call *Laughter*, which is always *Joy*: but what joy, what we think, and wherein we triumph when we laugh, is not hitherto declared by any. That it consisteth in *Wit*, or, as they call it, in the *Jest*, Experience *confuteth*: for Men laugh at Mischances and Indecencies, wherein there lieth no Wit nor jest at all. And forasmuch as the same Thing is no more ridiculous when it groweth stale or usual, whatsoever it be that moveth Laughter, it must be *new* and *unexpected*. Men laugh often (especially such as are greedy of Applause from every Thing they do well) at their *own* Actions performed never so little beyond their own Expectations; as also at their own *Jests*: And in this Case it is manifest; that the Passion of Laughter proceedeth from a *sudden* conception of some *Ability* in himself that laugheth. Also Men laugh at the *Infirmities* of others, by Comparison where-with their own Abilities are set off and illustrated. Also Men laugh at *Jests*, the *Wit* whereof always consisteth in the elegant *Discovering* and Conveying to our minds some *Absurdity* of *another*: And in this case also the Passion of Laughter proceedeth from the *sudden* Imagination of our own Oddes and Eminency: for what is else the Recommending of our selves to our own good Opinion, by Comparison with another Mans Infirmary or absurdity? For when a Jest is broken upon our selves, or

Friends

Friends of whose Dishonour we participate, we never laugh thereat. I may therefore conclude, that the Passion of Laughter is nothing else but *sudden Glory* arising from some sudden Conception of some *Eminency* in our selves, by *Comparison* with the *Infirmity* of others, or with our own formerly: for Men laugh at the follies of themselves past, when they come suddenly to Remembrance, except they bring with them any present Dishonour. It is no wonder therefore that Men take hainously to be laughed at or derided, that is, triumphed over. Laughing *without Offence*, must be at *Absurdities* and *Infirmities abstracted* from Persons, and when all the Company may laugh together: for, laughing to ones self putteth all the rest into Jealousie, and Examination of themselves. Besides, it is Vain-Glory, and an Argument of little Worth, to think the *Infirmity* of another, sufficient Matter for his Triumph.

14. The Passion opposite hereunto, (whose Signs are another Distortion of the Face with Tears) called *Weeping*, is the *sudden Felling out* with our selves, or sudden Conception of Defect; and therefore *Children* weep often: for seeing they think that every Thing ought to be given them which they desire, of Necessity every Repulse must be a Check of their Expectation, and puts them in mind of their too much Weakness to make themselves Masters of all they look for. For the same Cause *Women* are more apt to weep than men, as being not only more accustomed to have their Wills, but also to measure their Powers by the Power and

Love of others that protect them. Men are apt to weep that prosecute Revenge, when the Revenge is suddenly stopt or frustrated by the Repentance of their Adversary; and such are the Tears of *Reconciliation*. Also revengeful Men are subject to this Passion upon the beholding those Men they pity, and suddenly remember they cannot help. Other weeping in Men proceedeth for the most part from the same Cause it proceedeth from in Women and Children.

15. The Appetite which Men call *Lust*, and the Fruition that appertaineth thereunto, is a *Sensual* Pleasure, but *not only* that; there is in it also a Delight of the Mind: for it consisteth of two Apperites together, to *please*, and to *be pleased*; and the Delight Men take in delighting, is not sensual, but a Pleasure or joy of the Mind consisting in the Imagination of the Power they have so much to please. But the Name *Lust* is used where it is condemned; otherwise it is called by the general Word *Love*: for the Passion is one and the same indefinite Desire of different Sex, as natural as Hunger.

16. Of *Love*, by which is understood the Joy Man taketh in the Fruition of any *present* Good, hath been already spoken of in the first Section, Chap. 7. under which is contained the *Love* Men bear to one *another*, or Pleasure they take in one anothers Company; and by which Nature, Men are said to be sociable. But there is another Kind of Love, which the Greeks call *ἔρως*, and is that which we mean, when we say that a Man is in Love: Forasmuch as this Passion

sion cannot be without Diversity of Sex, it cannot be denied but that it *participateth* of that indefinite *Love* mentioned in the former Section. But there is a great Difference betwixt the Desire of a Man *indefinite*, and the same Desire *limited ad hunc*; and this is that *Love* which is the great Theme of Poets: But notwithstanding their Praises, it must be defined by the Word *Need*: for it is a Conception a Man hath of his Need of *that one Person* desired. The Cause of this Passion is *not* always *nor* for the most part *Beauty*, or other Quality in the Beloved, unless there be withall *Hope* in the Person that loveth: which may be gathered from this, that in great Difference of Persons, the *greater* have often saln in love with the *meaner*; but not contrary. And from hence it is, that for the most part they have much better Fortune in Love, whose Hopes are built upon something *in their Person*, than those that trust to their *Expressions* and *Service*; and they that *care less*, than they that *care more*: which not perceiving, many Men cast away their Services, as one Arrow after another, till, in the End, together with their Hopes, they lose their Wits.

17. There is yet another Passion sometimes called *Love*, but more properly *good Will* or *Charity*. There can be no greater Argument to a Man, of his own Power, than to find himself able not only to accomplish his own Desires, but also to *assist* other Men in theirs: and this is that Conception wherein consisteth *Charity*. In which, first, is contained that *natural Affection* of Parents to their Children, which the *Greeks* call

call *Στοργή*, as also, that Affection wherewith Men seek to *assist* those that adhere unto them. But the Affection wherewith Men many times bestow their Benefits on *Strangers*, is not to be called Charity, but either *Contract*, whereby they seek to purchase friendship; or *Fear*, which maketh them to purchase peace. The Opinion of *Plato* concerning honourable Love, delivered according to his Custom in the Person of *Socrates*, in the Dialogue intituled *Convivium*, is this, That a Man full and pregnant with Wisdom and other Vertues, naturally seeketh out some beautiful Person, of Age and Capacity to conceive, in whom he may, without sensual Respects, ingender and produce the like. And this is the *Idea* of the then noted Love of *Socrates* wise and continent, to *Alcibiades* young and beautiful: In which, Love is not the sought Honour, but the Issue of his Knowledge; contrary to the common Love, to which though Issue sometimes follows, yet Men seek not that, but to please, and to be pleased. It should be therefore this Charity, or Desire to assist and advance others. But why then should the Wise seek the Ignorant, or be more charitable to the Beautiful than to others? There is something in it favouring of the Use of that time: in which Matter though *Socrates* be acknowledged for continent, yet the *Continent* have the Passion they contain, as much and more than they that *satiare* the Appetite; which maketh me suspect this *Platonick* Love for meerly sensual; but with an honourable Pretence for the Old to haunt the Company of the young and beautiful.

18. Forasmuch as all *Knowledge* beginneth from *Experience*, therefore also *new Experience* is the Beginning of *new Knowledge*, and the Increase of Experience the Beginning of the Increase of Knowledge. Whatsoever therefore happeneth new to a Man, giveth him Matter of *Hope* of *knowing* somewhat that he knew *not before*. And this Hope and Expectation of future Knowledge from any Thing that happeneth new and strange, is that Passion which we commonly call *Admiration*; and the same considered as Appetite, is called *Curiosity*, which is Appetite of Knowledge. As in the discerning of Faculties, *Man leaveth* all Community with *Beasts* at the Faculty of *imposing Names*; so also doth he surmount their Nature at this *Passion* of *Curiosity*. For when a Beast seeth any Thing new and strange to him, he considereth it so far only as to discern whether it be likely to serve his turn, or hurt him, and accordingly approacheth nearer to it, or fleeth from it: Whereas Man, who in most Events remembereth in what manner they were caused and begun, looketh for the Cause and Beginning of every Thing that ariseth new unto him. And from this Passion of Admiration and Curiosity, have arisen not only the Invention of Names, but also Supposition of such Causes of all Things as they thought might produce them. And from this Beginning is derived all *Philosophy*; as *Astronomy* from the Admiration of the Course of Heaven; *Natural Philosophy* from the strange Effects of the Elements and other Bodies. And from the Degrees of Curiosity, proceed also the

Degrees

Degrees of Knowledge amongst Men: For, to a Man in the Chace of Riches or Authority,) which in Respect of Knowledge are but Sensuality) it is a Diversity of little Pleasure, whether it be the Motion of the Sun or the Earth that maketh the Day, or to enter into other Contemplations of any strange Accident, than whether it conduce or not to the End he pursueth. Because *Curiosity* is *Delight*, therefore also *Novelty* is so, but especially that Novelty from which a Man conceiveth an *Opinion* true or false of *bettering* his own Estate; for, in such Case, they stand affected with the Hope that all Gamesters have while the Cards are shuffling.

19. Divers other Passions there be, but they want Names: whereof some nevertheless have been by most Men observed: For Example; from what Passion proceedeth it, that Men take *pleasure* to behold from the Shore the *Danger* of them that are at Sea in a Tempest, or in Fight, or from a safe Castle to behold two Armies charge one to another in the Field? It is certainly, in the whole Summ, *Joy*; else Men would never flock to such a Spectacle. Nevertheless there is in it both *Joy* and *Grief*: for as there is Novelty and Remembrance of our own Security present, which is *Delight*: so there is also *Pity*, which is *Grief*: But the *Delight* is so far predominant, that Men usually are content in such a Case to be Spectators of the Misery of their Friends.

20. *Magnanimity* is no more than *Glory*, of the which I have spoken in the first Section; but *Glory* well grounded upon certain Experience of

a Power sufficient to attain his End in open Manner. And *Pufflanimity* is the *Doubt* of that. Whatsoever therefore is a Sign of *Vain Glory*, the same is also a Sign of *Pufflanimity*: for sufficient Power maketh Glory a Spur to ones End. To be *pleased* or *displeased* with *Fame true* or *false*, is a *Sign* of that same, because he that relieth on Fame hath not his Success in his own Power. Likewise *Art* and *Fal-lacy* are Signs of *Pufflanimity*, because they depend not upon our own Power, but the Ignorance of others. Also *Proneness* to *Anger*, because it argueth Difficulty of proceeding. Also *O-stentation* of *Ancestors*, because all Men are more inclined to make shew of their own Power when they have it, than of anothers. To be at *Enmity* and Contention with *Inferiours*, is a Sign of the same, because it proceedeth from Want of Power to end the War. To *laugh* at others, because it is an Affectation of Glory from other Mens Infirmities, and not from any Ability of their own. Also *Irresolution*, which proceedeth from Want of power enough to condemn the little Difficulties that make Deliberations hard.

21. The Comparifon of the Life of Man to a Race, though it hold not in every Part, yet it holdeth so well for this our Purpose, that we may thereby both see and remember almost all the Passions before mentioned. But this *Race* we must suppose to have no other *Goal*, nor other *Garland*, but being formost, and in it To endeavour, is *Appetite*.
To be remifs, is *Sensuality*.

To

62. *Humane Nature.* CHAP. IX.

To consider them behind, is *Glory*.
 To consider them before, is *Humility*.
 To lose Ground with looking back, *Vain-Glory*.
 To be holden, *Hatred*.
 To turn back, *Repentance*.
 To be in breath, *Hope*.
 To be weary, *Despair*.
 To endeavour to overtake the next, *Emulation*.
 To supplant or overthrow, *Envie*.
 To resolve to break thorow a Stop foreseen, *Courage*.
 To break thorow a sudden Stop, *Anger*.
 To break thorow with Ease, *Magnanimity*.
 To lose Ground by little Hindrances, *Puſillanimity*.
 To fall on the sudden, is Disposition to *weep*.
 To see another fall, is Disposition to *laugh*.
 To see one out-gone whom we would not, is *Pity*.
 To see one out-gee whom we would not, is *Indignation*.
 To hold fast by another, is to *love*.
 To carry him on that so holdeth, is *Charity*.
 To hurt ones self for haſt, is *Shame*.
 Continually to be out-gone is *Miſery*.
 Continually to out-go the next before, is *Felicity*.
 And to forſake the Courſe, is to *die*.

CHAP. X.

1. **H**AVING shewed in the precedent Chapters, that Sense proceedeth from the Action of external Objects upon the *Brain*, or some internal *Substance* of the *Head*; and that the *Passions* proceed from the Alteration there made, and continued to the *Heart* : It is consequent in the next Place, seeing the Diversity of Degrees in Knowledge in divers Men, to be greater than may be ascribed to the divers *Temper*s of their *Brain*, to declare *what other Causes* may produce such *Oddes*, and Excess of *Capacity*, as we daily observe in one Man above another. As for that Difference which ariseth from *Sickness*, and such accidental Distempers, I omit the same, as impertinent to this Place, and consider, it only in such as have their *Health*, and *Organs* well disposed. If the Difference were in the natural Temper of the *Brain*, I can imagin no Reason why the same should not appear first and most of all in the Senses, which being equal both in the wise and less wise, infer an equal Temper in the common Organ (namely the *Brain*) of all the Senses.

2. But we see by Experience, that *Joy* and *Grief* proceed *not* in *all* Men from the *same Causes*, and that men differ very much in the *Constituti-*

on of the Body ; whereby , that which helpeth and furthereth *vital Constitution* in one, and is therefore delightful, hindereth it and crosseth it in another, and therefore causeth Grief. The *Difference* therefore of *Wits* hath its Original from the *different Passions*, and from the *Ends* to which the Appetite leadeth them.

3. And first, those Men whose Ends are *sensual* Delight, and generally are addicted to *Ease*, *Food*, *Operations* and *Exonerations* of the Body, must needs be the *less* thereby delighted with those *Imaginations* that *conduce not* to those Ends, such as are Imaginations of *Honour* and *Glory*, which, as I have said before, have Respect to the future : For Sensuality consisteth in the Pleasure of the Senses, which please only for the present, and take away the Inclination to observe such Things as conduce to Honour, and consequently maketh Men less curious, and less ambitious, whereby they less consider the Way either to Knowledge or other Power : in which two consisteth all the Excellency of Power cognitive. And this is it which Men call *Dulness*, and proceedeth from the Appetite of sensual or bodily Delight. And it may well be conjectured, that such Passion hath its Beginning from a *Grossness* and *Difficulty* of the *Motion* of the *Spirit* about the *Heart*.

4. The Contrary hereunto, is that *quick Ranging* of Mind described, Chap. 4 Sect. 3. which is joyned with *Ciriosity* of comparing the Things that come into the Mind, one with another : in which Comparison, a Man delighteth himself either with finding unexpected *Similitude* of Things, otherwise much unlike ; in which
Men

Men place the Excellency of *Fancy*, and from whence proceed those grateful Similies, Metaphors, and other Tropes, by which both *Poets* and *Orators* have it in their Power to make Things please or displease, and shew well or ill to others, as they like themselves; or else in discerning suddenly *Diffimilitude* in Things that otherwise appear the same. And this Vertue of the Mind is that by which Men attain to exact and perfect *Knowledge*; and the Pleasure thereof consisteth in continual Instruction, and in Distinction of Places, Persons, and Seasons, and is commonly termed by the Name of *Judgement*: for, to judge is nothing else, but to distinguish or discern: And both *Fancy* and *Judgement* are commonly comprehended under the Name of *Wit*, which seemeth to be a Tenuity and Agility of Spirits, contrary to that Restiness of the Spirits supposed in those that are dull.

5. There is another Defect of the Mind, which Men call *Levity*, which betrayeth also *Mobility* in the Spirits, but in Excess. An Example whereof is in them that in the midst of any serious Discourse, have their Minds diverted to every little Jest or witty Observation; which maketh them depart from their Discourse by a Parenthesis, and from that Parenthesis by another, till at length they either lose themselves, or make their Narration like a Dream, or some studied Nonsense. The Passion from whence this proceedeth, is *Curiosity*, but with too much *Equality* and Indifference: for when all Things make equal Impression and Delight, they equally throng to be expressed.

6. The Vertue opposite to this Defect, is *Gravity*, or *Steadiness*; in which the End being the great and Master-Delight, directeth and keepeth in the Way thereto all other Thoughts.

7. The *Extremity* of *Dulness* is that *natural Folly* which may be called *Stolidity*: But the Extream of *Levity*, though it be natural Folly distinct from the other, and obvious to every Mans Observation, I know *not* how to call it.

8. There is a Fault of the Mind called by the Greeks *'Απιστία*, which is *Indocibility*, or *Difficulty* of being taught; the which must needs arise from a *false Opinion* that they *know already* the Truth of that is called in question: for certainly Men are not otherwise so unequal in capacity as the *Evidence* is unequal between what is taught by the Mathematicians, and what is commonly discoursed of in other Books: and therefore if the Minds of Men were all of white Paper, they would all most equally be disposed to acknowledge whatsoever should be in right Method, and by right Ratiocination delivered to them: But when Men have once acquiesced in untrue Opinions, and registred them as Authentical Records in their Minds, it is no less impossible to speak intelligibly to such Men, than to write legibly upon a Paper already scribbled over. The immediate Cause therefore of *Indocibility*, is *Prejudice*; and of prejudice, false Opinion of our own Knowledge.

9. Another, and a principal Defect of the Mind, is that which Men call *Madness*, which appeareth to be nothing else but some *Imagination* of some such *Predominancy* above the rest, that we have *no Passion but from it*; and this

Con-

Conception is nothing else but excessive *vain Glory*, or *vain Dejection*: which is most propable by these Examples following, which proceed in Appearance every one of them from *Pride*, or some *Dejection* of Mind. As first, we have had the Example of one that preached in *Cheapside* from a Cart there, instead of a Pulpit, that he himself was Christ, which was *spiritual Pride* or *Madness*. We have had also divers Examples of *Learned Madness*, in which Men have manifestly been distracted upon any Occasion that hath put them in Remembrance of their own Ability. Amongst the learned Men, may be remembered (I think also) those that determine of the Time of the Worlds End, and other such the Points of Prophecy. And the gallant Madness of *Don Quixotte* is nothing else but an Expression of such Height of vain Glory as reading of *Romance* may produce in pusillanimous Men. Also Rage and Madness of Love, are but great Indignations of them in whose Brains is predominant Contempt from their Enemies, or their Mistresses. And the *Pride* taken in *Form* and *Behaviour*, hath made divers Men run mad, and to be so accounted, under the Name of Fantastick.

10. And as these are the Examples of Extremities, so also are there Examples too many of the Degrees, which may therefore be well accounted Follies; as it is a Degree of the *first*, for a Man, without certain Evidence, to think himself to be *inspired*, or to have any other Effect of Gods holy Spirit than other godly Men have. Of the *second*, for a Man continually to speak his mind in a *Censo* of other Mens Greek or Latine Sen-

tences. Of the *third*, much of the present Gallantry in Love and Duel. Of *Rage*, a Degree is *Malice*; and of *Fantastick* Madness, *Affection*.

11. As the former Examples exhibit to us Madness, and the Degrees thereof, proceeding from the Excess of Self-Opinion; so also there be other Examples of Madness, and the Degrees thereof, proceeding from *too much vain Fear* and *Dejection*; as in those melancholy Men that have imagined themselves brittle as Glass, or have had some other like Imagination: and Degrees hereof are all those exorbitant and causeless Fears, which we commonly observe in melancholy Persons.

CHAP. XI.

1. **H**itherto of the Knowledge of Things *natural* and of the Passions that arise naturally from them. Now forasmuch as we give Names not only to Things natural, but also to *supernatural*; and by all Names we ought to have some Meaning and Conception: It followeth in the next Place, to consider what Thoughts and Imaginations of the Mind we have, when we take into our Mouths the most blessed Name of GOD, and the Names of those *Vertues* we attribute unto him; as also, what *Image* cometh into the Mind at hearing the Name of *Spirit*, or the Name of *Angel*, good or bad.

2. And forasmuch as God Almighty is *incomprehensible*, it followeth, that we can have *no* Conception or *Image* of the *Deity*, and consequently, all *his Attributes* signifie our *Inability* and Defect of Power to *conceive* any Thing concerning his Nature, and not any Conception of the same, excepting only this, That *there is a God*: For the Effects we acknowledge naturally, do include a Power of their producing, before they were produced; and that Power presupposeth something existent that hath such Power: And the Thing so existing with Power to produce, if it were not *Eternal*, must needs have been produced by something before it, and that again by something else before that, till we come to an *Eternal* (that is to

say, the first) Power of all Powers, and first Cause of all Causes : And this is it which all Men conceive by the Name of GOD, implying Eternity, Incomprehensibility, and Omnipotency. And thus all that will consider, may know *that* God is, though not *what* he is : even a Man that is born blind, though it be not possible for him to have any Imagination what Kind of thing Fire is ; yet he cannot but know that somewhat there is that Men call Fire, because it warmeth him.

2. And whereas we attribute to God Almighty, *Seeing, Hearing, Speaking, Knowing, Loving*, and the like, by which Names we understand something in *Men* to whom we attribute them, we understand *nothing* by them in the Nature of God : For, as it is well reasoned, *Shall not the God that made the Eye, see ; and the Ear, hear ?* So it is also, if we say, Shall God, which made the Eye, not see without the Eye ; or that made the Ear, not hear without the Ear ; or that made the Brain, not know without the Brain ; or that made the Heart, not love without the Heart ? The *Attributes* therefore given unto the *Deity*, are such as *signifie* either our *Incapacity* or our *Reverence* : Our Incapacity, when we say Incomprehensible and Infinite ; our Reverence, when we give him those Names, which amongst us are the Names of those Things we most magnifie and commend, as Omnipotent, Omniscient, Just, Merciful, &c. And when God Almighty giveth those Names to himself in the Scriptures, it is but *ἀνθρωπίνως*, that is to say, by descending to our Manner of speaking ; without which we are not capable of understanding him.

4 By the Name of *Spirit*, we understand a *Body natural*, but of such *Subtily*, that it worketh not upon the Senses; but that filleth up the Place which the Image of a visible Body might fill up. Our Conception therefore of Spirit consisteth of *Figure without Colour*; and in Figure is understood Dimension, and consequently, to conceive a Spirit, is to conceive something that hath Dimension. But *Spirits supernatural* commonly signifie some *Substance without Dimension*; which two Words do flatly contradict one another: and therefore when we attribute the Name of Spirit unto God, we attribute it not as the Name of any Thing we conceive, no more than we ascribe unto him Sense and Understanding; but, as a Signification of our Reverence, we desire to abstract from him all corporal Grossness.

5. Concerning other Things, which some Men call *Spirits incorporeal*, and some *corporeal*, it is not possible by *natural Means* only, to come to *Knowledge* of so much, as that *there are such Things*. We that are Christians *acknowledge* that there be Angels good and evil, and that there are Spirits, and that the Soul of Man is a Spirit, and that those Spirits are immortal: *but*, to *know* it, that is to say, to have natural Evidence of the same, it is *impossible*: For, all *Evidence* is *Conception*, as it is said, Chap. 6. Sect. 3. and all Conception is *Imagination*, and proceedeth from *Sense*, Chap. 3. Sect. 1. And *Spirits* we suppose to be those Substances which work *not* upon the *Sense*; and therefore not conceivable. But though the Scripture acknowledge Spirits,

yet doth it no where say, that they are incorporeal, meaning thereby, without Dimension and Quality: Nor, I think, is that Word Incorporeal at all in the Bible; but it is said of the Spirit, that it abideth in Men; sometimes that it dwelleth in them, sometimes that it cometh on them, that it descendeth, and goeth, and cometh; and that Spirits are Angels, that is to say, Messengers: all which Words do imply *Locality*; and *Locality* is *Dimension*; and whatsoever hath Dimension, is *Body*, be it never so subtil. To me therefore it seemeth, that the Scripture favoureth them more, who hold Angels and Spirits corporeal, than them that hold the contrary. And it is a plain *Contradiction* in natural Discourse, to say of the Soul of Man, that it is *tota in toto, & tota in qualibet Parte Corporis*, grounded neither upon Reason nor Revelation, but proceeding from the Ignorance of what those Things are which are called *Spectra*, Images, that appear in the dark to Children, and such as have strong Fears, and other strange Imaginations, as hath been said, Chap. 3. Sect. 5. where I call them Phantasms: For, taking them to be Things real, without us, like Bodies, and seeing them to come and vanish so strangely as they do, unlike to Bodies; what could they call them else, but *incorporeal Bodies*? which is not a Name, but an Absurdity of Speech.

6. It is true, that the Heathens, and all Nations of the World, have acknowledged that there be *Spirits*, which for the most part they hold to be incorporeal; whereby it might be thought, that a Man by natural Reason, may arrive,

nive, without the Scriptures, to the Knowledge of this, *That Spirits are*: But the erroneous Collection thereof by the Heathens, may proceed, as I have said before, from the Ignorance of the Cause of Ghosts and Phantasms, and such other Apparitions. And from thence had the Grecians their Number of Gods, their Number of *Dæmons* good or bad, and for every Man his *Genius*; which is not the Acknowledging of this Truth, *That Spirits are*; but a false Opinion concerning the Force of Imagination.

7. And seeing the Knowledge we have of *Spirits*, is *not natural* Knowledge, but *Faith* from supernatural Revelation given to the holy Writers of the Scriptures; it followeth, that of Inspirations also, which is the Operation of Spirit in us, the Knowledge which we have, must all proceed from Scripture. The *Signs* there set down of *Inspiration*, are *Miracles*, when they be great, and manifestly above the Power of Men to do by Imposture: As for Example, the Inspiration of *Elias* was known by the miraculous Burning of the Sacrifice. But the *Signs* to distinguish whether a Spirit be good or evil, are the same by which we distinguish whether a Man or a Tree be good or evil, namely, *Actions* and *Fruit*: For there are *lying* Spirits, where-with Men are inspired sometimes, as well as with *Spirits* of *Truth*. And we are commanded in Scripture, to judge of the Spirits by their Doctrine, and not of the Doctrine by the Spirits. For Miracles, our Saviour hath forbidden us to rule our Faith by them, *Matth. 24. 24.* And Saint Paul saith, *Gal. 1. 8. Though an Angel from Heaven preach*

*preach to you otherwise, &c. let him be accur-
sed.* Where it is plain, that we are not to judge
whether the Doctrine be true or not, by the
Angel; but whether the Angel say true or no,
by the Doctrine. So likewise, *1 Joh. 4. 1. Believe
not every Spirit: for false Prophets are gone out in-
to the World. Vers. 2. Hereby shall ye know the
Spirit of God. Vers. 3. Every Spirit that confesseth
not that Jesus Christ is come in the Flesh, is
not of God: and this is the Spirit of Antichrist.
Vers. 15. Whosoever confesseth that Jesus is the
Son of God, in him dwelleth God, and he in God.
The Knowledge therefore we have of good and
evil Inspiration, cometh not by Vision of an An-
gel that may teach it, nor by a Miracle that
may seem to confirm it; but by Conformity of
Doctrine with this Article and Fundamental Point
of Christian Faith, which also Saint Paul saith
is the sole Foundation, That Jesus Christ is come
in the Flesh, 1 Cor. 3. 11*

8. But if *Inspiration* be discerned by *this*
Point, and *this* Point be acknowledged and be-
lieved upon the *Authority* of the *Scriptures*; How
(may some Men ask) know we that the *Scripture*
deserveth so great *Authority*, which must be
no less than that of the lively Voice of God;
that is, how we know the *Scriptures* to be the
Word of God? And first, it is manifest, that if by
Knowledge we understand Science infallible and
natural, as is defined, Chap. 6. Sect. 4. proceeding
from Sense, we cannot be said to know it, be-
cause it proceedeth not from the Conceptions
ingenerated by Sense. And if we understand
Knowledge as supernatural, we cannot have it

but

but by Inspiration: And of that *Inspiration* we cannot judge, but by the *Doctrine*: It followeth, that we have not any Way, natural or supernatural, of the *Knowledge* thereof, which can properly be called *Infallible Science* and *Evidence*. It remaineth, that the Knowledge that we have that the Scriptures are the Word of God, is only *Faith*, which Faith therefore is also by Saint Paul defined, *Heb. 11. 1.* to be the *Evidence of Things not seen*; that is to say, not otherwise evident but by Faith: for, whatsoever either is evident by Natural Reason, or Revelation supernatural, is not called Faith; else should not Faith cease, no more than Charity, when we are in Heaven; which is contrary to the Doctrine of the Scripture. And, we are *not* said to believe, but to know those Things that be evident.

9. Seeing then the Acknowledgment of Scriptures to be the Word of God, is not Evidence, but Faith, and Faith (Chap. 6. Sect. 7.) consisteth in the Trust we have of other Men, it appeareth plain, that the Men so trusted, are the holy Men of Gods Church succeeding one another from the Time of those that saw the wondrous Works of God Almighty in the Flesh. Nor doth this imply that God is not the Worker or Efficient Cause of Faith, or that Faith is begotten in Man without the Spirit of God: for, all those good Opinions which we admit and believe, though they proceed from Hearing, and Hearing from Teaching, both which are natural, yet they are the Work of God: for, all the Works of Nature are his, and they are attributed to the Spirit of God: As for

for Example, *Exod. 28. 3. Thou shalt speak unto all cunning Men, whom I have filled with the SPIRIT of Wisdom, that they may make Aaron's Garments for his Consecration, that he may serve me in the Priests Office.* Faith therefore wherewith we believe, is the Work of the Spirit of God in that Sense, by which the Spirit of God giveth to one Man Wisdom and cunning in Workmanship more than another, and by which he effecteth also in other Points pertaining to our ordinary Life; that one Man believeth that, which, upon the same Grounds, another doth not; and one Man reverenceth the Opinion, and obeyeth the Commands of his Superiour, and others not.

10. And seeing our Faith, that the Scriptures are the Word of God, began from the Confidence and Trust we repose in the Church; there can be no Doubt but that their Interpretation of the same Scriptures (when any Doubt or Controversie shall arise, by which this Fundamental Point, *That Jesus Christ is come in the Flesh*, may be called in question) is safer for any Man to trust to, than his own, whether Reasoning or Spirit, that is to say, his own Opinion.

11. Now concerning Mens Affections to Godward, they are not the same always that are described in the Chapter concerning Passions. There, for to love, is to be delighted with the Image or Conception of the Thing loved; but God is unconceivable: To love God therefore, in the Scripture, is to obey his Commandments, and to love one another. Also to trust God, is different from our trusting one another; for,

for, when a Man trusteth a Man, (Chap. 9. Sect. 8.) he layeth aside his own Endeavours: but if we do so in our Trust to God Almighty, we disobey him; and how shall we trust to him whom we know we disobey? To *trust to God Almighty* therefore, is to *referr* to his *good Pleasure* all that is *above our own Power* to effect: and this is *all one* with *Acknowledging one only God*, which is the first Commandment. And to *trust in Christ*, is no more but to acknowledge him for God; which is the fundamental Article of our Christian Faith: And consequently, to trust, rely, or, as some express it, to cast and roll our selves on Christ, is the same Thing with the Fundamental Point of Faith, namely, that *Jesus Christ is the Son of the living God*.

12. To *honour* God internally in the Heart, is the same Thing with that we ordinarily call Honour amongst Men: for it is nothing but the *Acknowledging* of his *Power*; and the Signs thereof, the same with the Signs of the Honour due to our Superiours, mentioned Chap. 8. Sect. 6. *viz.* to *praise*, to *magnifie*, to *blefs*; to pray to him, to thank him, to give Oblations and Sacrifices to him, to give Attention to his Word, to speak to him in Prayer with Consideration, to come into his Presence with humble Gesture, and in decent Manner, and to adorn his Worship with Magnificence and Cost: and these are natural Signs of our honouring him internally: And therefore the Contrary hereof, To neglect prayer, to speak to him *extempore*, to come to Church slovenly, to adorn the Place of his Worship

ship worse than our own Houses, to take up his Name in every idle Discourse, are the manifest Signs of Contempt of the Divine Majesty. There be other Signs which are arbitrary; as, to be uncovered, (as we be here); to put off their Shooes, as *Moses* at the fiery Bush, and some other of that Kind, which in their own Nature are indifferent, till, to avoid Indecency and Discord, it be otherwise determined by common Consent.

CHAP.

CHAP. XII.

1. **I**T hath been declared already, how *external* Objects cause *Conceptions*, and *Conceptions*, *Appetite* and *Fear*, which are the *first unperceiv'd Beginnings of our Actions*: for either the *Actions* immediately follow the first *Appetite*, as when we do any Thing upon a sudden; or else to our first *Appetite* there succeedeth some *Conception* of *Evil* to happen to us, by such *Actions*, which is *Fear*, and which holdeth us from proceeding. And to that *Fear* may succeed a new *Appetite*, and to that *Appetite* another *Fear* alternately, till the *Action* be either done, or some *Accident* come between, to make it impossible; and so this alternate *Appetite* and *Fear* ceaseth. This *alternate Succession of Appetite and Fear* during all the time the *Action* is in our *Power* to do or not to do, is that we call *Deliberation*; which Name hath been given it for that Part of the *Definition* wherein it is said that it lasteth so long as the *Action*, whereof we deliberate, is in our *Power*: for, so long we have *Liberty* to do or not to do; and *Deliberation* signifieth a Taking away of our own *Liberty*.

2. *Deliberation* therefore requireth in the *Action* deliberated *two Conditions*; one, that it be *future*; the other, that there be *Hope* of doing it, or possibility of not doing it; for, *Appetite* and *Fear* are *Expectations* of the future; and there is no *Expectation* of

of Good, without Hope; or of Evil, without Possibility: of *Necessaries* therefore there is *no Deliberation*. In Deliberation, the last Appetite, as also the last Fear, is called *Will*, viz. the last Appetite, Will to do, or Will to omit. It is all one therefore to say *Will*, and *last Will*: for, though a Man expresses his present Inclination and Appetite concerning the disposing of his Goods, by Words or Writing; yet shall it not be counted his Will, because he hath still Liberty to dispose of them other ways: but when Death taketh away that Liberty, then it is his Will.

3. Voluntary Actions and Omissions are such as have Beginning in the *Will*; all other are *involuntary*, or ~~mixed~~ *voluntary*, such as a Man doth upon Appetite or Fear; *involuntary*, such as he doth by Necessity of Nature, as when he is pushed, or falleth, and thereby doth Good or hurt to another: *mixt*, such as participate of both; as when a Man is carried to Prison, Going is voluntary, to the Prison, is involuntary: The Example of him that throweth his Goods out of a Ship into the Sea, to save his Person, is of an Action altogether voluntary; for, there is nothing therein involuntary, but the Hardness of the Choice, which is not his Action, but the Action of the Winds: what he himself doth, is no more against his Will, than to flee from Danger is against the Will of him that seeth no other Means to preserve himself.

4. *Voluntary* also are the Actions that proceed from sudden *Anger*, or other sudden *Appetite* in such Men as can discern Good or Evil: for, in them the Time precedent *is* to be judged Deliberation;

ration; for then also he deliberateth in what Cases it is good to *strike*, deride, or do any other Action proceeding from Anger or other such sudden Passion.

5. *Appetite*, *Fear*, *Hope*, and the rest of the Passions are *not* called *voluntary*; for they proceed *not* from, but are the *Will*, and the *Will* is not voluntary: for, a Man can no more say he will will, than he will will will, and so make an infinite Repetition of the Word [*will*]; which is absurd, and insignificant.

6. Forasmuch as *Will to do* is *Appetite*, and *Will to omit*, *Fear*; the Cause of *Appetite* and *Fear* is the Cause also of our *Will*: But the propounding of the Benefits and of Harms, that is to say, of Reward and Punishment, is the Cause of our *Appetite*, and of our Fears, and therefore also of our Wills, so far forth as we believe that such Rewards and Benefits as are propounded, shall arrive unto us; and consequently, our *Wills* follow our *Opinions*, as our *Actions* follow our *Wills*; in which Sense they say truly, and properly, that say the World is governed by Opinion.

7. When the Wills of many concur to one and the same Action and Effect, this *Concourse* of their *Wills* is called *Consent*; by which we must not understand one Will of many Men (for every Man hath his several Will) but many Wills to the producing of one Effect: But when the *Wills* of two divers Men produce such Actions as are reciprocally *resistant* one to the other, this is called *Contention*; and, being upon the Persons one of another, *Battel*: whereas Actions proceeding from *Consent*, are mutual *Aid*.

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8. When many Wills are involved or included in the Will of one or more consenting, (which how it may be, shall be hereafter declared) then is that involving of many Wills in one or more, called *Union*.

9. In *Deliberations* interrupted, as they may be by *Diversion* of other Business, or by *Sleep*, the last *Appetite* of such Part of the Deliberation is called *Intention*, or *Purpose*.

CHAP.

CHAP. XIII.

1. **H**AVING spoken of the Powers and Acts of the Mind, both cognitive and motive, considered in every Man by *himself*, without Relation to others; it will fall fitly into this Chapter, to speak of the Effects of the same Power one upon another; which Effects are also the Signs, by which one taketh notice what another conceiveth and intendeth. Of these Signs, some are such as cannot easily be counterfeited; as Actions and Gestures, especially if they be sudden, whereof I have mentioned some; (for Example, look in Chap. 9.) with the several Passions whereof they are Signs; Others there are which may be counterfeited; and those are Words or Speech; of the Use and Effects whereof, I am to speak in this Place.

2. The first Use of Language, is the expression of our Conceptions, that is, the begetting in one another the same Conceptions that we have in our selves; and this is called Teaching; wherein, if the Conception of him that teacheth continually accompany his Words, beginning at something true in Experience, then it begetteth the like Evidence in the Hearer that understandeth them, and maketh him to know something, which he is therefore said to learn: but if there be not such Evidence, then such teaching is called Persuasion, and begetteth no more in the Hear-

er, than what is in the Speakers bare *Opinion*. And the *Signs* of two *Opinions* contradictory one to another; namely, *Affirmation* and *Negation* of the same Thing, is called *Controversie*: but both *Affirmations*, or both *Negations*, *Consent in Opinion*.

3. The *infallible Sign* of *teaching exactly*, and without error, is this, that *no Man* hath ever taught the *Contrary*: Not that few, how few soever, if any; for commonly Truth is on the side of a few, rather than of the Multitude: But when in *Opinions* and *Questions* considered and discussed by many, it happeneth that not any one of the Men that so discuss'd them differ from another, then it may be justly inferred, they know what they teach, and that otherwise they do not. And this appears most manifestly to them that have considered the divers Subjects wherein they have exercised their Pens, and the divers Ways in which they have proceeded, together with the Diversity of the Success thereof: for, those Men who have taken in hand to consider nothing else but the Comparison of *Magnitudes*, *Numbers*, *Times*, and *Motions*, and how their Proportions are to one another, have thereby been the Authors of all those Excellencies by which we differ from such savage People as now inhabit divers places in *America*; and as have been the Inhabitants heretofore of those Countries where at this day Arts and Sciences do most flourish: for, from the Studies of these Men, have proceeded whatsoever cometh to us for Ornament by *Navigation*, and whatsoever we have beneficial

to humane Society by the *Division*, *Distinction*, and *Portraiting the Face of the Earth*; whatsoever also we have by the *Account of Times*, and *Forefight of the Course of Heaven*; whatsoever by *Measuring Distances*, *Plains*, and *Solids* of all Sorts; and whatsoever either *elegant* or *defensible in Building*: All which supposed a Way, what do we differ from the wildest of the *Indians*? Yet to this day was it never heard of, that there was any *Controversie* concerning any Conclusion in this Subject; the Science whereof hath nevertheless been continually amplified and enriched by the Conclusions of most difficult and profound Speculation. The *Reason* whereof is apparent to every Man that looketh into their Writings; for they proceed from most *low* and *humble* Principles, evident even to the meanest Capacity; going on *slowly*, and with most *scrupulous Ratiocination*; viz. from the Imposition of Names, they infer the Truth of their *first* Propositions; and from two of the first, a *third*; and from any two of the three, a *fourth*; and so on, according to the Steps of Science, mentioned Chap. 6. Sect. 4. On the other side, those Men who have written concerning the Faculties, Passions, and Manners of Men, that is to say; of *Moral Philosophy*, and of *Policy*, *Government*, and *Laws*, whereof there be infinite Volumes, have been so far from removing Doubt and Controversie in the Questions they have handled, that they have very much multiplied the same: Nor doth any Man at this day so much as pretend to know more than hath been delivered Two thousand Years ago by *Aristotle*:

and yet every Man thinks that in this Subject he knoweth as much as any other; supposing there needeth thereunto no Study but that accrueeth unto them by natural Wit; though they play, or imploy their Mind otherwise in the Purchase of Wealth or Place. The Reason whereof is no other, than that in their Writings and Discourses they take for Principles those Opinions which are already vulgarly received; whether true or false, being for the most part false. There is therefore a great deal of *Difference* between *Teaching* and *Perswading*; the Sign of *this* being *Controversie*; the Sign of the former, *no Controversie*.

4. There be *two Sorts* of Men that commonly be called *learned*: One is that Sort that proceedeth *evidently* from humble Principles, as is described in the last Section; and those Men are called *Mathematici*: The other are they that *take up* Maxims from their *Education*, and from the *Authority* of Men, or of Custom, and *take the habitual Discourse* of the Tongue for *Ratiocination*; and these are called *Dogmatici*. Now seeing in the last Section those we call *Mathematici* are absolved of the Crime of breeding Controversie, and they that pretend not to Learning cannot be accused, the Fault lieth altogether in the *Dogmaticks*, that is to say, those that are imperfectly learned, and with Passion press to have their Opinions pass every where for Truth, without any evident Demonstration either from Experience, or from Places of Scripture of uncontroverted Interpretation.

5. The

5. The Expression of those Conceptions which *cause* in us the *Experience* of Good while we deliberate, as also of those which cause our Expectation of Evil, is that which we call *Counselling*, and is the internal Deliberation of the Mind concerning what we our selves are to do or not to do. The *Consequences* of our Actions are our *Counsellors*, by *alternate Suceession* in the Mind. So in the Counsel which a Man taketh from *other Men*, the *Counsellors alternately* do *make appear the Consequences* of the Action, and do not any of them deliberate, but furnish among them all, him that is counselled with Arguments whereupon to deliberate with himself.

6. Another Use of Speech is *Expression* of *Appetite*, *Intention*, and *Will*; as the Appetite of Knowledge by *Interrogation*; Appetite to have a Thing done by another, as *Request*, *Prayer*, *Petition*: Expressions of our Purpose or intention, as *Promise*, which is the Affirmation or Negation of some Action to be done in the future: *Threatning*, which is the Promise of Evil; and *Commanding*, which is that Speech by which we signify to another our *Appetite* or *Desire to have any Thing done, or left undone*, for Reasons contained in the Will it self: For it is not properly said, *Sic volo, sic jubeo*, without that other Clause, *Stet pro Ratione Voluntas*: And when the Command is a sufficient Reason to move us to Action, then is that Command called a *Law*.

7. Another Use of Speech is *Instigation* and *Appeasing*, by which we increate or diminish

one anothers *Passion*: It is the same Thing with *Perswasion*; the Difference not being real; for, the Begetting of *Opinion* and *Passion* is the same. But whereas in *Perswasion* we aim at Getting *Opinion* from *Passion*; here, the End is, to raise *Passion* from *Opinion*. And as in raising an *Opinion* from *Passion*, any *Premisses* are good enough to inforce the desired *Conclusion*; so, in raising *Passion* from *Opinion*, it is no matter whether the *Opinion* be true or false, or the *Narration* historical or fabulous: for, not the *Truth*, but the *Image*, maketh *Passion*: and a *Tragedy*, well acted, affecteth no less than a *Murther*.

8. Though words be the *Signs* we have of one anothers *Opinions* and *Intentions*, because the *Aquivocation* of them is so frequent according to the *Diversity* of *Contexture*, and of the *Company* wherewith they go, which, the *Presence* of him that speaketh, our *Sights* of his *Actions*, and *Conjecture* of his *Intentions*, must help to discharge us of; it must therefore be extream hard to find the *Opinions* and *Meaning* of those *Men* that are gone from us long ago, and have left us no other *Signification* thereof than their *Books*, which cannot possibly be understood without *History*, to discover those aforementioned *Circumstances*, and also without great *Prudence* to observe them.

9. When it happeneth that a *Man* signifieth unto us two contradictory *Opinions*, whereof the one is clearly and directly signified, and the other either drawn from that by *Consequence*, or not known to be contradictory to it; then
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(when he is not present to explicate himself better) we are to take the *former* for his Opinion; for that is clearly signified to be his, and directly; whereas the other might proceed from error in the Deduction, or Ignorance of the Repugnancy. The like also is to be held in two contradictory Expressions of a Mans Intention and Will, for the same Reason.

10. Forasmuch as whosoever *speaketh to another*, intendeth thereby to *make him understand* what he saith, if he speak unto him either in a Language which he that heareth understandeth not, or use any Word in other Sence than he believeth is the Sence of him that heareth, he *intendeth also not* to make him understand what he saith; which is a *Contradiction* of himself. It is therefore always to be supposed, that he which intendeth not to deceive, alloweth the private Interpretation of his Speech to him to whom it is addressed.

11. *Silence*, in him that *believeth* that the same shall be taken for a *Sign of his Intent*, is a Sign thereof indeed: for, if he did not consent, the Labour of Speaking *so much as* to declare the same, is so little, as it is to be presumed he would have done it.

Method of finding out the Nature of Man so far as was requisite for the finding out the first and most simple Elements wherein the Compositions of Politick Rules and Laws are lastly resolved ; which was my present Purpose.

C O N C L U S I O N .

THus have we considered the Nature of Man so far as was requisite for the finding out the first and most simple Elements wherein the Compositions of Politick Rules and Laws are lastly resolved ; which was my present Purpose.

F I N I S .

De Corpore Politico.

OR THE
ELEMENTS
OF
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MORAL & POLITICK.
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
Discourses upon several Heads; as

Of { *The Law of Nature.*
 Oaths and Covenants.
 Several Kinds of Government.

With the Changes and Revolutions
of them.

By *Tho. Hobbs* of *Malmsbury.*

LONDON, Printed for *Matthew Gilliflower*,
Henry Rogers, and *Tho. Foe*, Booksellers in *Westminster-*
Hall. MDCLXXIV.



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T O T H E
R E A D E R.

Reader,

YOU may be pleased to take notice, That the first Part of this Work depends upon a former Treatise of Humane Nature, written by Mr. Hobbs, and by a Friend of his committed to the Press for the Benefit of Mankind. It was thought fit, that nothing of so worthy an Author should be left unprinted, especially considering, that this Piece is most useful for the Society of reasonable Creatures, being the Grounds and Principles of Policy,
without

To the Reader.

without which there would be nothing but Confusion in the World: I am confident, if Mens Minds were but truly fixt upon the Center of this Discourse, they would not prove such Weather-cocks, to be turned about with the Wind of every false Doctrine, and vain Opinion. We should then be free from those Disorders which threaten distraction to the Soul, and Destruction to the Commonwealth. But let others write never so well, if our Practice do not second their Instructions, we may be wise enough to foresee our Misery, but never know how to prevent it. What pity is it, that such rare Conclusions as these are, should produce no other Effect, to inform our Knowledge, and confute our Conversation, whilst we neglect the Truth that is apprehended. Yet there is some hope, that such Observers, whose Wisdom hath received the stamp of Goodness, will improve their skill to a real Advancement of those Benefits, which lye hoarded up in this curious Cabinet. To whose Use and Behoof, these excellent Notions are

To the Reader.

are commended, as the best that ever were writ in this kind, and may serve for a general Ground and Foundation to all regular Conceptions, that concern the Essence and Existence of Man, the Government of Kingdoms and Commonwealths, and by consequence our eternal Salvation.

De

To the H. order.

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DE
Corpore Politico.

CHAP. I.

- 1, 2. *Men by Nature Equal.*
3. *By Vain Glory indisposed to allow Equality with themselves, to others.*
4. *Apt to provoke another by Comparisons.*
5. *Apt to incroach one upon another.*
6. *Right defined.*
7. *Right to the End, implyeth Right to the Means.*
8. *Every Man his own Judge by Nature.*
9. *Every Man's Strength and Knowledge for his own Use.*
10. *Every Man by Nature hath Right to all Things.*
11. *War and Peace defined.*
12. *Men by Nature in the State of War.*
13. *In manifest Inequality Might is Right.*
14. *Reason dictateth Peace.*

1. **I**N a former Treatise of Humane Nature already Printed, hath been set forth the whole Nature of Man, consisting in the Powers natural of his Body and Mind, and may all be comprehended in these Four, *Strength of Body, Experience, Reason, and Passion.*

2. In this, it will be expedient to consider in what estate of Security this our Nature hath placed us, and what Probability it hath left us, of continuing and preserving our selves against the Violence of one another. And first, if we consider how little Odds there is of Strength or Knowledge, between Men of mature Age, and with how great Facility he that is the weaker in Strength or in Wit, or in both, may utterly destroy the Power of the Stronger; since there needeth but little Force to the taking away of a Man's Life, we may conclude, that Men considered in meer Nature, ought to admit amongst themselves Equality; and that he that claimeth no more, may be esteemed Moderate.

3. On the other side, considering the great Difference there is in Men, from the Diversity of their Passions, how some are vainly Glorious, and hope for Precedency and superiority above their Fellows, not only when they are equal in Power, but also when they are inferiour; we must needs acknowledge that it must necessarily follow, that those Men who are moderate, and look for no more but Equality of Nature, shall be obnoxious to the Force of Others, that will attempt to subdue them. And from hence shall proceed

proceed a general diffidence in Mankind, and mutual Fear one of another.

4. Farther, since Men by natural Passion are divers wayes offensive one to another, every Man thinking well of himself, and hating to see the same in others, they must needs provoke one another by Words, and other Signs of Contempt and Hatred, which are incident to all Comparifon, till at last they must determine the Preheminance by Strength and Force of Body.

5. Moreover, considering that many mens Appetites carry them to one and the same End; which End sometimes can neither be enjoyed in common, nor divided, it followeth, that the stronger must enjoy it alone, and that it be decided by Battle who is the stronger. And thus the Greatest Part of Men, upon no Assurance of Odds, do nevertheless through Vanity, or Comparifon, or Appetite, provoke the Rest, that otherwise would be contented with Equality.

6. And forasmuch as Necessity of Nature maketh Men to will and desire *Bonum sibi*, that which is good for themselves, and to avoid that which is hurtful; but most of all, the terrible Enemy of Nature, Death, from whom we expect both the Loss of all Power, and also the greatest of Bodily Pains in the Losing; It is not against Reason, that a Man doth all he can to preserve his own Body and Limbs both from Death and Pain. And that which is not against Reason, Men call *Right*, or *Ius*, or *Blameless Liberty*, of using our own natural Power and Ability. It is therefore a Right of Nature, That every Man

may preserve his own Life and Limbs, with all the Power he hath.

7. And because where a Man hath Right to the End, and the End cannot be attained without the Means, that is, without such Things as are necessary to the End, it is consequent that it is not against Reason, and therefore Right for a Man to use all Means, and do whatsoever Action is necessary for the Preservation of his Body.

8. Also every Man by Right of Nature, is Judge himself of the Necessity of the Means, and of the Greatness of the Danger. For if it be against Reason, that I be Judge of mine own Danger my Self, then it is Reason, that Another Man be Judge thereof. But the same Reason that maketh another Man Judge of those Things that concern me, maketh me also Judge of that that concerneth him. And therefore I have Reason to judge of his Sentence, whether it be for my Benefit, or not.

9. As a Mans Judgment in Right of Nature is to be imployed for his own Benefit, so also the Strength, Knowledge, and Art, of every Man is then rightly imployed, when He useth it for himself; else must not a Man have right to preserve himself.

10. Every Man by Nature hath Right to all Things, that is to say, to do whatsoever he listeth to whom he listeth, to possess, use, and enjoy all things he will and can. For seeing all things he willeth, must therefore be Good unto him in his own Judgment, because he willeth them, and may tend to his Preservation some time or other,
or

or he may judge so, and we have made Him Judge thereof, Sect. 8. it followeth, that all things may rightly also be done by him. And for this Cause it is rightly said, *Natura dedit omnia omnibus*, that Nature hath given all things to all Men; in-somuch, that *ius* and *Utile*, Right and Profit, is the same thing. But that Right of all Men to all things, is in effect no better than if no Man had Right to any Thing. For there is little Use and Benefit of the Right a Man hath, when another as strong, or stronger than himself hath Right to the same.

11. Seeing then to the Offensiveness of Mans Nature one to another, there is added a Right of every Man to every thing, whereby one Man invadeth with Right, and another Man with Right resisteth, and Men live thereby in perpetual Diffidence, and study how to preoccupate each other; The Estate of men in this natural Liberty, is the Estate of War. For *War* is nothing else but that Time wherein the Will and Contention of contending by Force, is either by Words or Actions sufficiently declared; and the Time which is not War, is *Peace*.

12. The Estate of Hostility and War being such, as thereby Nature it self is destroyed, and Men kill one another; (as we know also that it is, both by the Experience of Salvage Nations that live at this day, and by the Histories of our Ancestors the old Inhabitants of *Germany*, and other now civil Countreys, where we find the People few, and short lived, and without the Ornaments and comforts of Life, which by Peace and Society are usually invented and procured,)

He therefore that desireth to live in such an Estate as is the Estate of Liberty and Right of all to all, contradicteth Himself. For every man by natural Necessity desireth his own Good, to which this Estate is contrary, wherein we suppose Contention between Men by Nature equal, and able to destroy one another.

13. Seeing this Right of protecting our selves by our own Discretion and Force, proceedeth from Danger, and that Danger from the Equality between Mens Forces, much more Reason is there, that a Man prevent such Equality before the Danger cometh, and before the Necessity of Battle. A Man therefore that hath another Man in his Power to rule or govern, to do good to, or harm, hath Right, by the Advantage of this his present Power, to take Caution at his Pleasure, for his Security against that other in Time to come. He therefore that hath already subdued his Adversary, or gotten into his Power any other, that either by Infancy, or Weakness, is unable to resist him, by Right of Nature may take the best Caution, that such Infant, or such feeble and subdued Person can give him, of being ruled and governed by him for the Time to come. For seeing we intend always our own Safety and Preservation, we manifestly contradict that our Intention, if we willingly dismiss such a one, and suffer him at once to gather Strength and be our Enemy. Out of which may also be collected, That irresistible Might in the state of Nature, is Right.

14. But since it is supposed by the Equality of Strength, and other natural Faculties of Men, that no Man is of Might sufficient, to assure himself for any long Time, of preserving himself thereby, whiles he remaineth in the State of Hostility and War; Reason therefore dictateth to every Man for his own Good, to seek after Peace, as far forth as there is Hope to attain the same: and strengthen himself with all the Help he can procure, for his own Defence against those, from whom such Peace cannot be obtained: and to do all those things which necessarily conduce thereunto,

C H A P. II.

1. *The Law of Nature consisteth not in Consent of Men, but Reason.*
2. *That every Man divest himself of t^e Right he hath to all things, is One Precept of Nature.*
3. *What it is to relinquish and transfer ones Right.*
4. *The Will to transfer, and the Will to accept both necessary to the passing away of Right.*
5. *Right not transferred by words de Futuro, only.*
6. *Words de Futuro, together with other Signs of the Will, may transfer Right.*
7. *Free Gift defined.*
8. *Contract, and the Sorts of it.*
9. *Covenant defined.*
10. *Contract of mutual Trust, is of no Validity in the Estate of Hostility.*
11. *No Covenant of Men but with one another.*
12. *Covenant how dissolved.*
13. *Covenant extorted by Fear, in the Law of Nature valid.*
14. *Covenant contrary to former Covenant, void.*
15. *An Oath defined.*
16. *Oath to be administred to every Man in his own Religion.*
17. *Oath addeth not to the Obligation.*
18. *Covenants bind but to endeavour.*

1. **W**Hat it is we call the Law of Nature, is not agreed upon by those, that have hitherto written. For the most part, such Writers

as have occasion to affirm, that any thing is against the Law of Nature, do alledge no more than this, That it is against the Consent of all Nations, or the wisest and most civil Nations. But it is not agreed upon, who shall judge which Nations are the Wisest. Others make that against the Law of Nature, which is contrary to the Consent of all Mankind; which Definition cannot be allowed, because then no Man could offend against the Law of Nature; for the Nature of every Man is contained under the Nature of Mankind. But forasmuch as all Men are carried away by the Violence of their Passion, and by evil Customes, do those things which are commonly said to be against the Law of Nature; It is not the Consent of Passions, or Consent in some Error gotten by Custom, that makes the Law of Nature. Reason is no less of the Nature of Man than Passion, and is the same in all Men, because all Men agree in the Will to be directed and governed in the Way to that which they desire to attain, namely, their own Good, which is the Work of Reason: There can therefore be no other Law of Nature than Reason, nor no other Precepts of *Natural Law*, than those which declare unto us the Ways of Peace, where the same may be obtained, and of Defence where it may not.

2. One Precept of the Law of Nature therefore is this, *That every man divest Himself of the Right he hath to all things by Nature.* For when divers Men having Right not only to all things else; but to one anothers Persons, if they use the same, there ariseth thereby Invasion on the one Part, and Resistance on the other, which is
War,

war, and therefore contrary to the Law of Nature, the Summ whereof consisteth in making Peace.

3. When a Man devesteth and putteth from his Right, he either simply relinquisheth it, or transferreth the same to another Man. To *Relinquish* it, is by sufficient signs to declare, that it is his Will no more to do that Action, which of Right he might have done before. To *Transferr* Right to another, is by sufficient Signs to declare to that other accepting thereof, that it is his Will not to resist, or hinder him, according to that Right he had thereto before he transferred it. For seeing that by Nature every Man hath Right to every Thing, it is impossible for a Man to transfer unto another any Right that he had not before. And therefore all that a Man doth in transferring of Right, is no more but a declaring of the Will, to suffer him, to whom he hath so transferred his Right, to make Benefit of the same, without Molestation. As for Example, when a Man giveth his Lands or Goods to another, he taketh from himself the Right to enter into, and make use of the said Lands or Goods, or otherwise to hinder him of the Use of what he hath given.

4. In transferring of Right, two Things therefore are required: One on the Part of him that transferreth, which is a sufficient Signification of his Will therein; The other, on the Part of him to whom it is transferred, which is a sufficient Signification of his Acceptation thereof. Either of these failing, the Right remaineth where it was: nor is it to be supposed, that he which giveth his Right to one that accepteth it not, doth there-
by

by simply relinquish it, and transferr it to whomsoever will receive it : in as much as the Cause of transferring the same to one , rather than to another , is in the one , rather than in the rest.

5. When there appear no other Signs that a Man hath relinquished, or transferred his Right, but only Words, it behoveth that the same be done in Words, that signifie the present Time, or the Time past, and not only the Time to come. For he that saith of the Time to come, (as for Example) to morrow, I will give, declareth evidently , that he hath not yet given. The Right, therefore remaineth in him to day, and so continues, till he have given actually. But he that saith, I give, presently, or have given to another any thing, to have and enjoy the same to morrow, or any other Time further, hath now actually transferred the said Right, which otherwise he should have had at the Time that the other is to enjoy it.

6. But because Words alone are not a sufficient Declaration of the Mind, as hath been shewed, Chap. 13. Sect. 8. Words spoken *de Futuro* when the Will of him that speaketh them may be gathered by other Signs, may be taken very often as if they were meant *de Prasenti* : For when it appeareth, that he that giveth, would have his words so understood by him to whom he giveth, as if he did actually transfer his Right, then he must needs be understood to will all that is necessary to the same.

7. When a Man transferreth any Right of His to another, without Consideration of reciprocal Benefit past, present, or to come, this is called *Free Gift*. And in Free Gift, no other Words can be binding,

binding, but those which are *de Prasenti*, or *de Præterito*: For being *de Futuro* only, they transferr nothing, nor can they be understood, as if they proceeded from the Will of the Giver; because being a free Gift, it carrieth with it no Obligation greater than that which is enforced by the Words. For he that promiseth to give, without any other Consideration but his own Affection, so long as he hath not given, deliberateth still, according as the Causes of his Affections continue, or diminish: And he that deliberateth, hath not yet willed, because the Will is the Last Act of his Deliberation. He that promiseth therefore, is not thereby a *Donor*, but *Doson*; which Name was given to that *Antiochus*, that promised often, but seldom gave.

8. When a Man transferreth his Right upon Consideration of reciprocal Benefit, this is not Free Gift, but Mutual *Donation*, and is called *Contract*. And in all Contracts, either both Parties presently perform, and put each other into a Certainty and Assurance of enjoying what they contract for. As when Men buy or sell, or barter; Or one Party performeth presently, and the other promiseth, as when one selleth upon Trust; Or else neither Party performeth presently, but trust one another. And it is impossible there should be any Kind of Contract besides these three. For either both the Contractors trust, or neither; or else one trusteth, and the other not.

9. In all Contracts where there is Trust, the Promise of him that is trusted, is called a *Covenant*. And this though it be a Promise, and of the Time to come, yet it doth transfer the Right, when that
Time

Time cometh, no less than an actual Donation. For it is a manifest Sign, that he which did perform, understood it was the Will of Him that was trusted, to perform also. Promises therefore, upon Consideration of reciprocal Benefit, are Covenants and Signs of the Will, or last Act of Deliberation, whereby the Liberty of performing, or not performing, is taken away, and consequently are obligatory. For where Liberty ceaseth, there beginneth Obligation.

10. Nevertheless, in Contracts that consist of such mutual Trust, as that nothing be by either Party performed for the present, when the Contract is between such as are not compellable, he that performeth first, considering the Disposition of Men to take Advantage of every thing for their Benefit, doth but betray himself thereby to the Covetousness or other Passion of Him with whom he contracteth. And therefore such Covenants are of none Effect. For there is no Reason why the one should perform first, if the other be likely not to perform afterward. And whether he be likely or not, He that doubteth, shall be Judge himself, as hath been said, Chap. 1. Sect. 8. as long as they remain in the Estate and Liberty of Nature. But when there shall be such Power Coercive over both the Parties, as shall deprive them of their private Judgments in this Point, then may such Covenants be effectual, seeing he that performeth first shall have no reasonable Cause to doubt of the Performance of the other, that may be compelled thereunto.

11. And forasmuch as in all Covenants, and Contracts, and Donations, the Acceptance of him
to

to whom the Right is transferred, is necessary to the Essence of those Covenants, Donations, &c. It is impossible to make a Covenant or Donation to any, that by Nature, or Absence, are unable; or if able, do not actually declare their Acceptation of the same. First of all therefore, it is impossible for any Man to make a Covenant with God Almighty, farther than it hath pleased Him to declare who shall receive and accept of the said Covenant in his Name. Also it is impossible to make Covenant with those Living Creatures, of whose Wills we have no sufficient Sign, for Want of Common Language.

12. A Covenant to do any Action at a certain Time and Place, is then dissolved by the Covenanter, when that Time cometh, either by the Performance, or by the Violation. For a Covenant is void that is once impossible. But a Covenant not to do without Time limited, which is as much as to say, a Covenant never to do, is dissolved by the Covenanter then only, when he violateth it, or dyeth. And generally, all Covenants are dischargeable by the Covenantee, to whose Benefit, and by whose Right, he that maketh the Covenant is obliged. This Right therefore of the Covenantee relinquished, is a Release of the Covenant. And universally, for the same Reason, all Obligations are determinable at the Will of the Obliger.

13. It is a Question often moved, Whether such Covenants oblige, as are extorted from Men by Fear. As for Example, Whether if a Man for Fear of Death, hath promised to give a Thief an hundred Pounds the next day, and not discover him;

him; Whether such Covenant be obligatory, or not. And though in some Cases such Covenant may be void, yet it is not therefore void, because extorted by Fear. For there appeareth no Reason, why that which we do upon Fear, should be less firm than that which we do for Covetousness. For both the One and the Other maketh the Action Voluntary. And if no Covenant should be Good, that proceedeth from Fear of Death, no Conditions of Peace between Enemies, nor any Laws, could be of Force, which are all consented to from that Fear. For who would lose the Liberty that Nature hath given him, of governing himself by his own Will and Power, if they feared not Death in the retaining of it? What Prisoner in War might be trusted to seek his Ransom, and ought not rather to be killed, if he were not tyed by the Grant of his Life, to perform his Promise? But after the Introduction of Policy and Laws, the Case may alter; for if by the Law the Performance of such a Covenant be forbidden, then he that promiseth any Thing to a Thief, not only may, but must refuse to perform it. But if the Law forbid not the Performance, but leave it to the Will of the Promiser, then is the Performance still lawful: and the Covenant of Things lawful is obligatory, even towards a Thief.

14. He that giveth, promiseth or covenanteth to one, and after, giveth, promiseth, or covenanteth the same to another, maketh void the latter Act. For it is impossible for a Man to transfer that Right which he himself hath not; and that Right he hath not, which he himself hath before transferred.

15. An

15. An *Oath* is a Clause annexed to a Promise, containing a Renunciation of Gods Mercy by him that promiseth, in case he perform not as far as is lawful and possible for him to do. And this appeareth by the Words which make the Essence of the Oath, *So help me God.* So also was it amongst the Heathen. And the Form of the Romans was, *Thou Jupiter kill him that breaketh, as I kill this Beast.* The Intention therefore of an Oath being to provoke Vengeance upon the *Breakers* of Covenant; it is to no purpose to swear by Men, be they never so great, because their Punishment by divers Accidents may be avoided, whether they will, or no, but God's Punishment not. Though it were a Custom of many Nations, to swear by the Life of their Princes; yet those Princes being ambitious of divine Honour, give sufficient Testimony, that they believed, Nothing ought to be sworn by, but the Deity.

16. And seeing Men cannot be afraid of the Power they believe not, and an Oath is to no purpose, without Fear of Him they swear by, it is necessary that he that sweareth, do it in that Form which himself admitteth in his own Religion, and not in that Form which he useth, that putteth him to the Oath. For though all Men may know by Nature, that there is an Almighty Power, nevertheless they believe not, that they swear by him in any other Form or Name, than what their own (which they think the true) Religion teacheth them.

17. And by the Definition of an Oath, it appeareth that it addeth not a greater Obligation to perform the Covenant sworn, than the Covenant
nant

nant carrieth in it self, but it putteth a Man into greater Danger, and of greater Punishment.

18. Covenants and Oaths are *de Voluntariis*, that is, *de Possilibus*. Nor can the Covenantee understand the Covenanter to promise *Impossibles*; for they fall not under Deliberation: and consequently, (by Chap. 13. Sect. 10. which maketh the Covenanter Interpreter) no Covenant is understood to bind further, than to our best Endeavour; either in Performance of the Thing promised, or in something Equivalent.

CHAP. III.

1. *That Men stand to their Covenants.*
 2. *Injury defined.*
 3. *That Injury is done only to the Covenantor.*
 4. *The Signification of those Names, Just, Unjust.*
 5. *Justice not rightly divided into Commutative, and Distributive.*
 6. *It is a Law of Nature, that he that is trusted, turn not that trust to the Damage of Him that trusteth.*
 7. *Ingratitude defined.*
 8. *It is a Law of Nature, to endeavour to accommodate one another.*
 9. *And that Man forgive upon Cautions for the Future.*
 10. *And that Revenge ought to respect the Future only.*
 11. *That Reproach and Contempt declared, is against the Law of Nature.*
 12. *That Indifference of Commerce is of the Law of Nature.*
 13. *That Messengers employed to procure or maintain Peace, ought to be safe by the Law of Nature.*
1. **I**T is a common Saying that Nature maketh nothing in vain. And it is most certain, that as the Truth of a Conclusion, is no more but the Truth of the Premises that make it; so the Force of

of the Command, or Law of Nature, is no more than the Force of the Reasons inducing thereunto. Therefore the Law of Nature mentioned in the former Chapter, Sect. 2. namely, *That every Man should divest himself of the Right, &c.* were utterly vain, and of none Effect, if this also were not a Law of the same Nature, *That every Man is obliged to stand to, and perform, those Covenants he maketh.* For what Benefit is it to a Man, that any thing be promised, or given unto him, if he that giveth, or promiseth, performeth not, or retaineth still the Right of taking back what he hath given?

2. The Breach or Violation of Covenant, is that which Men call *Injury*, consisting in some Action or Omission, which is therefore called *Unjust*. For it is Action or Omission, without *Just*, or Right, which was transferred or relinquished before. There is a great Similitude between that we call *Injury*, or *Injustice* in the Actions and Conversations of Men in the World, and that which is called *Absurd* in the Arguments and Disputations of the Schools. For as he which is driven to contradict an Assertion by Him before maintained, is said to be reduced to an Absurdity; so he that through Passion doth, or omitteth that which before by Covenant he promised to do, or not to omit, is said to commit Injustice; And there is in every Breach of Covenant a Contradiction properly so called. For he that covenanteth, willeth to do, or omit, in the Time to come. And he that doth any Action, willeth it in that present, which is part of the Future Time contained in the Covenant. And therefore he that violateth a Covenant, willeth the Doing and the not Doing of the same Thing, at the same Time, which

is a Plain Contradiction. And so *Injury* is an *Absurdity* of Conversation, as *Absurdity* is a Kind of *Injustice* in Disputation.

3. In all Violation of Covenant, (to whomsoever accrueth the Damage) the Injury is done only to him to whom the Covenant was made. For Example: If a Man covenant to obey his Master, and the Master command him to give Money to a Third, which he promiseth to do, and doth not, though this be to the Damage of the Third, yet the Injury is done to the Master only. For he could violate no Covenant with him, with whom none was made, and therefore doth him no Injury. For Injury consisteth in Violation of Covenant by the Definition thereof.

4. The names of *Just*, *Unjust*, *Justice*, *Injustice*, are Equivocal, and signifie diversly. For Justice and Injustice, when they be attributed to Actions, signifie the same Thing with *no Injury*, and *Injury*, and denominate the Action *Just*, or *Unjust*, but not the Man so. For they denominate him *Guilty*, or *Not Guilty*. But when Justice or Injustice, are attributed to Men, they signifie *Proneness*, and Affection and Inclination of Nature, that is to say, Passions of the Mind, apt to produce just and unjust Actions. So that when a Man is said to be *Just*, or *Unjust*; not the Action, but the Passion and Aptitude, to do such Actions, is considered. And therefore a Just Man may have committed an Unjust Act; and an Unjust Man may have done justly, not only one, but most of his Actions. For there is an *oderunt peccare* in the Unjust, as well as in the Just, but from different Causes. For the Unjust Man who abstaineth from Injuries for Fear of Punishment,

nishment, declareth plainly, that the Justice of his Actions dependeth upon Civil Constitution, from whence Punishments proceed, which would otherwise in the Estate of Nature be unjust, according to the Fountain from whence they spring. This Distinction therefore of *Justice*, and *Injustice*, ought to be remembred, that when Injustice is taken for Guilty, the Action is Unjust, but not therefore the Man; and when Justice is taken for *Guiltlessness*, the Actions are just, and yet not always the Man. Likewise when Justice and Injustice are taken for Habits of the Mind, the Man may be just, or unjust, and yet not all his Actions so.

5. Concerning the Justice of Actions, the same is usually divided into two Kinds, whereof Men call the one *Commutative*, and the other *Distributive*; and are said to consist, the one in Proportion *Arithmetical*; the other in *Geometrical*: and *Commutative* Justice, they place in Permutation, as Buying, Selling, and Bartering; *Distributive*, in giving to every Man according to their Deserts. Which Distinction is not well made, in as much as Injury, which is the Injustice of Action, consisteth not in the Inequality of the Things changed, or distributed, but in the Inequality that Men (contrary to Nature and Reason) assume unto themselves above their Fellows. Of which Inequality, shall be spoken hereafter. And for *Commutative* Justice placed in Buying and Selling, though the Thing bought be unequal to the Price given for it, yet forasmuch as both the Buyer and the Seller are made Judges of the Value, and are thereby both satisfied, there can be no Injury done on either Side, neither Party having trusted, or covenanted with the other. And for

Distributive Justice, which consisteth in the Distribution of our own Benefits, seeing a Thing is therefore said to be our own, because we may dispose of it at our own Pleasure, it can be no Injury to any Man, though our Liberality be farther extended towards another, than towards him; unless we be thereto obliged by Covenant: and then the Injustice consisteth in the Violation of that Covenant, and not in the Inequality of Distribution.

6. It happeneth many times that Man benefiteth, or contributeth, to the Power of another, without any Covenant, but only upon Confidence and Trust of obtaining the Grace and Favour of that other, whereby he may procure a greater, or no less Benefit and Assistance to himself. For by Necessity of Nature, every Man doth in all His voluntary Actions intend some good unto Himself. In this Case it is a Law of Nature, *That no Man suffer him, that thus trusteth to his Charity, or good Affection towards him, to be in the worse Estate for his Trusting.* For if he shall so do, Men will not dare to confer mutually to each others Defence, nor put themselves into each others Mercy upon any Terms whatsoever, but rather abide the utmost and worst Event of Hostility; by which general Diffidence, Men will not only be enforced to war, but also afraid to come so much within the Danger of one another, as to make any Overture of Peace. But this is to be understood of those only, that confer their Benefits (as I have said) upon Trust only, and not for Triumph or Ostentation. For as when they do it upon Trust, the End they aimed at, namely to be well used, is the Reward; so also when they do it for Ostentation, they have the Reward in themselves.

7. But

7. But seeing in this Case there passeth no Covenant, the Breach of this Law of Nature is not to be called *Injury*. It hath another Name, to wit, *Ingratitude*.

8. It is also a Law of Nature, *That every Man do help and endeavour to accommodate each other as far as may be, without Danger of their Persons, and loss of their Means, to maintain and defend themselves.* For seeing the Causes of War and Desolation proceed from those Passions, by which we strive to accommodate our selves, and to leave others as far as we can behind us, it followeth, that that Passion by which we strive mutually to accommodate each other, must be the Cause of Peace. And this Passion is that Charity defined, Chap. 9. Sect. 17.

9. And in this Precept of Nature, is included and comprehended also this, *That a Man forgive and pardon him that hath done him wrong, upon his Repentance and Caution for the Future.* For Pardon, is Peace granted to him, that (having provoked to War) demandeth it. It is not therefore Charity, but Fear, when a Man giveth Peace to him that repenteth not, nor giveth Caution for maintaining thereof in the Time to come. For he that repenteth not, remaineth with the Affection of an Enemy; as also doth he that refuseth to give Caution; and consequently, is presumed not to seek after Peace, but Advantage. And therefore to forgive Him is not commanded in this Law of Nature, nor is Charity, but may sometime be Prudence. Otherwise, not to pardon upon Repentance and Caution, considering Men cannot abstain from provoking one another, is never to give Peace. And that is against the general Definition of the Law of Nature.

10. And seeing the Law of Nature commandeth Pardon, when there is Repentance and Caution, for the Future it followeth, that the same Law ordaineth, *That no Revenge be taken upon the Consideration only of the Offence past, but of the Benefit to come*, that is to say, That all Revenge ought to tend to Amendment, either of the Person offending, or of others, by the Example of His Punishment; which is sufficiently apparent, in that the Law of Nature commandeth Pardon, where the Future Time is secured. The same is also apparent by this, That Revenge when it considereth the Offence past, is nothing else, but present Triumph and Glory, and directeth to no End: and what is directed to no End, is therefore unprofitable; and consequently the Triumph of Revenge, is Vain Glory: and whatsoever is vain, is against Reason; and to hurt one another without Reason, is contrary to that, which by Supposition is every Mans Benefit, namely Peace, and what is contrary to Peace, is contrary to the Law of Nature.

11. And because all Signs which we shew to one another of Hatred and Contempt, provoke in the highest Degree to Quarrel and Battel, (in as much as Life it self, with the Condition of enduring Scorn, is not esteemed worth the enjoying, much less Peace) it must necessarily be implied as a Law of Nature, *That no Man reproach, revile, deride, or any otherwise declare his Hatred, Contempt, or Disesteem of any other.* But this Law is very little practised. For what is more ordinary than Reproaches of those that are rich, towards them that are not? or of those that sit in Place of Judicature, towards those that are accused at the Bar? altho' to grieve them in that Manner, be no Part of the Punishment

nishment for their Crime, nor contained in their Office. But Use hath prevailed, That what was lawful in the Lord towards the Servant whom he maintaineth, is also practised as lawful in the more Migh-ty towards the Less; though they contribute no-thing towards their Maintenance.

12. It is also a Law of Nature, *That one Man al-
low Commerce and Traffick indifferently to one another.* For
he that alloweth that to one Man, which he denyeth
to another, declareth his hatred to Him, to whom
he denyeth. And to declare Hatred, is War. And
upon this Title was grounded, the great War be-
tween the *Athenians*, and the *Peloponnesians*. For
would the *Athenians* have condescended to suffer the
Megareans, their Neighbours, to traffick in their
Ports, and Markets, that War had not begun.

13. And this also is a Law of Nature, *That all
Messengers of Peace, and such as are employed to procure
and maintain Amity between Man and Man, may safely
come and go.* For seeing Peace is the General Law of
Nature, the Means thereto (such as are these Men)
must in the same Law be comprehended.

CHAP. IV.

1. *A Law of Nature, That every Man acknowledge other for his Equal.*
2. *Another, That Men allow $\text{Æqualia} \text{Æqualibus}$.*
3. *Another, That those Things which cannot be divided, be used in common.*
4. *Another, That Things indivisible and incommunicable, be divided by Lot.*
5. *Natural Lot, Primogeniture, and first Possession.*
6. *That Men submit to Arbitration.*
7. *Of an Arbitrator.*
8. *That no Man press his Counsel upon any Man against his Will.*
9. *How to know suddenly what is the Law of Nature.*
10. *That the Law of Nature taketh Place after Security from others to observe the same.*
11. *The Right of Nature not to be taken away by Custom, nor the Law of Nature abrogated by any Act.*
12. *Why the Dictates of Nature are called Laws.*
13. *Whatsoever is against Conscience in a Man that is his own Judge, is against the Law of Nature.*
14. *Of Malum Poenæ, Malum Culpæ; Virtus and Vice.*

15. *Aptitude*

15. *Aptitude to Society, fulfilleth the Law of Nature.*

1. **T**He Question, Which is the Better Man, is determinable only in the Estate of Government and Policy, though it be mistaken for a Question of Nature, not only by ignorant Men, that think one Mans Blood better than anothers by Nature, but also by Him, whose Opinions are at this Day, and in these Parts, of greater Authority than any other humane Writings. For he putteth so much Difference between the Powers of Men by Nature, that he doubteth not to set down, as the Ground of all his Politicks, That some Men are by Nature worthy to govern, and others by Nature ought to serve. Which foundation hath not only weakened the whole Frame of his Politicks, but hath also given Men Colour and Pretences, whereby to disturb and hinder the Peace of one another. For though there were such a Difference of Nature, that Master and Servant were not by Consent of Men, but by inherent Virtue; yet who hath that Eminency of Virtue, above others, and who is so stupid, as not to govern himself, shall never be agreed upon amongst Men, who do every one naturally think himself, as able, at the least, to govern another, as another to govern him. And when there was any Contentation between the Finer and the Courser Wits, (as there hath been often in Times of Sedition & Civil War) for the most part, these latter carried away the Victory; and as long as Men arrogate to themselves more Honour than they give to others, it cannot be imagined, how they can possibly live in Peace: and consequently we are to suppose, that for Peace Sake, Nature hath ordained this Law,

That

That every Man acknowledge other for his Equal. And the Breach of this Law, is that we call *Pride*.

2. As it was necessary that a Man should not retain his Right to every Thing, so also was it, that he should retain his Right to some Things; To his own Body (for Example) the Right of Defending, whereof he could not transfer; To the Use of Fire, Water, Free Air, and Place to live in, and to all Things necessary for Life. Nor doth the Law of Nature command any Divesting of other Rights; than of those only which cannot be retained without the Loss of Peace. Seeing then many Rights are retained, when we enter into Peace one with another, Reason and the Law of Nature dictateth, *Whatsoever Right any Man requireth to retain, he allow every other Man to retain the same.* For he that doth not so, alloweth not the Equality mentioned in the former Section. For there is no Acknowledgment of Worth, without Attribution of the Equality of Benefit and Respect. And this allowance of *Aequalia Aequalibus*, is the same thing with the allowing of *Proportionalia Proportionalibus*. For when a Man alloweth to every Man alike, the Allowance he maketh, will be in the same Proportion, in which are the Numbers of Men to whom they are made. And this is it Men mean by *Distributive Justice*, and is properly termed *Equity*. The Breach of the Law is that which the Greeks call *πλεονεξία*, which is commonly rendred *Covetousness*, but seemeth to be more precisely expressed by the word *Incroaching*.

3. If there pass no other Covenant, the Law of Nature is, *That such Things as cannot be divided, be used in common, proportionably to the Numbers of them that are to use the same, or without Limitation, when the*
Quantity

Quantity thereof sufficeth. For first supposing the Thing to be used in common, not sufficient for them that are to use it without Limitation, if a few shall make more Use thereof than the rest, that Equality is not observed, which is required in the second Section. And this is to be understood, as all the rest of the Laws of Nature, without any other Covenant antecedent: for a Man may have given away his Right of Common, and so the Case be altered.

4. In those Things which neither can be divided, nor used in common, the Rule of Nature must needs be one of these, *Lot, or alternate Use*: for besides these two Ways, there can no other Equality be imagined; and for alternate Use, he that beginneth, hath the Advantage; and to reduce that Advantage to Equality, there is no other Way but Lot, in Things therefore indivisible and incommunicable, it is the Law of Nature, *That the Use be alternate, or the Advantage given away by Lot*; because there is no other Way of Equality. And Equality is the Law of Nature.

5. There be two Sorts of Lots; one Arbitrary, made by Men, and commonly known by the Names of *Lot, Chance, Hazzard*, and the like; and there is *Natural Lot*, such as is *Primogeniture*, which is no more but the Chance, or Lot, of being first born, which it seemeth they considered, that call Inheritance by the Name of *κληρονομία*, which signifieth *Distribution by Lot*. Secondly, *prima Occupatio*, first Seizing, or finding of a Thing, whereof no Man made Use before, which for the most part also is merely *Chance*.

9. Although Men agree upon these Laws of Nature, and endeavour to observe the same; yet considering

considering the Passions of Men, that make it difficult to understand by what Actions, and Circumstances of Actions, those Laws are broken, there must needs arise many great Controversies about the Interpretation thereof, by which the Peace must needs be dissolved, and Men return again to their former Estate of Hostility. For the taking away of which Controversies, it is necessary that there be some common *Arbitrator* and *Judge*, to whose Sentence, both the Parties in the Controversies ought to stand. And therefore it is a Law of Nature, *That in every Controversie, the Parties thereto ought mutually to agree upon an Arbitrator, whom they both trust, and mutually to covenant to stand to the Sentence he shall give therein.* For where every Man is his own *Judge*, there properly is no Judge at all; as where every Man carveth out his own Right, it hath the same effect, as if there were no Right at all: and where is no Judge, there is no End of Controversie: And therefore the Right of Hostility remaineth.

7. An *Arbitrator* therefore, or he that is Judge, is trusted by the Parties to any Controversie, to determine the same by the Declaration of his own Judgment therein. Out of which followeth first, that the Judge ought not to be concerned in the Controversie He endeth, for in that Case he is a Party, and ought by the same Reason to be judged by another. Secondly, that he maketh no Covenant with either of the Parties, to pronounce Sentence for the one, more than for the other. Nor doth he covenant so much, as that his Sentence shall be just; for that were to make the Parties Judges of the Sentence, whereby the Controversie would remain still undecided. Nevertheless for the Trust reposed

eposed in him, and for the Equality which the Law of Nature requireth him to consider in the Parties, he violateth that Law, if for Favour, or Hatred to either Party, he give other Sentence than he thinketh Right. And thirdly, that no Man ought to make himself Judge in any Controversie between others, unless they consent and agree thereto.

8. It is also the Law of Nature, *That no Man obtrude or press his Advice or Counsel to any Man, that declareth himself unwilling to hear the same.* For seeing a Man taketh Counsel concerning what is Good or Hurt of himself only, and not of his Counsellor, and that Counsel is a voluntary Action, and therefore tendeth also to the Good of the Counsellor, there may be often just Cause to suspect the Counsellor: and though there be none, yet seeing Counsel unwillingly heard, is a needless Offence to him that is not willing to hear it, and Offences tend all to the Breach of Peace, it is therefore against the Law of Nature to obtrude it.

9. A Man that shall see these Laws of Nature set down and inferred with so many Words, and so much adoe, may think there is yet much more Difficulty and Subtily required to acknowledge and do according to the said Laws in every sudden Occasion, when a Man hath but a little Time to consider. And while we consider Man in most Passions, as of *Anger, Ambition, Covetousness, Vain-Glory*, and the like, that tend to the excluding of natural Equality, it is true. But without these Passions, there is an easie Rule to know upon a sudden, whether the Action I be to do, be against the Law of Nature, or not. And it is but this; *That a Man imagine Himself in the Place of the Party with whom*

whom He hath to do, and reciprocally him in His. Which is no more but a changing (as it were) of the Scales. For every Mans Passion weigheth heavy in his own Scale, but not in the Scale of his Neighbour. And this Rule is very well known and expressed in this Old Dictate, *Quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri ne feceris.*

10. These Laws of Nature, the Summ whereof consisteth, in forbidding us to be our own Judges, and our own Carvers, and in commanding us to accommodate one another; In case they should be observed by some, and not by others, would make the Observers but a Prey to them that should neglect them, leaving the Good both without Defence against the Wicked, and also with a Charge to assist them: which is against the Scope of the said Laws, that are made only for the Protection and Defence of them that keep them. Reason therefore, and the Law of Nature over and above all these particular Laws, doth dictate this Law in general, *That those particular Laws be so far observed, as they subject us not to any Incommodity, that in our own Judgment may arise, by the neglect thereof in those towards whom we observe them;* and consequently requireth no more but the Desire and constant Intention to endeavour and be ready to observe them, unless there be Cause to the contrary in other Mens Refusal to observe them towards us. The Force therefore of the Law of Nature, is not in *Foro externo*, till there be security for Men to obey it, but is always in *Foro interno*, wherein the Action of Obedience being unsafe, the Will and Readiness to perform, is taken for the Performance.

11. Amongst

11. Amongst the Laws of Nature, Customs and Prescriptions are not numbred. For whatsoever Action is against Reason, though it be reiterated never so often, or that there be never so many Precedents thereof, is still against Reason, and therefore not a Law of Nature, but contrary to it. But Consent and Covenant may so alter the Cases, which in the Law of Nature may be put, by changing the Circumstances, that that which was Reason before, may afterwards be against it; and yet is Reason still the Law. For though every Man be bound to allow equally to another, yet if that other shall see cause to renounce the same, and make himself Inferiour, than, if from thenceforth he consider him as Inferiour, he breaketh not thereby that Law of Nature, that commandeth to allow Equality. In sum, *A Mans own Consent may abridge him of the Liberty which the Law of Nature leaveth him, but Custom not; nor can either of them abrogate either these, or any other Law of Nature.*

12. And forasmuch as Law (to speak properly) is a Command, and these Dictates, as they proceed from Nature, are not Commands, they are not therefore called Laws, in Respect of Nature, but in Respect of the Author of Nature, God Almighty.

13. And seeing the Laws of Nature concern the Conscience, not he only breaketh them that doth any Action contrary, but also he whose Action is conformable to them, in case he think it contrary. For though the Action chance to be right, yet in his Judgement he despiseth the Law.

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14. Every

14. Every Man by natural Passion, calleth that Good which pleaseth him for the present, or so far forth as he can foresee; and in like Manner, that which displeaseth him, Evil. And therefore he that foreseeth the whole Way to his Preservation, (which is the End that every One by Nature aimeth at,) must also call it Good, and the contrary Evil. And this is that Good and Evil, which not every Man in Passion calleth so, but all Men by Reason. And therefore the Fulfilling of all these Laws is Good in Reason, and the Breaking of them Evil. And so also the Habit, or Disposition, or Intention to fulfill them Good; and the Neglect of them Evil. And from hence cometh that Distinction of *Malum Pœna*, and *Malum Culpa*; for *Malum Pœna* is any pain or molestation of the Mind whatsoever; but *Malum Culpa* is that Action which is contrary to Reason, and the Law of Nature: As also the Habit of doing according to these and other Laws of Nature, that tend to our Preservation, is that we call *Virtues*; and the Habit of doing the contrary *Vice*. As for Example, Justice is that Habit by which we stand to Covenants, Injustice the contrary Vice; Equity that Habit by which we allow Equality of Nature, Arrogancy the contrary Vice; Gratitude the Habit whereby we requite the Benefit and Trust of others, Ingratitude the contrary Vice; Temperance the Habit, by which we abstain from all Things that tend to our Destruction, Intemperance the contrary Vice; Prudence the same with Virtue in general. As for the common Opinion, that Virtue consisteth in Mediocrity, and Vice in Extreams, I see no ground for it, nor can find any such Mediocrity.

Mediocrity. Courage may be Virtue, when the Daring is Extream, if the Cause be Good; and extream Fear, no Vice, when the Danger is Extream. To give a Man more than his Due, is no Injustice, though it be to give him less: and in Gifts it is not the Summ that maketh Liberality, but the Reason. And so in all other Virtues and Vices. I know that this Doctrine of Mediocrity is *Aristotle's*, but his Opinions concerning Virtue and Vice, are no other than those, which were received then, and are still by the generality of Men unstudied, and therefore not very likely to be accurate.

15. The Summ of Virtue is to be Sociable with them that will be Sociable, and Formidable to them that will not. And the same is the Summ of the Law of Nature: For in being Sociable, the Law of Nature taketh place by the way of Peace and Society; and to be Formidable, is the Law of Nature in War, where to be feared is a Protection a Man hath from his own Power: and as the former consisteth in Actions of Equity and Justice, the latter consisteth in Actions of Honour. And Equity, Justice, and Honour, contain all Virtues whatsoever.

CHAP. V.

A Confirmation out of Holy Scripture of the principal Points mentioned in the two last Chapters concerning the Law of Nature.

1. **T**He Laws mentioned in the former Chapters, as they are called the Laws of Nature, for that they are the Dictates of Natural Reason, and also Moral Laws, because they concern the Manners and Conversation, one towards another; so are they also Divine Laws in Respect of the Author thereof, God Almighty; and ought therefore to agree, or at least, not to be repugnant to the Word of God revealed in Holy Scripture. In this Chapter therefore, I shall produce such Places of Scripture, as appear to be most consonant to the said Laws.

2. And first, the Word of God seemeth to place the Divine Law in Reason, by all such Texts as ascribe the same to the Heart and Understanding; as Psal. 40. 8. *Thy Law is in my Heart.* Heb. 8. 10. *After those Days, saith the Lord, I will put my Laws in their Mind:* And Heb. 10. 16. The same, Psal. 37. 31. speaking of the Righteous Man, he saith, *The Law of God is in his Heart.* Psal. 19. 7. 8. *The Law of God is perfect, converting the soul. It giveth Wisdom to the simple, and light unto the eyes.* Jer. 31. 33. *I will put my Law in their inward parts, and write it in their Hearts.* And Joh. 1. the Law-giver

giver Himself, God Almighty, is called by the Name of *Αἰών*, which is also called, *ver. 4. The Light of Men*; and *vers. 9. The Light which lighteth every Man, which cometh into the World.* All which are Descriptions of Natural Reason.

3. And that the Law Divine, for so much as is Moral, are those Precepts which tend to Peace, seemeth to be much confirmed by such Places of Scripture, as these, *Rom. 3. 17. Righteousness (which is the fulfilling of the Law) is called, The way of Peace.* And *Psal. 85. 10. Righteousness and Peace shall kiss each other.* And *Matth. 5. 9. Blessed are the Peace-makers.* And *Heb. 7. 2. Melchisedeck King of Salem* is interpreted *King of Righteousness*, and *King of Peace.* And *vers. 21. Our Saviour Christ* is said to be, *a Priest for ever after the Order of Melchisedeck*: Out of which may be inferred, That the Doctrine of our Saviour Christ annexeth the Fulfilling of the Law to Peace.

4. That the Law of Nature is unalterable, is intimated by this, That the Priesthood of *Melchisedeck* is everlasting; and by the Words of our Saviour, *Matth. 5. 18. Heaven and Earth shall pass away, but one jot or Tittle of the Law shall not pass till all Things be fulfilled.*

5. That Men ought to stand to their Covenants, is taught, *Psal. 15. where the Question being asked, vers. 1. Lord who shall dwell in thy Tabernacle, &c.* It is answered, *vers. 4. He that sweareth to his own Hinderance, and yet changeth not.* And that Men ought to be gratified, where no Covenant passeth, *Deut. 25. 4. Thou shalt not muzzle the Ox that treadeth out the Corn*, which *S. Paul, 1 Cor. 9. 5.* interpreteth not of Oxen but of Men.

6. That Men content themselves with Equality, as it is the Foundation of Natural Law, so also is it of the second Table, of the Divine Law, Matth. 22. 39. 40. *Thou shalt love thy Neighbour as thy self.* On these two Laws depend the whole Law and the Prophets; which is not so to be understood, as that a Man should study so much his Neighbours Profit as his own, or that he should divide his Goods amongst his Neighbours; but that he should esteem his Neighbour worthy all Rights and Priviledges that himself enjoyeth; and attribute unto him, whatsoever he looketh should be attributed unto himself: which is no more, but that he should be humble, meek, and content with Equality.

7. And that in Distributing of Right amongst Equals, that Distribution is to be made according to the Proportions of the Numbers, which is the giving of *equalia equalibus*, & *proportionalia proportionalibus*; we have, Numb. 26 53, 54. the Commandment of God to Moses; *Thou shalt divide the Land according to the Number of Names; to many thou shalt give more, to few thou shalt give less, to every one according to his Number.* That Decision by Lot is a Means of Peace, Prov. 18. 18. *The Lot causeth Contention to cease, and maketh Partition among the Mighty.*

8. That the Accomodation and forgiveness of one another, which have before been put for Laws of Nature, are also Law Divine, there is no Question. For they are the Essence of Charity, which is the Scope of the whole Law. That we ought not to reproach, or reprehend one another, is the Doctrine of our Saviour, Matth. 7. 1. *Judge not, that*

that ye be not judged. Verſ. 3. *Why ſeeſt thou the Mote that is in thy Brothers Eye, and ſeeſt not the Beam that is in thine own Eye?* Alſo the Law that forbiddeth us to preſs our Counſel upon others further than they admit, is a Divine Law. For after our Charity and Deſire to rectifie one another is rejected, to preſs it farther, is to reprehend him, and condemn him, which is forbidden in the Text laſt recited; as alſo Rom. 14. 12. *Every one of us ſhall give Account of himſelf to God. Let us not therefore judge one another any more, but uſe your Judgement rather in this, that no Man put an Occaſion to fall, or a Stumbling Block before his Brother.*

9. Farther, The Rule of Men concerning the Law of Nature, *Quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri ne feceris*, is confirmed by the like, Matth. 7. 12. *Whatſoever therefore you would have Men do unto you, that do you unto them: for this is the Law and the Prophets.* And Rom. 2. 1. *In that thou judgeſt another, thou condemneſt thy ſelf, &c.*

10. It is alſo manifeſt by the Scriptures, That theſe Laws concern only the Tribunal of our Conſcience; and that the Actions contrary to them, ſhall be no farther puniſhed by God Almighty, than as they proceed from Negligence, or Contempt. And firſt, that theſe Laws are made to the Conſcience, appeareth, Matth. 5. 20. *For I ſay unto you, Except your Righteouſneſs exceed the Righteouſneſs of the Scribes and Pharifees, ye ſhall not enter into the Kingdom of Heaven.* Now the Pharifees were the moſt exact amongſt the Jews in the external Performance; they therefore muſt want the Sincerity of Conſcience; elſe could not our Saviour have required a greater Righte-

ousness than theirs. For the same Reason our Saviour Christ saith, *The Publican departed from the Temple justified, rather than the Pharisee.* And Christ saith, *His Yoke is easie, and his Burthen light;* which proceedeth from this, that Christ required no more than our best Endeavour. And *Rom. 14. 23. He that doubteth, is condemned, if he eat.* And in innumerable Places both in the Old and New Testament, God Almighty declareth, that he taketh the Will for the Deed, both in Good and Evil Actions. By all which it plainly appears, that the Divine Law is dictated to the Conscience. On the other side it is no less plain, that how many and hainous Actions soever a Man commit through Infirmitie, he shall nevertheless, whensoever he shall condemn the same in his own Conscience, be freed from the Punishments that to such Actions otherwise belong. For, *At what time soever a Sinner doth repent him of his Sins from the Bottom of his Heart, I will put all his Iniquities out of my Remembrance, saith the Lord.*

11. Concerning Revenge, which by the Law of Nature ought not to aim (as I have said, Chap. 3. Sect. 10.) at present Delight, but future Profit, there is some Difficulty made, as if the same accorded not with the Law Divine, by such as object the Continuance of Punishment after the Day of Judgement, when there shall be no Place, neither for Amendment, nor for Example. This Objection had been of some Force, if such Punishment had been ordained after all Sins were past; but considering the Punishment was instituted before Sin, it serveth to the Benefit of Mankind, because it keepeth Men in peaceable and virtuous

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Conversation by the Terrour. And therefore such Revenge was directed to the Future only.

12. Finally, There is no Law of Natural Reason, that can be against the Law Divine : for God Almighty hath given Reason to a Man to be a Light unto him. And I hope it is no Impiety to think, that God Almighty will require a strict Account thereof, at the Day of Judgement, as of the Instructions, which we were to follow in our Peregrination here, notwithstanding the Opposition and Affronts of Supernaturalists now a-days, to rational and moral Conversation.

CHAP.

CHAP. VI.

1. *That Men, notwithstanding these Laws, are still in the State of War, till they have Security one against another.*
2. *The Law of Nature in War, is nothing but Honour.*
3. *No Security without the Concord of many.*
4. *That Concord of many cannot be maintained without Power to keep them all in Awe.*
5. *The Cause why Concord remaineth in a Multitude of some irrational Creatures, and not of Men.*
6. *That Union is necessary for the maintaining of Concord.*
7. *How Union is made.*
8. *Body Politick defined.*
9. *Corporation defined.*
10. *Sovereign and Subject defined.*
11. *Two sorts of Bodies Politick, Patrimonial, and Commonwealth.*

1. **I**N Chap. 12. Sect. 16. of the Treatise of Humane Nature, it hath been shewed, that the Opinions Men have of the Rewards and Punishments which are to follow their Actions, are the Causes that make and govern the Will to those Actions. In this Estate of Man therefore, wherein all Men are equal, and every Man allowed to be his own Judge, the Fears they have one of another

other are equal, and every Mans Hopes consist in his own Sleight and Strength: & consequently when any Man by his natural Passion, is provoked to break these Laws of Nature, there is no Security in any other Man of his own Defence but *Anticipation*. And for this Cause, every Mans Right (howsoever he be inclined to Peace) of doing whatsoever seemeth good in his own Eyes, remaineth with him still, as the necessary Means of his Preservation. And therefore till there be Security amongst Men for the keeping of the Law of Nature one towards another, Men are still in the Estate of War, and nothing is unlawful to any Man that tendeth to his own Safety or Commodity: And this Safety and Commodity consisteth in the mutual Aid and Help of one another, whereby also followeth the mutual Fear of one another.

2. It is a Proverbial Saying, *Inter Arma silent Leges*. There is a little therefore to be said concerning the Laws that Men are to observe one towards another in Time of War, wherein every Mans Being and Well-being is the Rule of his Actions. Yet thus much the Law of Nature commandeth in War, That Men satiate not the Cruelty of their present Passions, whereby in their own Conscience they foresee no Benefit to come. For that betrayeth not a Necessity, but a Disposition of the Mind to War, which is against the Law of Nature. And in old Time we read, that Rapine was a Trade of Life, wherein nevertheless many of them that used it, did not only spare the Lives of those they invaded but left them also such Things, as were neces-

necessary to preserve that Life which they had given them; as namely their Oxen and Instruments for Tillage, though they carried away all their other Cattel and Substance. And as the Rapine it self was warranted in the Law of Nature, by the Want of Security otherwise to maintain themselves, so the Exercise of Cruelty was forbidden by the same Law of Nature, unless Fear suggested any thing to the contrary. For nothing but Fear can justify the Taking away of Anothers Life. And because Fear can hardly be made manifest, but by some Action dishonourable, that bewrayeth the Conscience of Ones own Weakness, all Men, in whom the Passion of Courage or Magnanimity hath been predominant, have abstained from Cruelty; inso-much, that though there be in War no Law, the Breach whereof is Injury, yet there are in War those Laws, the Breach whereof is Dishonour. In one Word therefore, the only Law of Actions in War, is *Honour*; and the Right of War, *Providence*.

3. And seeing Natural Aid is Necessary for Defence, as mutual Fear is necessary for Peace, we are to consider how Great Aids are required for such Defence, and for the Causing of such mutual Fear, as Men may not easily adventure on one another. And first it is evident, that the mutual Aid of two or three Men is of very little Security. For the Odds on the other side, of a Man or two, giveth sufficient Encouragement to an Assault. And therefore before Men have sufficient Security in the Help of one another, their Number must be so great, that the Odds of a few which the Enemy may have, be no certain and sensible Advantage.

4. And

4. And supposing how great a Number soever of Men assembled together for their mutual Defence, yet shall not the Effect follow, unless they all direct their Actions to one and the same End; which Direction to one and the same End is that which, Chap. 12. Sect. 7. is called *Consent*. This *Consent* (or Concord) amongst so many Men, though it may be made by the Fear of a present Invader, or by the Hope of a present Conquest, or Booty, and indure as long as that Action endureth, nevertheless by the Diversity of Judgments and Passions in so many Men contending naturally for Honour and Advantage one above another, it is impossible, not only that their Consent to aid each other against an Enemy, but also that the Peace should last between themselves, without some mutual and common Fear to rule them.

5. But contrary hereunto may be objected, the Experience we have of certain living Creatures irrational, that nevertheless continually live in such good Order and Government for their common Benefit, and are so free from Sedition and War amongst themselves, that for Peace, Profit, and Defence, nothing more can be imaginable. And the Experience we have in this, is in that little Creature the Bee, which is therefore reckoned amongst *Animalia Politica*. Why wherefore may not Men that foresee the Benefit of Concord, continually maintain the same without Compulsion, as well as they? To which I answer, That amongst other living Creatures, there is no Question of Precedence in their own Species, nor Strife about Honour, or Acknowledgment

ment of one anothers Wisdom, as there is amongst Men, from whence arise Envy and Hatred of one towards another, and from thence Sedition and War. Secondly, those living Creatures aim every one at Peace and Food common to them all; Men aim at Dominion, Superiority, and private Wealth, which are distinct in every Man, and breed Contention. Thirdly, those living Creatures that are without Reason, have not Learning enough to espy, or to think they espy any Defect in the Government; and therefore are contented therewith. But in a Multitude of Men, there are always some that think themselves wiser than the rest, and strive to alter what they think amiss, and divers of them strive to alter divers ways, and that causeth War. Fourthly, they want Speech, and are therefore unable to instigate one another to Faction, which Men want not. Fifthly, they have no Conception of Right and Wrong, but only of Pleasure and Pain, and therefore also no Censure of one another, nor of their Commander, as long as they are themselves at ease; whereas Men that make themselves Judges of Right and Wrong, are then least at quiet, when they are most at ease. Lastly, Natural Concord, such as is amongst those Creatures, is the Work of God by the Way of Nature; but Concord amongst Men is artificial, and by Way of Covenant. And therefore no Wonder, if such irrational Creatures as govern themselves in Multitude, do it much more firmly than Mankind, that do it by Arbitrary Institution.

6. It remaineth therefore still, that Consent (by which I understand the Concurrence of many Mens Wills to one Action.) is not sufficient Security for their common Peace, without the Erection of some common Power, by the Fear whereof, they may be compelled both to keep the Peace amongst themselves, & to joyn their Strengths together, against a common Enemy. And that this may be done, there is no Way imaginable, but only Union, which is defined Chap. 12. Sect. 8. to be the Involving, or including the Wills of many in the Will of one Man, or in the Will of the greatest Part of any one Number of Men, that is to say, in the Will of one Man, or of one *Council*. For a Council is nothing else, but an *Assembly* of Men deliberating concerning something common to them all.

7. The making of Union consisteth in this, That every Man by Covenant oblige himself to some one, and the same Man, or to some one and the same Council, by them all named and determined, to do those Actions, which the said Man or Council shall command them to do, and to do no Action, which He or They shall forbid, or command them not to do. And farther, in case it be a Council, whose Commands they covenant to obey, that then also they covenant, that every Man shall hold that for the Command of the whole Council, which is the Command of the greater Part of those Men, whereof such Council consisteth. And though the Will of Man being not voluntary, but the Beginning of voluntary Actions, is not subject to Deliberation and Covenant; yet when a Man
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covenanteth to subject his Will to the Command of another, he obligeth himself to this, that he resign his Strength and Means to him, whom he covenanteth to obey. And hereby he that is to command, may by the Use of all their Means and Strength, be able by the Terror thereof, to frame the Will of them all to Unity and Concord, amongst themselves.

8. This Union so made, is that which Men call now a-days, *A Body Politick*, or Civil Society; and the Greeks call it *Πόλις*, that is to say, a City, which may be defined to be a Multitude of Men, united as one Person, by a common Power, for their common Peace, Defence, and Benefit.

9. And as this Union into a City or Body Politick, is instituted with common Power over all the particular Persons, or Members thereof, to the common Good of them all; so also may there be amongst a Multitude of those Members instituted, a subordinate Union of certain Men, for certain common Actions to be done by those Men for some common Benefit of theirs, or of the whole City; as for subordinate Government, for Counsel, for Trade, and the like. And these Subordinate Bodies Politick are usually called *Corporations*; and their Power such over the particulars of their own Society, as the whole City, whereof they are Members, have allowed them.

10. In all Cities, or Bodies Politick not Subordinate, but Independent, that one Man, or one Counsel, to whom the particular Members have given that common Power, is called their *Sovereign*, and his Power, the Sovereign Power; which

which consisteth in the Power and the Strength, that every of the Members have transferred to him from themselves by Covenant. And because it is impossible for any man really to transfer his own Strength to another, or for that other to receive it; It is to be understood, that to transfer a Mans Power and Strength, is no more but to lay by, or relinquish his own Right of Resisting him to whom he so transferreth it. And every Member of the Body Politick, is called a *Subject*, to wit, to the *Sovereign*.

11. The Cause in general, which moveth a Man to become subject to another, is (as I have said already) the Fear of not otherwise preserving himself. And a Man may subject himself to him that invadeth, or may invade him, for Fear of him; or Men may joyn amongst themselves, to subject themselves to such as they shall agree upon for Fear of others. And when many Men subject themselves the former Way, there ariseth thence a Body Politick, as it were naturally. From whence proceedeth *Dominion*, *Paternal*, and *Despoticke*. And when they subject themselves the other Way, by mutual Agreement amongst many, the Body Politick they make, is for the most part, called a Commonwealth, in Distinction from the former, though the Name be the general Name for them both. And I shall speak in the first place of Commonwealths, and afterward of Bodies Politick, Patrimonial, and Despotical.

THE Second Part.

C H A P. I.

1. *Introduction.*
2. *A Multitude before their Union, &c.*
3. *Express Consent of every particular, &c.*
4. *Democratical, Aristocratical and Monarchical Union may be instituted for ever, or, &c.*
5. *Without Security no private Right relinquished.*
6. *Covenants of Government without Power of Coercion, are no Security.*
7. *Power Coercive, &c.*
8. *The Sword of War, &c.*
9. *Decision in all Debates, &c. annexed to the Sword.*
10. *Laws Civil, &c.*
11. *Appointment of Magistrates, &c.*
12. *Sovereign Power includeth Impunity.*

13. *A supposed Commonwealth, where Laws are made first, and the Commonwealth after.*
14. *The same refell'd.*
15. *Mixt Forms of Government supposed in Sovereignty.*
16. *That refell'd.*
17. *Mixt Government, &c.*
18. *Reason and Experience to prove absolute Sovereignty somewhere in all Commonwealths.*
19. *Some principal, &c. Marks of Sovereignty.*

I. **T**HAT Treatise of Humane Nature, which was formerly printed, hath been wholly spent in the Consideration of the natural Power, and the natural Estate of Man, namely, of his Cognition and Passions in the first Eleven Chapters, and how from thence proceed his Actions; in the Twelfth, how Men know one anothers Minds: In the last, in what Estate Mens Passions set them. In the first Chapter of this Treatise, what Estate they are directed unto by the Dictates of Reason, that is to say, what be the principal Articles of the Law of Nature, in the 2. 3. 4. 5. And lastly, how a Multitude of Persons Natural, are united by Covenants into one Person Civil, or Body Politick. In this Part therefore shall be considered, the Nature of a Body Politick, and the Laws thereof, otherwise called Civil Laws. And whereas it hath been said in the last Chapter, and last Section of the former Part, that there be two ways of erecting a Body Politick; one by Arbitrary Institution of many Men assembled together, which is like a Creation out of nothing by Humane

mane Wit ; the other by Compulsion, which is as it were a Generation thereof out of natural Force ; I shall first speak of such Erection of a Body Politick, as proceedeth from the Assembly and Consent of a Multitude.

2. Having in this Place to consider, a Multitude of Men about to unite themselves into a Body Politick, for their Security, both against one another, and against common Enemies, and that by Covenants ; The knowledge of what Covenants they must needs make, dependeth on the Knowledge of the Persons, and the Knowledge of their End. First, for their Persons they are many, and (as yet) not one ; not can any Action done in a Multitude of People met together, be attributed to the Multitude, or truly called the Action of the Multitude, unless every Mans Hand, and every Mans Will, (not so much as one expected) have concurred thereto. For Multitude, though in their Persons they run together, yet they concur not always in their Designs. For even at that Time when Men are in Tumult, though they agree a Number of them to one Mischief, and a Number of them to one another ; yet in the whole, they are amongst themselves in the State of Hostility, and not of Peace ; like the seditious *Jews* besieged in *Jerusalem*, that could joyn against their Enemies, and fight amongst themselves. Whensoever therefore any Man saith, that a Number of Men hath done any Act, it is to be understood, that every particular Man in that Number hath consented thereunto, and not the greatest part only. Secondly, Though thus assembled with Intention to unite

themselves, they are yet in that Estate in which every Man hath Right to every Thing, and consequently, as hath been said, Chap. 1. Sect. 10. in an Estate of enjoying nothing. And therefore *Meum* and *Tuum* hath no Place amongst them,

3. The first Thing therefore they are to do, is expressly every Man to consent to something, by which they may come near to their Ends, which can be nothing else imaginable, but this, That they allow the Wills of the major Part of their whole Number, or the Wills of the major Part of some certain Number of Men by them determined and named; or lastly, the Will of some one Man, to involve and be taken for the Wills of every Man. And this done, they are united, and a *Body Politick*. And if the major Part of their whole Number be supposed to involve the Wills of all the particulars, then are they said to be a *Democracy*, that is to say, a Government wherein the whole Number, or so many of them as please, being assembled together, are the Sovereign, and every particular Man a Subject. If the major Part of a certain Number of Men named or distinguished from the rest, be supposed to involve the Wills of every one of the particulars, then are they said to be an *Oligarchy*, or *Aristocracy*, which two Words signifie the same Thing, together with the divers Passions of those that use them. For when the Men that be in that Office please, they are called an *Aristocracy*, or otherwise an *Oligarchy*, wherein those, the major Part of which declare the Wills of the whole Multitude being assembled, are the Sovereign, and

and every Man severally a Subject. Lastly, if their Consent be such, that the Will of one Man, whom they name, shall stand for the Wills of them all, then is their Government or Union called a *Monarchy*, and that one Man a Sovereign, and every of the rest a Subject.

4. And those several Sorts of Unions, Governments, and Subjections of Mans Will, may be understood to be made, either absolutely, that is to say, for all future Time, or for a Time limited only. But forasmuch as we speak here of a Body Politick, instituted for the perpetual Benefit and Defence of them that make it; which therefore Men desire should last for ever, I will omit to speak of those that be temporary, and consider of those that be for ever.

5. The End for which one Man giveth up, and relinquisheth to another, or others, the *right* of protecting and defending himself by his own Power, is the Security which he expecteth thereby, of Protection and Defence from those to whom he doth so relinquish it; and a Man may then account himself in the Estate of Security, when he can foresee no Violence to be done unto him, from which the Doer may not be deterred by the Power of that Sovereign, to whom they have every one subjected themselves: and without that Security, there is no Reason for a Man to deprive himself of his own advantages, and make himself a Prey to others. And therefore when there is not such a Sovereign Power erected, as may afford this Security, it is to be understood, that every Mans *right* of Doing whatsoever seemeth Good in his own Eyes, remaineth

Still with him; and contrariwise, where any Subject hath Right by his own Judgement and Discretion, to make use of his Force, it is to be understood, that every Man hath the like, and consequently, that there is no Commonwealth at all established. How far therefore in the making of a Commonwealth, Man subjecteth his Will to the Power of others, must appear from the End, namely, Security. For whatsoever is necessary to be by Covenant transferred, for the attaining thereof, so much is transferred, or else every Man is in his natural Liberty to secure himself.

6. Covenants agreed upon by every Man assembled for the making of a Commonwealth, and put in Writing without erecting of a Power of Coercion, are no reasonable Security for any of them that so covenant, nor are to be called Laws, and leave Men still in the Estate of Nature and Hostility. For seeing the Wills of most Men are governed only by Fear, and where there is no Power of Coercion, there is no Fear, the Wills of most Men will follow their Passions of Covetousness, Lust, Anger, and the like, to the Breaking of those Covenants, whereby the rest, also, who otherwise would keep them, are set at Liberty, and have no Law, but from themselves.

7. This Power of Coercion, as hath been said, Chap. 2. Sect. 3. of the former part, consisteth in the transferring of every Mans Right of Resistance against him, to whom he hath transferred the Power of Coercion. It followeth therefore, that no Man in any Commonwealth whatsoever, hath Right to resist Him, or Them, on whom they have transferred this Power Coercive, or (as Men use

use to call it) the Sword of Justice, supposing the Not-Resistance possible. For Part 1. Chap. 2. Sect. 18. Covenants bind but to the utmost of our Endeavour.

8. And forasmuch as they who are amongst themselves in Security, by the Means of this Sword of Justice, that keeps them all in Awe, are nevertheless in danger of Enemies from without, if there be not some Means found, to unite their strengths and natural Forces, in the Resistance of such Enemies, their Peace amongst themselves is but in vain. And therefore it is to be understood as a Covenant of every Member to contribute their several Forces for the Defence of the whole, whereby to make One Power as sufficient, as is possible for their Defence. Now seeing that every Man hath already transferred the Use of his Strength to Him, or Them, that have the Sword of Justice, it followeth, that the Power of Defence, that is to say, the Sword of War, be in the same Hands wherein is the Sword of Justice; and consequently those two Swords are but one, and that inseparably and essentially annexed to the Sovereign Power.

9. Moreover, seeing to have the Right of the Sword, is nothing else but to have the Use thereof depending only on the Judgement and Discretion of Him or Them that have it, it followeth, That the Power of Indenture in all Controversies, wherein the Sword of Justice is to be used; and in all Deliberations concerning War, (wherein the Use of that Sword is required) the Right of Resolving and Determining what is to be done, belong to the same Sovereign.

10. Farther,

10. Farther, considering it is no less, but much more necessary to prevent Violence and Rapine, than to punish the same when it is committed, and all Violence proceedeth from Controversies that arise between Men concerning *Mens* and *Thum*, Right and Wrong, Good and Bad, and the like, which Men use every one to measure by their own Judgments, It belongeth also to the Judgement of the same Sovereign Power, to set forth and make known the common Measure by which every Man is to know what is his, and what another; what is Good, and what Bad, and what he ought to do, and what not, and to command the same to be observed. And these Measures of the Actions of the Subjects are those, which Men call *Laws Politick*, or Civil: The making whereof, must of Right belong to him that hath the Power of the Sword, by which Men are compelled to observe them; for otherwise they should be made in vain.

11. Furthermore, seeing it is impossible that any one Man that hath such Sovereign Power, can be able, in Person, to hear and determine all Controversies, to be present at all Deliberations concerning common Good, and to execute and perform all those common Actions that belong thereunto, whereby there will be Necessity of Magistrates, and Ministers of publick Affairs; it is consequent, that the Appointment, Nomination, and Limitation, of the same be understood, as an inseparable Part of the same Sovereignty, to which the Summ of all Judicature, and Execution, hath been already annexed.

12. And

12. And forasmuch, as the Right to use the Forces of every particular Member, is transferred from themselves, to their Sovereign, a Man will easily fall upon this Conclusion of himself, That to Sovereign Power (whatsoever it doth) there belongeth Impunity.

13. The Summ of these Rights of Sovereignty; namely, the absolute Use of the Sword in Peace and War, the making and abrogating of Laws, *Supreme Judicature, & Decision*, in all Debates judicial and deliberative, the Nomination of all Magistrates and Ministers, with other Rights contained in the same, make the Sovereign Power no less absolute in the Commonwealth, than before Commonwealth, every Man was absolute in himself, to do, or not to do, what he thought good; which Men, that have not had the Experience of that miserable Estate, to which Men are reduced by long War, think so hard a Condition, that they cannot easily acknowledge such Covenants, and Subjection on their Parts, as are here set down to have been ever necessary to their Peace. And therefore some have imagined, that a Commonwealth may be constituted in such Manner, as the Sovereign Power may be so limited, and moderated, as they shall think fit themselves. For Example; They suppose a Multitude of Men to have agreed upon certain Articles, (which they presently call Laws) declaring how they will be governed, and that done, to agree farther upon some Man, or Number of Men, to see the same Articles performed, and put in execution; and to enable Him, or Them thereunto, they allot unto them a Provision limited, as of certain Lands, Taxes, Penalties, and the like
then,

then, which (if mis-spent) they shall have no more, without a new Consent of the same Men that allowed the former. And thus they think they have made a Commonwealth, in which it is unlawful for any private Man to make use of his own Sword for his Security; wherein they deceive themselves.

14. For first, if to the Revenue, it did necessarily follow, that there might be Forces raised and procured at the Will of him that hath such Revenue; yet since the Revenue is limited, so must also the Forces: but limited Forces against the Power of an Enemy, which we cannot limit, are insufficient. Whensoever therefore there happeneth an Invasion greater than those Forces are able to resist, and there be no other Right to levy more, then is every Man by Necessity of Nature, allowed to make the best Provision he can for himself; and thus is the Private Sword, and the Estate of War again reduced. But seeing Revenue, without the Right of commanding Men, is of no use, neither in Peace, nor War, it is necessary to be supposed, that he that hath the Administration of those Articles, which are in the former Section supposed, must have also Right to make use of the Strengths of particular Men. And what Reason soever giveth him that Right over any one, giveth him the same over all. And then is his Right absolute. For he that hath Right to all their Forces, hath Right to dispose of the same. Again, supposing those limited Forces and Revenue, either by the necessary, or negligent Use of them to fail, and that for a Supply, the same Multitude be again to be assembled, who shall have

have Power to assemble them, that is to compel them to come together? If he that demandeth the Supply hath that Right, to wit, the Right to compel them all, then is his Sovereignty absolute; if not; then is every particular Man at Liberty to come or not; to frame a New Commonwealth, or not, and so the Right of the private Sword returneth. But suppose them willingly, and of their own accord, assembled to consider of this Supply, if now it be still in their Choice, whether they shall give it, or not, it is also in their Choice, whether the Commonwealth shall stand or not. And therefore there lyeth not upon any of them any Civil Obligation that may hinder them from using Force, in case they think it tend to their Defence. This Device therefore of them that will make Civil Laws first, and then a Civil Body afterwards (as if Policy made a Body Politick, and not a Body Politick made Policy) is of no Effect.

15. Others, to avoid the hard Condition, as they take it, of absolute Subjection (which (in hatred thereto) they also call Slavery) have despised a Government, as they think, mixed of the three Sorts of Sovereignty. As for Example; They suppose the Power of making Laws, given to some great Assembly Democratical, The Power of Judicature to some other Assembly, and the Administration of the Laws to a Third, or to some one Man; and this Policy they call mixt Monarchy, or mixt Aristocracy, or mixt Democracy, according as any of these three Sorts do most visibly predominate. And in this Estate of Government, they think the Use of the Private Sword excluded.

16. And

16. And supposing it were so, How were this Condition which they call *Slavery*, eased thereby. For in this Estate they would have no Man allowed, either to be his own Judge, or own Carver, or to make any Laws unto himself; and as long as these three agree, they are as absolutely subject to them, as is a Child to the Father, or a Slave to the Master, in the state of Nature. The Ease therefore of this Subjection, must consist in the Disagreement of those amongst whom they have distributed the Rights of Sovereign Power. But the same Disagreement is War. The Division therefore of the Sovereignty, either worketh no Effect to the taking away of simple Subjection, or introduceth War, wherein the Private Sword hath Place again. But the Truth is, as hath been already shewed in 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12. precedent Sections, the Sovereignty is indivisible. And that seeming Mixture of several Kinds of Government, not Mixture of the Things themselves, but Confusion in our Understandings, that cannot find out readily to whom we have subjected our selves.

17. But though the Sovereignty be not mixt, but be always either simple Democracy, or simple Aristocracy, or pure Monarchy, nevertheless in the Administration thereof, all those Sorts of Government may have Place subordinate. For suppose the Sovereign Power be Democracy, as it was sometimes in *Rome*, yet at the same Time they may have a Council Aristocratical, such as was the Senate; and at the same Time they may have a Subordinate Monarch, such as was their Dictator, who had, for a Time, the Exercise of the whole Sovereignty, and such as are all Generals in War,

War. So also in Monarchy there may be a Council Aristocratical of Men, chosen by the Monarch ; or Democratical of Men, chosen by the Consent (the Monarch permitting) of all the particular Men of the Commonwealth. And this Mixture is it that imposeth, as if it were the Mixture of Sovereignty. As if a Man should think, because the Great Council of *Venice* doth nothing ordinarily but choose Magistrates, Ministers of State, Captains, and Governours of Towns, Ambassadors, Counsellors, and the like, that therefore their Part of the Sovereignty is only chusing of Magistrates ; and that the making of War, and Peace, and Laws, were not theirs, but the Part of such Counsellors as they appointed thereto : whereas it is the Part of *these* to do it but subordinately, the supream Authority thereof being in the Great Council that chuse them.

18. And as Reason teacheth us, that a Man, considered out of Subjection to Laws, and out of all Covenants obligatory to others, is free to do and undo, and deliberate as long as he listeth, every Member being obedient to the Will of the whole Man, that Liberty being nothing else but his Natural Power, without which, he is no better than an inanimate Creature, not able to help himself ; So also it teacheth us, That a Body Politick, of what Kind soever, not subject to another, nor obliged by Covenants, ought to be free, and in all Actions to be assisted by the Members, every one in their Place, or at least, not resisted by them. For otherwise, the Power of a Body Politick (the Essence whereof, is the Not-Resistance of the Members) is none, nor a Body Politick

tick of any Benefit. And the same is confirmed by the Use of all Nations and Commonwealths, wherein that Man or Council which is virtually the whole, hath any absolute Power over every particular Member; Or what Nation or Commonwealth is there, that hath not Power and Right to constitute a General in their Wars? But the Power of a General is absolute; and consequently there was absolute Power in the Commonwealth, from whom it was derived. For no Person, natural or civil, can transfer unto another more Power than himself hath.

19. In every Commonwealth, where particular Men are deprived of their Right to protect themselves, there resideth an Absolute Sovereignty, as I have already shewed. But in what Man, or in what Assembly of Men the same is placed, is not so manifest, as not to need some Marks, whereby it may be discerned. And first, it is an infallible Mark of absolute Sovereignty in a Man, or in an Assembly of Men, if there be no Right in any other Person, Natural or Civil, to punish that Man, or to dissolve that Assembly. For he that cannot of Right be punished, cannot of Right be resisted; and he that cannot of Right be resisted, hath Coercive Power over all the rest, and thereby can frame and govern their Actions at his pleasure, which is absolute Sovereignty. Contrariwise, he that in a Commonwealth is punishable by any, or that Assembly that is dissolvable, is not Sovereign. For a Greater Power is always required to punish and dissolve, than theirs who are punished or dissolved; and that Power cannot be called Sovereign, than which there is a Greater.

Greater. Secondly, that Man or Assembly, that by their own Right not derived from the present Right of any other, may make Laws, or abrogate them at his or their Pleasure, have the Sovereignty absolute. For seeing the Laws they make, are supposed to be made by Right, the Members of the Commonwealth, to whom they are made, are obliged to obey them, and consequently not resist the Execution of them; which not Resistance, maketh the Power Absolute of him that ordaineth them. It is likewise a Mark of this Sovereignty, to have the Right Original of appointing Magistrates, Judges, Counsellors, and Ministers of State. For without that Power, no Act of Sovereignty, or Government, can be performed. Lastly, and generally, whosoever by his own Authority independent, can do any Act, which another of the same Commonwealth may not, must needs be understood to have the Sovereign Power. For by Nature Men have equal Right. This Inequality therefore must proceed from the Power of the Commonwealth. He therefore that doth any Act lawfully by his own Authority, which another may not, doth it by the Power of the Commonwealth in himself, which is Absolute Sovereignty.

CHAP. II.

1. *Democracy precedeth all other, &c.*
2. *The Sovereign People covenanteth not with the Subjects.*
3. *The Sovereign, &c. cannot, &c. do Injury, &c.*
4. *The Faults of the Sovereign People, &c.*
5. *Democracy, &c. an Aristocracy of Orators.*
6. *Aristocracy how made.*
7. *The Body of the Optimates not properly said to injure the Subjects.*
8. *The Election of the Optimates, &c.*
9. *An Elective King, &c.*
10. *A Conditional King, &c.*
11. *The Word People Equivocal.*
12. *Obedience discharged by Release, &c.*
13. *How such Releases are to be understood.*
14. *Obedience discharged by Exile.*
15. *By Conquest.*
16. *By Ignorance of the Right of Succession.*

1. **H**AVING spoken in general concerning instituted Policy in the former Chapter; I come in this, to speak of the Sorts thereof in special, how every of them is instituted. The first in Order of Time of these three Sorts, is Democracy; and it must be so of Necessity, because an Aristocracy and a Monarchy, require Nomination of Persons agreed upon, which Agreement in a great Multitude of Men, must consist in the Consent of the major

Part;

Part; and where the Votes of the major Part involve the Votes of the rest, there is actually a Democracy.

2. In the making of a Democracy, there passeth no Covenant between the Sovereign, and any Subject. For while the Democracy is a making, there is no Sovereign with whom to contract. For it cannot be imagined, that the Multitude should contract with it self, or with any one Man, or Number of Men, Parcel of it self, to make it self Sovereign; nor that a Multitude considered as One Aggregate, can give it self any Thing which before it had not. Seeing then that Sovereignty Democratical is not conferred by the Covenant of any Multitude, which supposeth Union and Sovereignty already made, it resteth, that the same be conferred by the particular Covenants of every several Man; that is to say, every Man with every Man, for and in Consideration of the Benefit of his own Peace and Defence, covenanteth to stand to and obey whatsoever the major Part of their whole Number, or the major Part of such a Number of them, as shall be pleased to assemble at a certain Time and Place, shall determine and command. And this is that which giveth Being to a Democracy, wherein the Sovereign Assembly was called of the Greeks, by the Name of *Demos*, (that is, the People,) from whence cometh Democracy. So that, where to the Supreme and Independent Court, every Man may come that will, and give his Vote, there the Sovereign is called the People.

3. Out of this that hath been said, may readily be drawn, That whatsoever the People doth

to any one particular Member or Subject of the Commonwealth, the same by him ought not to be stiled Injury. For first Injury (by the Definition, Part 1. Chap. 3. Sect. 2.) is Breach of Covenant; but Covenants (as hath been said in the precedent Section) there passed none from the People to any private Man; and consequently it (to wit, the People) can do him no Injury. Secondly, how unjust soever the Action be, that this Sovereign *Demus* shall do, is done by the Will of every particular Man subject to him, who are therefore guilty of the same. If therefore they stile it *Injury*, they but accuse themselves. And it is against Reason for the same Man, both to do and complain; Implying this Contradiction, That whereas he first ratified the People Acts in general, he now disalloweth the same of them in particular. It is therefore said truly, *Volenti non fit Injuria*. Nevertheless nothing doth hinder, but that divers Actions done by the People, may be unjust before God Almighty, as Breaches of the Laws of Nature.

4. And when it happeneth, that the People by Plurality of Voices, that decree or command any Thing contrary to the Law of God or Nature, though the Decree and Command be the Act of every Man, not only present in the Assembly, but also absent from it; yet is not the Injustice of the Decree, the Injustice of every particular Man, but only of those Men, by whose express Suffrages, the Decree or Command was passed. For a Body Politick, as it is a Fictitious Body, so are the Faculties and Will thereof Fictitious also. But to make a particular Man unjust, which

which consisteth of a Body and Soul natural, there is required a Natural and very Will.

5. In all Democracies, though the Right of Sovereignty be in the Assembly, which is virtually the whole Body; yet the Use thereof is always in One, or a few particular Men. For in such great Assemblies, as those must be, whereinto every Man may enter at his Pleasure, there is no Means any Ways to deliberate and give Counsel what to do, but by long and set Orations, whereby to every Man there is more or less Hope given, to incline and sway the Assembly to their own Ends. In a Multitude of Speakers therefore, where always either One is eminent alone, or a Few being equal amongst themselves, are eminent above the rest, that One or Few must of Necessity sway the Whole. In-somuch, that a Democracy, in Effect, is no more than an Aristocracy of Orators, interrupted sometimes with the temporary Monarchy of one Orator.

6. And seeing a Democracy is by Institution, the Beginning both of Aristocracy and Monarchy, we are to consider next, how Aristocracy is derived from it. When the particular Members of the Commonwealth growing weary of Attendance at publick Courts, as dwelling far off, or being attentive to their private Busineses, and withall, displeased with the Government of the People, assemble themselves to make an Aristocracy, there is no more required to the making thereof, but putting to the Question one by one, the Names of such Men as it shall consist of, and

assenting to their Election; and by Plurality of Vote, to transfer that Power, which before the People had, to the Number of Men so named and chosen.

7. And from this Manner of erecting an Aristocracy, it is manifest, that the Few, or *Optimates*, have entred into no Covenant with any of the particular Members of the Commonwealth, whereof they are Sovereign; and consequently cannot do any Thing to any private Man, that can be called *Injury* to him, howsoever their Act be wicked before Almighty God, according to that which hath been said before, Section. 3. Farther, it is impossible, that the People, as one Body Politick, should covenant with the Aristocracy or *Optimates*, on whom they intend to transfer their Sovereignty. For no sooner is the Aristocracy erected, but the Democracy is annihilated, and the Covenants made unto them void.

8. In all Aristocracies, the Admission of such, as are from Time to Time to have Vote in the Sovereign Assembly, dependeth on the Will and Decree of the present *Optimates*. For they being the Sovereign, have the Nomination (by the 11. Section of the former Chapter) of all Magistrates, Ministers, and Counsellours of State whatsoever, and may therefore chuse either to make them elective, or hereditary, at their pleasure.

9. Out of the same Democracy, the Institution of a Political Monarch proceedeth in the same Manner, as did the Institution of the Aristocracy, to wit, by a Decree of the Sovereign People, to pass the Sovereignty to one Man named and approved

proved by Plurality of Suffrage. And if this Sovereignty be truly and indeed transferred, the Estate or Commonwealth is an Absolute Monarchy, wherein the Monarch is at Liberty, to dispose as well of the Succession, as of the Possession, and not an Elective Kingdom. For suppose a Decree be made first in this Manner, That such a One shall have the Sovereignty for his Life, and that afterward they will chuse a-new. In this Case, the Power of the People is dissolved, or not; if dissolved, then after the Death of him that is chosen, there is no Man bound to stand to the Decrees of them that shall, as Private Men, run together to make a new Election; and consequently, if there be any Man, who by the advantage of the Reign of Him that is dead, hath Strength enough to hold the Multitude in Peace and Obedience, he may lawfully, or rather is by the Law of Nature obliged so to do: if this Power of the People were not dissolved at the chusing of their King for Life, then is the people Sovereign still, and the King a Minister thereof only, but so, as to put the whole Sovereignty in Execution; A Great Minister, but no otherwise for his Time, than a Dictator was in *Rome*. In this Case, at the Death of him that was chosen, they that meet for a new Election, have no new, but their old Authority for the same. For they were the Sovereign all the Time, as appeareth by the Acts of those Elective Kings, that have procured from the People, that their Children might succeed them. For it is to be understood, when a Man receiveth any Thing from the Authority of the People, he receiveth it not from the People his Subjects,

but from the People his Sovereign. And farther, though in the Election of a King for his Life, the People grant him the Exercise of their Sovereignty for that Time; yet if they see cause, they may recal the same before the Time. As a Prince that conferreth an Office for Life, may nevertheless upon Suspicion of Abuse thereof, recal it at his Pleasure; in as much as Offices that require Labour and Care, are understood to pass from him that giveth them as *Onera*, *Burthens*, to them that have them; the recalling whereof are therefore not *Injury*, but *Favour*. Nevertheless, if in making an Elective King, with Intention to reserve the Sovereignty, they reserve not a Power at certain known and determined Times and Places to assemble themselves, the Reservation of their Sovereignty is of no Effect, in as much as no Man is bound to stand to the Decrees and Determinations of those that assemble themselves without the Sovereign Authority.

10. In the former Section is shewed, that Elective Kings that exercise their Sovereignty for a Time, which determines with their Life, either are Subjects, or not Sovereigns; And that it is, when the People in Election of them, reserve unto themselves the Light of Assembling at certain Times and Places limited and made known; Or else Absolute Sovereigns, to dispose of the Succession at their Pleasure, and that is, when the People in their Election hath declared no Time nor Place of their meeting, or have left it to the Power of the Elected King, to assemble and dissolve them at such Times, as he himself shall think good. There is another Kind of Limitation of Time to him

him that shall be elected to use the Sovereign Power, (which whether it hath been practised any where, or not, I know not, but it may be imagined, and hath been objected against the Rigour of Sovereign Power) and it is this, that the People transfer their Sovereignty upon Conditions. As for Example, For so long as he shall observe such and such Laws, as they then prescribe him. And here as before in elected Kings, the Question is to be made, Whether in the Electing of such a Sovereign, they reserved to themselves a Right of Assembling at Times and Places limited and known, or not; if not, then is the Sovereignty of the People dissolved, and have neither Power to judge of the Breach of the Conditions given him, nor to command any Forces for the Deposing of Him, whom on that Condition they had set up, but are in the Estate of War amongst themselves, as they were before they made themselves a Democracy: and consequently, if he that is elected by the Advantage of the Possession he hath of the Publick Means, be able to compel them to Unity and Obedience, he hath not only of the Right of Nature to warrant him, but of the Law of Nature to oblige him thereunto. But if in Electing Him, they reserved to themselves a Right of Assembling, and appointed certain Times and Places to that purpose, then are they Sovereign still, and may call their conditional King to account at their pleasure, and deprive him of his Government, if they judge he deserve it, either by Breach of the Condition set him, or otherwise. For the Sovereign Power can by no Covenant with a Subject be bound to
continue

continue him in the Charge he undergoeth by their Command, as a Burden imposed not particularly for his Good, but for the Good of the Sovereign People.

11. The Controversies that arise concerning the Right of the People, proceed from the Equivocation of the Word. For the Word People, hath a double Signification. In one Sense it signifieth only a Number of Men, distinguished by the Place of their Habitation; as the *People of England*, or the *People of France*, which is no more, but the Multitude of those particular Persons that inhabit those Regions, without Consideration of any Contracts or Covenants amongst them, by which any One of them is obliged to the rest. In another Sense, it signifieth a Person Civil, that is to say, Either one Man, or One Council, in the Will whereof, is included and involved, the Will of every one in particular. As for Example, In this latter Sense, the Lower House of Parliament is all the Commons, as long as they sit there with Authority and Right thereto; but after they be dissolved, though they remain, they be no more the People, nor the Commons, but only the Aggregate, or Multitude of the particular Men there sitting, how well soever they agree, or concur, in Opinions amongst themselves; whereupon, they that do not distinguish between these two Significations, do usually attribute such Rights to a dissolved Multitude, as belong only to the People virtually contained in the Body of the Commonwealth or Sovereignty. And when a great Number of their own Authority flock together in any Nation, they usually give them the Name

Name of the whole Nation. In which Sense they say the People rebelleth, or the People demandeth, when it is no more than a dissolved Multitude, of which though any one Man may be said to demand or have Right to something, yet the Heap, or Multitude, cannot be said to demand or have Right to any thing. For where every Man hath his Right distinct, there is nothing left for the Multitude to have Right unto: and when the Particulars say, This is Mine, This is Thine, and This is His, and have shared all amongst them, there can be nothing whereof the Multitude can say, This is Mine; nor are they One Body, as behoveth them to be, that demand any Thing under the Name of Mine, or His: and when they say Ours, every Man is understood to pretend in several, and not the Multitude. On the other side, when the Multitude is united into a Body Politick, and thereby are a People in the other Signification, and their Wills virtually in the Sovereign, there the Rights and Demands of the Particulars do cease; and he or they that have the Sovereign Power, doth for them all, demand, and vindicate under the Name of His, that which before they called in the Plural, Theirs.

12. We have seen how particular Men enter into Subjection, by transferring their Rights; It followeth to consider, how such Subjection may discharged. And first, if He or They that have the Sovereign Power, shall relinquish the same voluntarily, there is no Doubt, but every Man is again at Liberty to obey, or not. Likewise, if He or They retaining the Sovereignty over the rest, do nevertheless exempt some one or more,
from

from their Subjection, every Man so exempted, is discharged. For He or They to whom any Man is obliged, hath the Power to release him.

13. And here it is to be understood, that when He or They that have the Sovereign Power, give such Exemption, or Priviledge, to a Subject, as is not separable from the Sovereignty, and nevertheless directly retaineth the Sovereign Power, not knowing the Consequence of the Priviledge they grant, the Person or Persons exempted or priviledged, are not thereby released. For in contradictory Significations of the Will, Part 1. Chap. 13. Sect. 9. that which is directly signified, is to be understood for the Will, before that which is drawn from it by Consequence.

14. Also Exile perpetual, is a Release of Subjection, forasmuch, as being out of the Protection of the Sovereignty that expelled him, he hath no Means of subsisting but from himself. Now every Man may lawfully defend himself, that hath no other Defence; else there had been no Necessity, that any Man should enter into voluntary Subjection, as they do in Commonwealths.

15. Likewise a Man is released of his Subjection by Conquest. For when it cometh to pass, that the Power of a Commonwealth is overthrown, and any particular Man thereby lying under the Sword of his Enemy, yieldeth himself Captive, he is thereby bound to serve him that taketh him, and consequently discharged of his Obligation to the former. For no Man can serve two Masters.

16. Lastly,

16. Lastly, Ignorance of the Succession dischargeth Obedience. For no Man can be understood to be obliged to obey he knoweth not whom.

CHAP.

CHAP. III.

1. 2. *Titles to Dominion ; Master and Servant, &c.*
3. *Chains and other, &c. Bonds, &c. Slave defined.*
4. *Servants have no Property against their Lord, &c.*
5. *The Master hath right to alienate his Servant.*
6. *The Servant of the Servant, &c.*
7. *How Servitude is discharged.*
8. *The middle Lord, &c.*
9. *The Title of Man, &c. over Beasts.*

1. **H**AVING set forth in the two preceeding Chapters, the Nature of a Commonwealth *Institutive* by the Consent of many Men together, I come now to speak of Dominion, or a Body Politick by Acquisition, which is commonly called a *Patrimonial* Kingdom. But before I enter thereinto, it is necessary to make known upon what Title one Man may acquire Right, that is to say, Property or Dominion over the Person of another. For when one Man hath Dominion over another, there is a little Kingdom. And to be a King by Acquisition, is nothing else, but to have acquired a Right or Dominion over many.

2. Considering Men therefore again in the State of Nature, without Covenants or Subjection one to another, as if they were but even now all at once created Male and Female, there be three
Titles

Titles only, by which one Man may have Right and Dominion over another; whereof two may take place presently, and those are, Voluntary Offer of Subjection, and Yielding by Compulsion: the Third is to take place, upon the Supposition of Children begotten amongst them. Concerning the first of these three Titles, it is handled before in the two last Chapters. For from thence cometh the Right of Sovereigns over their Subjects in a Commonwealth Institutive. Concerning the second Title, (which is when a Man submitteth to an Assailant for Fear of Death) thereby accrueth a Right of Dominion. For where every Man (as it happeneth in this Case) hath Right to all Things, there needs no more for the making of the said Right effectual, but a Covenant from him that is overcome, not to resist him that overcometh. And thus cometh the Victor to have Right of absolute Dominion over the Conquered. By which there is presently constituted a little Body Politick, which consisteth of two Persons, the one Sovereign, which is called the *Master*, or Lord; the other Subject, which is called the *Servant*. And when a Man hath acquired Right over a Number of Servants so considerable, as they cannot by their Neighbours be securely invaded, this Body Politick is a Kingdom Despotical.

3. And it is to be understood, that when a Servant taken in the Wars, is kept bound in natural Bonds, as Chains and the like, or in Prison, there hath passed no Covenant from the Servant to his Master. For those natural Bonds have no need of strengthening by the verbal Bonds of Covenant, and they shew that the Servant is not trusted.

But

But Covenant (Part 1. Chap. 15. Sect. 9.) supposeth Trust. There remaineth therefore in the Servant thus kept bound, or in Prison, a Right of delivering himself, if he can, by what Means soever. This Kind of Servant is that which ordinarily and without Passion, is called a *Slave*. The *Romans* had no such distinct Name, but comprehended all under the Name of *Servus*; whereof such as they loved and durst trust, were suffered to go at Liberty, and admitted to Places of Office, both near to their Persons, and in their Affairs abroad; the rest were kept chained, or otherwise restrained with natural Impediments to their Resistance. And as it was amongst the *Romans*, so it was amongst other Nations, the former Sort having no other Bond but a supposed Covenant, without which the Master had no reason to trust them; the latter being without Covenant, and no otherwise tyed to Obedience, but by Chains, or other like forcible Custody.

4. A Master therefore is to be supposed to have no less Right over those, whose Bodies he leaveth at Liberty, than over those he keepeth in Bonds and Imprisonment, and hath absolute Dominion over both, and may say of his Servant, that he is His, as he may of any other Thing: And whatsoever the Servant had, and might call his, is now the Master's; for he that disposeth of the Person, disposeth of all, the Person could dispose of: insomuch, as though there be *Meum & Tuum* amongst Servants distinct from one another by the Dispensation, and for the Benefit of their Master; yet there is no *Meum & Tuum* belonging to any of them against the Master himself, whom they are
not

not to resist, but to obey all his Commands as Law.

5. And seeing both the Servant and all that is committed to him, is the Property of the Master, and every Man may dispose of his own, and transfer the same at his pleasure, the Master may therefore alienate his Dominion over them, or give the same by his last Will to whom he list.

6. And if it happen, that the Master himself by Captivity or voluntary Subjection, become Servant to another, then is that other Master *paramount*; and those Servants of him that becometh Servant, are no farther obliged, than their Master paramount shall think good; forasmuch as he disposing of the Master subordinate, disposeth of all he hath, and consequently of his Servants, So that the Restriction of absolute Power in Masters, proceedeth not from the Law of Nature, but from the Political Law of him that is their Master Supreme or Sovereign.

7. Servants immediate to the supreme Master, are discharged of their Servitude, or Subjection in the same Manner that Subjects are released of their Allegiance in a Commonwealth Institutive. As first, by Release. For he that captiveth, (which is done by accepting what the Captive transferreth to him) setteth again at Liberty, by transferring back the same. And this Kind of Release is called *Manumission*. Secondly, by Exile. For that is no more but Manumission given to a Servant, not in the Way of Benefit, but Punishment. Thirdly, By a new Captivity, where the servant having done his Endeavour to defend himself, hath thereby performed his Covenant to his former

mer Master, and for the Safety of his Life, entring into new Covenant with the Conquerour, is bound to do his best Endeavour to keep that likewise. Fourthly, Ignorance of who is Successour to his deceased Master, dischargeth him of Obedience: for no Covenant holdeth longer than a Man knoweth to whom he is to perform it. And lastly, that Servant that is no longer trusted, but committed to his Chains and Custody, is thereby discharged of the Obligation *in Foro interno*, and therefore if he can get loose, may lawfully go his way.

8. But Servants subordinate, though manumitted by their immediate Lord, are not thereby discharged of their Subjection to their Lord paramount. For the immediate Master hath no Property in them, having transferred his Right before to another, namely, to his own and Supream Master. Nor if the chief Lord should manumit his immediate Servant, doth he thereby release his Servants of their Obligation to him that is so manumitted. For by this Manumission, he recovereth again the absolute, Dominion he had over them before. For after a Release, (which is the Discharge of a Covenant) the Right standeth as it did before the Covenant was made.

9. This Right of Conquest, as it maketh one Man Master over another, so also maketh it a Man to be Master of the irrational Creatures. For if a Man in the State of Nature be in Hostility with Men, and thereby have lawful Title to subdue or kill, according as his own Conscience and Discretion shall suggest unto him for his Safety and Benefit, much more may he do the same to Beasts; that is to say, save and preserve for his own Service, according

according to his Discretion, such as are of Nature apt to obey, and commodious for Use ; and to kill and destroy with perpetual War, all other, as fierce and noisome to him. And this Dominion is therefore of the Law of Nature, and not of the Divine Law Positive. For if there had been no such Right before the Revealing of Gods Will in the Scripture, then should no Man, to whom the Scripture hath not come, have right to make use of those his Creatures, either for his Food or Sustainance. And it were a hard Condition of Mankind, that a fierce and salvage Beast should with more Right kill a Man, then a Man a Beast.

 CHAP. IV.

1. *The Dominion over the Child, &c.*
2. *Preheminence of Sex giveth not the Child to the Father, rather than to the Mother.*
3. *The Title of the Father or Mother, &c.*
4. *The Child of a Woman-Servant, &c.*
5. *The Right to the Child given from the Mother, &c.*
6. *The Child of the Concubine, &c.*
7. *The Child of the Husband and the Wife, &c.*
8. *The Father, or he or she that bringeth up the Child, have absolute Power over Him.*
9. *Freedom in Subjects what it is.*
10. *A Great Family is a Patrimonial Kingdom.*
11. *Succession of the Sovereign Power, &c.*
12. *Though the Successour be not declared, yet there is always One to be presumed.*
13. *The Children preferred to the Succession, &c.*
14. *The Males before the Females.*
15. *The Eldest before the rest of the Brothers.*
16. *The Brother next to the Children.*
17. *The Succession of the Possessor, &c.*

1. **O**F three Ways by which a Man becometh subject to another, mentioned Sect. 2. Chap. the last, namely, Voluntary Offer, Captivity and Birth; the former two have been spoken of, under the Name of Subjects, and Servants. In the next Place, we are to set down the third Way of Subjecti-
on

on, under the Name of Children, and by what Title one Man cometh to have Propriety in a Child, that proceedeth from the Common Generation of two, (to wit) of Male and Female. And considering Men again dissolved from all Covenants one with another, and that (Part 1. Chap. 4. Sect. 2.) Every Man by the Law of Nature, hath Right or Propriety to his own Body, the Child ought rather to be the Propriety of the Mother, (of whose Body it is Part, till the Time of Separation, than of the Father. For the Understanding therefore of the Right that a Man or Woman hath to his or their Child, two Things are to be considered; First, what Title the Mother, or any other originally hath, to a Child new born: Secondly, how the Father, or any other Man, pretendeth by the Mother.

2. For the first, they that have written of this Subject, have made Generation to be a Title of Dominion over Persons, as well as the Consent of the Persons themselves. And because Generation giveth Title to Two, namely, Father and Mother, whereas Dominion is indivisible, they therefore ascribe Dominion over the Child to the Father only, *Ob Praestantiam Sexus*, but they shew not, neither can I find out by what Coherence, either Generation inferreth Dominion, or Advantage of so much Strength, which, for the most part, a Man hath more than a Woman, should generally and universally entitle the Father to a Propriety in the Child, and take it away from the Mother.

3. The Title to Dominion over a Child, proceedeth not from the Generation, but from the Preservation of it; and therefore in the Estate of

Nature, the Mother, in whose Power it is to save or destroy it, hath Right thereto by that Power, according to that which hath been said, Part 1. Chap. 1. Sect. 13. And if the Mother shall think fit to abandon, or expose her Child to Death, whatsoever Man or Woman shall find the Child so exposed, shall have the same Right which the Mother had before ; And for this same Reason, namely , for the Power not of Generating, but Preserving. And though the Child thus preserved, do in time acquire Strength , whereby he might pretend Equality with Him or Her that hath preserved him, yet shall that Pretence be thought unreasonable, both because his Strength was the Gift of him, against whom he pretendeth, and also because it is to be presumed, that he which giveth Sustenance to another, whereby to strengthen him, hath received a Promise of Obedience in Consideration thereof. For else it would be Wisdom in Men, rather to let their Children perish, while they are Infants, than to live in their Danger or Subjection, when they are grown.

4. For the Pretences which a Man may have to Dominion over a Child by the Right of the Mother, they be of divers Kinds. One by the Absolute Subjection of the Mother ; another, by some particular Covenant from her, which is less than a Covenant of such Subjection. By absolute Subjection, the Master of the Mother, hath Right to her Child, according to Sect. 6. Chap. 3. whether he be the Father thereof, or not. And thus the Children of the Servant are the Goods of the Master *in perpetuum*.

5. Of Covenants that amount not to Subjection between a Man and Woman, there be some which are made for a Time ; they are Covenants of Cohabitation, or else of Copulation only. And in this latter Case, the Children pass by Covenants particular. And thus in the Copulation of the *Amazons* with their Neighbours, the Fathers by Covenant had the Male Children only, the Mothers retaining the Females.

6. And Covenants of Cohabitation are either for Society of Bed, or for Society of all things ; if for Society of Bed only, then is the Woman called *A Concubine*. And here also the Child shall be his or hers, as they shall agree particularly by Covenant. For although for the most part, a Concubine is supposed to yield up the Right of her Children to the Father, yet doth not Concubinate enforce so much.

7. But if the Covenants of Cohabitation be for Society of all Things, it is necessary that but one of them govern and dispose of all that is common to them both ; without which, (as hath been often said before) Society cannot last. And therefore the Man, to whom for the most part, the Woman yieldeth the Government, hath for the most part also, the sole Right and Dominion over the Children. And the Man is called the Husband, and the Woman the Wife. But because sometimes the Government may belong to the Wife only, sometimes also the Dominion over the Children shall be in her only. As in the Case of a Sovereign Queen, there is no Reason that her Marriage should take from her the Dominion over her Children.

8. Children therefore, whether they be brought up and preserved by the Father, or by the Mother, or by whomsoever, are in most absolute Subjection to Him or Her, that so bringeth them up, or preserveth them. And they may alienate them, that is, assign his or her Dominion, by selling, or giving them, in Adoption or Servitude, to others; or may pawn them for Hostages, kill them for Rebellion, or sacrifice them for Peace, by the Law of Nature, when he or she, in his or her Conscience, think it to be necessary.

9. The Subjection of them who institute a Commonwealth amongst themselves, is no less absolute, than the Subjection of Servants. And therein they are in equal Estate. But the Hope of those is greater than the Hope of these. For he that subjecteth himself uncompelled, thinketh there is Reason he should be better used, than he that doth it upon Compulsion; and coming in freely, calleth himself, though in Subjection, a *Freeman*; whereby it appeareth, that Liberty is not any Exemption from Subjection and Obedience to the Sovereign Power, but a State of better Hope than theirs, that have been subjected by Force and Conquest. And this was the Reason, that the Name which signifieth Children in the Latine Tongue, is *Liberi*, which also signifieth *Freemen*. And yet in *Rome*, nothing at that time was so obnoxious to the Power of others, as Children in the Family of their Fathers. For both the State had Power over their Life without Consent of their Fathers, and the Father might kill his Son by his own Authority, without any Warrant from the State. Freedom therefore in Commonwealths is
nothing

nothing but the Honour of Equality of Favour with other Subjects, and Servitude the Estate of the rest. A Freeman therefore may expect Employments of Honour, rather than a Servant. And this is all that can be understood by the Liberty of the Subject. For in all other Senses, Liberty is the State of him that is not subject.

10. Now when a Father that hath Children, hath Servants also, the Children (not by the Right of the Child, but by the natural Indulgence of the Parents) are such Freemen. And the Whole consisting of the Father or Mother, or both, and of the Children, and of the Servants, is called a *Family*, wherein the Father or Mother of the Family is Sovereign of the same, and the rest (both Children and Servants equally) Subjects. The same Family, if it grow by Multiplication of Children, either by Generation, or Adoption; or of Servants, either by Generation, Conquest, or voluntary Submission, to be so Great and Numerous, as in Probability it may protect it self, then is that Family called a *Patrimonial Kingdom*, or Monarchy by Acquisition, wherein the Sovereignty is in One Man, as it is in a Monarch made by *Political Institution*. So that whatsoever Rights be in the One, the same also be in the Other. And therefore I shall no more speak of them as distinct, but of Monarchy in general.

11. Having shewed by what Right the several Sorts of Commonwealths, Democracy, Aristocracy, and Monarchy, are erected, it followeth, to shew by what Right they are continued. The Right by which they are continued, is called the Right of Succession to the Sovereign Power; whereof there

there is nothing to be said a Democracy, because the Sovereign dyeth not, as long as there be Subjects alive: Nor in an Aristocracy, because it cannot easily fall out, that the *Optimates* should every one fail at once: And if it should so fall out, there is no question, but the Commonwealth is thereby dissolved. It is therefore in a Monarchy only, that there can happen a Question concerning the Succession. And first, forasmuch as a Monarch, which is absolute Sovereign, hath the Dominion in his own Right, he may dispose thereof at his own Will. If therefore by his last Will, he shall name his Successor, the Right passeth by that Will.

12. Nor if the Monarch dye without any Will concerning the Succession declared, it is not therefore to be presumed, it was his Will, his Subjects, which are to him as his Children and Servants, should return again to the State of Anarchy, that is, to War and Hostility. For that were expressly against the Law of Nature, which commandeth to procure Peace, and to maintain the same. It is therefore to be conjectured with Reason, that it was the Intention to bequeath them Peace, that is to say, a Power Coercive, whereby to keep them from Sedition amongst themselves; and rather in the Form of a Monarchy, than any other Government; forasmuch as he, by the Exercise thereof in his own Person, hath declared, that he approveth the same.

13. Farther, it is to be supposed, his Intention was, that his own Children should be preferred in the Succession (when nothing to the contrary is expressly declared) before any other. For
Men

Men naturally seek their own Honour, and that consisteth in the Honour of their Children after them.

14. Again, seeing every Monarch is supposed to desire to continue the Government in his Successors, as long as he may ; and that generally Men are indued with greater Parts of Wisdom and Courage, by which all Monarchies are kept from dissolution, than Women are ; it is to be presumed, where no express Will is extant to the contrary, he preferreth his Male Children before the Female. Not but that Women may govern, and have in divers Ages and Places governed wisely, but are not so apt thereto in generals, as Men.

15. Because the Sovereign Power is indivisible, it cannot be supposed, that he intended the same should be divided, but that it should descend intirely upon one of them, which is to be presumed, should be the Eldest, assigned thereto by the Lot of Nature, because he appointed no other Lot for the Decision thereof. Besides, what difference of Ability soever there may be amongst the Brethren, the Odds shall be adjudged to the Elder, because no Subject hath Authority otherwise to judge thereof.

16. And for want of Issue in the Possessor, the Brother shall be presumed Successor. For by the Judgment of Nature, next in Blood, is next in Love ; and next in Love, is next to Preferment.

17. And as the Succession followeth the first Monarch, so also it followeth Him or Her that is in Possession ; and consequently, the Children of Him in Possession, shall be preferred before the Children of his Father, or Predecessor.

CHAP. V.

1. *The Utility of the Commonwealth, &c.*
2. *The Loss of Liberty, &c.*
3. *Monarchy approved by, &c.*
4. *Monarchy less Subject to Passion, &c.*
- 5, 6. *Subjects in Monarchy, &c.*
7. *Laws in Monarchy less changeable, &c.*
8. *Monarchies less Subject to Dissolution.*

1. **H**AVING set forth the Nature of a Person Politick, and the three Sorts thereof, Democracy, Aristocracy, and Monarchy; In this Chapter shall be declared, the *Conveniencies*, and *Inconveniencies*, that arise from the same, both in general; and of the said several Sorts in particular. And first, seeing a Body Politick is erected only for the ruling and governing of particular Men, the Benefit and Damage thereof, consisteth in the Benefit or Damage of being ruled. The Benefit is that for which a Body Politick was instituted, namely, the Peace and Preservation of every particular Man, than which it is not possible there can be a greater, as hath been touched before, Part 1. Chap. 1. Sect. 12. And this Benefit extendeth equally both to the *Sovereign*, and to the *Subjects*. For He or They that have the Sovereign Power, have but the Defence of their Persons, by the Assistance of the Particulars; and every particular Man hath his Defence by their Union

Union in the Sovereign. As for other Benefits, which pertain not to their Safety and Sufficiency, but to their well and delightful Being, such as are superfluous Riches, they so belong to the Sovereign, as they must also be in the Subject; and so to the Subject, as they must also be in the Sovereign. For the Riches and Treasure of the Sovereign, is the Dominion he hath over the Riches of his Subjects. If therefore the Sovereign provide not so as that particular Men may have Means, both to preserve themselves, and also to preserve the Publick; the Common or Sovereign Treasure can be none. And on the other side, if it were not for a Common and Publick Treasure belonging to the Sovereign Power, Mens private Riches would sooner serve to put them into Confusion and War, than to secure and maintain them. Insomuch, as the Profit of the Sovereign and Subject goeth alwayes together. That Distinction therefore of Government, that There is one Government for the Good of him that governeth, and another for the Good of them that be governed; whereof the former is *Despoticall*, (that is Lordly), the other, a Government of *Freemen*, is not right. No more is the Opinion of them that hold it to be no City, which consisteth of a Master and his Servants. They might as well say, it were no City, that consisted in a Father and his own Issue, how numerous soever they were. For to a Master that hath no Children, the Servants have in them all those Respects, for which Men love their Children. For they are his Strength, and his Honour. And his Power is no greater over them, than over his Children.

2. The Inconvenience arising from Government in general, to him that governeth, consisteth partly in the continual Care and Trouble about the Business of other Men, that are his Subjects; and partly, in the Danger of his Person. For the Head always is that Part, not only where the Care resideth, but also against which the Stroke of an Enemy most commonly is directed. To ballance this Incommodity, the Sovereignty, together with the Necessity of this Care and Danger, comprehendeth so much Honour, Riches, and Means, whereby to delight the Mind, as no private Mans Wealth can attain unto. The Inconveniences of Government in general to a Subject are none at all, if well considered, but in Appearance. There be two Things that may trouble his Mind, or two general Grievances; The one is Loss of Liberty; The other, the Uncertainty of *Meum & Tuum*. For the first, it consisteth in this, That a Subject may no more govern his own Actions according to his own Discretion and Judgment, or (which is all one) Conscience, as the present Occasions from Time to Time shall dictate to him; but must be tyed to do according to that Will only, which once for all he had long ago laid up, and involved in the Wills of the major Part of an Assembly, or in the Will of some one Man. But this is really no Inconvenience. For, as it hath been shewed before, it is the only Means, by which we have any Possibility of preserving our selves. For if every Man were allowed this Liberty of following his Conscience, in such Difference of Consciences, they would not live together in Peace an Hour. But it appeareth

a great Inconvenience to Every Man in particular, to be debarred of this Liberty, because every one a part considereth it as in himself, and not as in the rest; by which Means, Liberty appeareth in the Likeness of Rule and Government over others. For where one Man is at Liberty, and the rest bound, there that One hath Governnient; which honour, he that understandeth not so much, demanding by the name simply of Liberty, thinketh it a great Grievance and Injury to be denied it. For the second Grievance concerning *Menum & Tumum*, it is also none, but in appearance only; it consisteth in this, That the Sovereign Power taketh from him that which he used to enjoy, knowing no other Propriety, but Use and Custom. But without such Sovereign Power, the Right of Men is not Propriety to any Thing, but a Community, no better than to have no Right at all, as hath been shewed, Part 1. Chap 1 Sect. 10. Propriety therefore being derived from the Sovereign Power, is not to be pretended against the same, especially, when by it Every Subject hath his Propriety against every other Subject, which when Sovereignty ceaseth, he hath not, because in that Case they return to War amongst themselves. Those Levies therefore which are made upon Mens Estates, by the Sovereign Authority, are no more but the price of that Peace and Defence which the Sovereignty maintaineth for them. If this were not so, no Money nor Forces for the Wars, nor any other publick Occasion, could justly be levied in the World. For neither King, nor Democracy nor Aristocracy, nor the Estates of any Land, could do it, if the Sovereignty could not. For
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in all those Cases, it is levied by Vertue of the Sovereignty. Nay more, by the Three Estates, here the Land of One Man, may be transferred to another, without Crime of him from whom it was taken, and without Pretence of Publick Benefit, as hath been done; and this without Injury, because done by the Sovereign Power. For the Power whereby it is done, is no less than Sovereign, and cannot be greater. Therefore this Grievance for *Meum & Tuum* is not real, unless more be exacted than is necessary; but it seemeth a Grievance, because to them that either know not the Right of Sovereignty, or to whom that Right belongeth, it seemeth an Injury; and Injury, how little soever the Damage, is always grievous, as putting us in mind of our Disability to help our selves, and into Envy of the Power to do us wrong.

3. Having spoken of the Inconveniencies of the Subject, by Government in general, let us consider the same in the three several Sorts thereof, namely, *Democracy*, *Aristocracy*, and *Monarchy*; whereof the two former are in effect but One. For (as I have shewed before) Democracy is but the Government of a few Orators. The Comparison therefore will be between Monarchy and Aristocracy: And to omit, that the World as it was created, so also it is governed by One God Almighty; and that all the Ancients have preferred Monarchy before other Governments, both in Opinion, because they feigned a Monarchical Government amongst their gods, and also by their Custom; for that in the most ancient Times all People were so governed: And that Paternal Government, which is Monarchy, was instituted in

in the Beginning from the Creation ; And that other Governments have proceeded from the Dissolution thereof, caused by the Rebellious Nature of Mankind, and be but Pieces of broken Monarchies cemented by Humane Wit, I will insist only on this Comparison, upon the Inconveniences that may happen to the Subjects in Consequence to each of these Governments.

4. And first, it seemeth inconvenient there should be committed so great a Power to One Man, as that it might be lawful to no other Man or Men to resist the same ; and some think it inconvenient *eo Nomine*, because he hath the Power. But this Reason we may not by any Means admit, For it maketh it inconvenient to be ruled by Almighty God, who without question hath more Power over every Man, than can be conferred upon any Monarch. This Inconvenience therefore must be derived not from the Power, but from the Affections and Passions which reign in every one, as well Monarch, as Subject, by which the Monarch may be swayed to use that Power amiss : And because an Aristocracy consisteth of Men, if the Passions of many Men be more violent when they are assembled together, than the Passions of One Man alone, it will follow, that the Inconvenience arising from Passions will be greater in an *Aristocracy*, than a *Monarchy*. But there is no Doubt, when Things are debated in great Assemblies, but every Man delivering his Opinion at large without Interruption, endeavoureth to make whatsoever he is to set forth for Good, better ; and what he would have apprehended as Evil,
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worse, as much as is possible, to the end his Counsel may take place: which Counsel also is never without Aim at his own Benefit, or Honour; Every Mans End being some Good to himself. Now this cannot be done without working on the Passions of the rest. And thus the Passions of these that are singly moderate, are altogether vehement; even as a great many Coals, though but warm asunder, being put together, inflame one another.

5. Another Inconvenience of Monarchy, is this, That the Monarch, besides the Riches necessary for the Defence of the Commonwealth, may take so much more from the Subjects, as may enrich his Children, Kindred and Favourites, to what Degree he pleaseth; which though it be indeed an Inconvenience, if he should so do, yet is the same both greater in an Aristocracy, and also more likely to come to pass, For there not one only, but many have Children, Kindred, and Friends to raise. And in that Point they are as Twenty Monarchs for one, and likely to set forward one anothers Designs mutually, to the Oppression of all the rest, The same also happeneth in a Democracy, if they all do agree; otherwise they bring a worse Inconvenience, to wit, Sedition.

6. Another Inconvenience of Monarchy, is the Power of dispensing with the Execution of Justice, whereby the Family and Friends of the Monarch, may with Impunity, commit Outrages upon the People, or oppress them with Extortion. But in Aristocracies, not only one, but many have Power of taking Men out of the

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Hands of Justice, and no Man is willing his Kindred or Friends should be punished according to their Demerits. And therefore they understand amongst themselves without further speaking, as a tacite Covenant, *Hodie mihi, cras tibi.*

7. Another Inconvenience of Monarchy, is the Power of altering Laws. Concerning which, it is necessary that such a Power be, that Laws may be altered, according as Mens Manners change, or as the Conjuncture of all Circumstances within and without the Commonwealth shall require; the Change of Law being then inconvenient, when it proceedeth from the Change, not of the Occasion, but of the Minds of Him or Them, by whose Authority the Laws are made. Now it is manifest enough of it self, that the Mind of one Man is not so variable in that Point, as are the Decrees of an Assembly. For not only they have all their Natural Changes, but the Change of any one Man may be enough with Eloquence and Reputation, or by Solicitation and Faction, to make that Law to day, which another by the very same Means, shall abrogate to morrow.

8. Lastly, the greatest Inconvenience that can happen to a Commonwealth, is the Aptitude to dissolve into civil War; and to this are Monarchies much less subject, than any other Governments. For where the Union, or Band of a Commonwealth is one Man, there is no Distraction; whereas in Assemblies, those that are of different Opinions, and give different Counsel, are apt to fall out amongst themselves, and to cross the Designs of the Commonwealth for one anothers Sake:

and when they cannot have the Honour of making good their own Devices, they yet seek the Honour to make the Counsels of their Adversaries prove vain. And in this Contention, when the Opposite Factions happen to be any Thing equal in Strength, they presently fall to War. Wherein Necessity teacheth both Sides, that an absolute Monarch, to wit, a General, is necessary both for their Defence against one another, and also for the Peace of each Faction within it self. But this Aptitude to Dissolution, is to be understood for an Inconvenience in such Aristocracies only, where the Affairs of State are debated in great and numerous Assemblies, as they were anciently in *Athens*, and in *Rome*; and not in such as do nothing else in great Assemblies, but choose Magistrates and Counsellours, and commit the handling of State Affairs to a Few; such as is the Aristocracy of *Venice* at this Day. For these are no more apt to dissolve from this Occasion, than Monarchies, the Counsel of State being both in the One and the Other alike.

CHAP. VI.

1. *A Difficulty concerning Absolute Subjection to Man, arising from our absolute Subjection to God Almighty, propounded.*
2. *That this Difficulty is only amongst those Christians that deny the Interpretation of Scripture, to depend upon the Sovereign Authority of the Commonwealth.*
3. *That Humane Laws are not made to govern the Consciences of Men, but their Words and Actions.*
4. *Places of Scripture to prove Obedience due from Christians to their Sovereign in all Things.*
5. *A Distinction propounded between a Fundamental Point of Faith, and a Superstruction.*
6. *An Explication of the Points of Faith, that be Fundamental.*
7. *That the Belief of those Fundamental Points, is all that is required to Salvation, as of Faith.*
8. *That other Points not Fundamental, are not necessary to Salvation as Matter of Faith; and that no more is required by Way of Faith to the Salvation of one Man, than to another.*
9. *That Superstructions are not Points of the Faith necessary to a Christian.*
10. *How Faith and Justice concur to Salvation.*

11. *That in Christian Commonwealths, Obedience to God and Man, stand well together.*
12. *This Tenet, Whatsoever is against the Conscience, is Sin, interpreted*
13. *That all Men do confess the Necessity of submitting of Controversies to some Humane Authority.*
14. *That Christians under an Infidel are discharged of the Injustice of disobeying them, in that which concerneth the Faith necessary to Salvation, by not resisting.*

1. **H**AVING shewed, that in all Commonwealths whatloever, the Necessity of Peace and Government requireth, that there be existent some Power, either in One Man, or in One Assembly of Men, by the Name of the Power Sovereign, to which it is not lawful for any Member of the same Commonwealth to disobey; There occurreth now a Difficulty, which, if it be not removed, maketh it unlawful for a Man to put himself under the Command of such Absolute Sovereignty, as is required thereto. And the Difficulty is this; We have amongst us the Word of God for the Rule of our Actions: Now if we shall subject our selves to Men also, obliging our selves to do such Actions as shall be by them commanded, when the Commands of God and Man shall differ, we are to obey God, rather than Man; And consequently, the Covenant of general Obedience to Man is unlawful.

2. This Difficulty hath not been of very great Antiquity in the World. There was no such *Dilemma* amongst the Jews; for their Civil Law,
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and Divine Law, was one and the same Law of *Moses*; the Interpreters whereof were the Priests, whose Power was subordinate to the Power of the King; as was the Power of *Aaron*, to the Power of *Moses*. Nor is it a Controversie that was ever taken notice of amongst the *Grecians*, *Romans*, or other Gentiles: for amongst these their several Civil Laws were the Rules whereby not only Righteousness and Virtue, but also Religion, and the external Worship of God, was ordered and approved; that being esteemed the true Worship of God, which was *κατὰ τὰ νόμιμα*, according to the Laws Civil. Also those Christians that dwell under the Temporal Dominion of the Bishop of *Rome*, are free from this Question; for that they allow unto him (their Sovereign) to interpret the Scriptures, which are the Law of God, as he in his own Judgment shall think right. This Difficulty therefore remaineth amongst, and troubleth those Christians only, to whom it is allowed, to take for the Sense of the Scripture, that which they make thereof, either by their own private Interpretation, or by the Interpretation of such as are not called thereunto by publick Authority; they that follow their own Interpretation continually, demanding Liberty of Conscience; and those that follow the Interpretation of Others not ordained thereunto by the Sovereign of the Commonwealth, requiring a Power in Matters of Religion either above the Power Civil, or at least not depending on it.

3. To take away this Scruple of Conscience, concerning Obedience to Humane Laws, amongst those that interpret to themselves the Word of God in the Holy Scriptures, I propound to their Consideration, first, That no Humane Law is intended to oblige the Conscience of a Man, unless it break out into Action, either of the Tongue, or other Part of the Body. The Law made thereupon would be of none Effect, because no Man is able to discern, but by Word or other Action whether such Law be kept or broken. Nor did the Apostles themselves pretend Dominion over Mens Consciences, concerning the Faith they preached, but only Perswasion and Instruction. And therefore S. Paul saith, 2 Cor. 1. 24. writing to the *Corinthians*, concerning their Controversies, that He and the Rest of the Apostles had no Dominion over their Faith, but were Helpers of their Joy.

4. And for the Actions of Men which proceed from their Consciences, the regulating of which Actions is the only Means of Peace, if they might not stand with Justice, it were impossible that Justice towards God, and Peace amongst Men, should stand together in that Religion that teacheth us, that *Justice and Peace shall kiss each other*, and in which we have so many Precepts of Absolute Obedience to humane Authority; as Matth. 23. 2, 3. we have this Precept, *The Scribes and Pharisees sit in Moses Seat; all therefore whatsoever they bid you observe, that observe and do.* And yet were the Scribes and Pharisees not Priests, but men of Temporal Authority. Again; Luk. 11. 17. *Every Kingdom divided against it self, shall be desolate; and*
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is not that Kingdom divided against it self, where the Actions of every one shall be ruled by his private Opinion, or Conscience, and yet those Actions such as give Occasion of Offence and Breach of Peace? Again, Rom. 13. 5. *Wherefore you must be subject, not because of Wrath only, but also for Conscience Sake,* Tit. 3. 1. *Put them in Remembrance, that they be subject to Principalities and Powers,* 1 Pet. 2. 13, 14. *Submit your selves unto all Manner of Ordinance of Man, for the Lords Sake, whether it be unto the King, as unto the Superior, or unto Governours, as unto them that are sent of him for the punishment of evil Doers.* Jude verse. 8. *These Dreamers also that defile the flesh, and despise Government, and speak evil of them that are in Authority.* And forasmuch as all Subjects in Commonwealths are in the Nature of Children and Servants, that which is a Command to them, is a Command to all Subjects. But to these S. Paul saith, Colos. 3. 20, 22. *Children, obey your Parents in all Things, Servants, be obedient to your Masters according to the Flesh in all Things.* And vers. 23. *Do it heartily, as to the Lord.* These Places considered, it seemeth strange to me, that any Man in a Christian Commonwealth, should have any Occasion to deny his Obedience to publick Authority, upon this Ground, that *It is better to obey God than Man.* For though S. Peter and the Apostles did so answer the Council of the Jews, that forbade them to preach Christ, there appeareth no Reason that Christians should alledg the same against their Christian Governours, that command to preach Christ. To reconcile this seeming Contradiction of simple Obedience to God,
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And simple Obedience to Man, we are to consider a Christian Subject, as under a Christian Sovereign, or under an Infidel.

5. And under a Christian Sovereign we are to consider, what Actions we are forbidden by God Almighty to obey them in, and what not. The Actions we are forbidden to obey them in, are such only, as imply a Denial of that Faith which is necessary to our Salvation: for otherwise there can be no Pretence of Disobedience; for why should a Man incur the Danger of a temporal Death, by displeasing of his Superiour, if it were not for Fear of eternal Death hereafter? It must therefore be inquired, what those Propositions and Articles be, the Belief whereof, our Saviour or his Apostles have declared to be such, as without believing them, a Man cannot be saved; and then all other Points, that are now controverted, and made Distinction of Sects, *Papists, Lutherans, Calvinists, Arminians*, &c. as in old Time, the like made *Paulists, Apollonians*, and *Cephasians*; must needs be such, as a Man needeth not for the holding thereof, deny Obedience to his Superiours. And for the Points of Faith necessary to Salvation, I shall call them *Fundamental*, and every other Point a *Superstruction*.

9. And without all Controversie, there is not any more necessary Point to be believed for Mans Salvation, than this, That *Jesus is the Messiah*, that is, *the Christ*; which Proposition is explicated in sundry Sorts, but still the same in Effect; as, that *He is Gods Anointed*; for that is signified by the Word, *Christ*: that *He was the true and lawful King of Israel, The Son of David, The Saviour of the World,*

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The Redeemer of Israel, The Salvation of God, He that should come into the World, The Son of God, and (which I desire by the way to have noted, against the now Sect of Arrians) The begotten Son of God, Acts 3. 13. Heb. 5. 5. The only begotten Son of God, 1 Joh. 1. 14, 18. Joh. 3. 16, 18. 1 Joh. 4. 9. That he was God, Joh. 1. 1. Joh. 20. 28. That the Fullness of the Godhead dwelt in him bodily. Moreover, The Holy one, The Holy One of God, The Forgiver of sins, That he is risen from the Dead. These are Explications, and Parts of that general Article, that Jesus is the Christ. This Point therefore, and all the Explications thereof are Fundamental; as also all such as be evidently inferred from thence; as, Belief in God the Father. Joh. 12. 44. He that believeth in me, believeth not in me, but in him that sent me: 1 Joh. 2. 23. He that denieth the Son, hath not the Father. Belief in God the Holy Ghost, of whom Christ saith, Joh. 14. 26. But the Comforter which is the Holy Ghost, whom the Father will send in my Name: and Joh. 15. 16. But when the Comforter shall come, whom I will send unto you from the Father, even the Spirit of Truth. Belief of the Scriptures, by which we believe those Points and of the Immortality of the Soul, without which we cannot believe he is a Saviour.

7. And as these are the Fundamental Points of Faith necessary to Salvation; so also are they only necessary as Matter of Faith, and only essential to the Calling of a Christian; as may appear by many evident Places of Holy Scripture: Joh. 5. 39. *Search the Scriptures, for in them you think to have eternal Life, and they are they which testify of me.* Now, forasmuch as by the Scripture, is meant there
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the Old Testament, (the New being then not written) the Belief of that which was written concerning our Saviour in the Old Testament, was sufficient Belief for the obtaining of Eternal Life : but in the Old Testament, there is nothing revealed concerning Christ, but that he is the Messiah, and such Things as belong to the Fundamental Points thereupon depending. And therefore those Fundamental Points are sufficient to Salvation as of Faith. And Joh. 6. 28, 29. *Then said they unto him, What shall we do, that we might work the Works of God ? Jesus answered and said unto them, This is the Work of God, that ye believe in him, whom he hath sent.* So that the Point to be believed is, *That Jesus Christ came forth from God, and he which believeth it, worketh the Works of God.* Joh. 11. 26, 27. *Whosoever liveth and believeth in me, shall never dye. Believest thou this ? She said unto him, Yea, Lord, I believe that thou art the Christ, the Son of God which should come into the World.* Hence followeth, *He that believeth this, shall never dye.* Joh. 20. 31. *But these things are written, that ye might believe, that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God, and that in believing, ye might have Life through his Name.* By which appeareth, that this Fundamental Point is all that is required, as of Faith to our Salvation : 1 Joh. 4. 2. *Every Spirit that confesseth that Jesus Christ, is come into the Flesh, is of God :* 1 Joh. 5. 1. *Whosoever believeth that Jesus is the Christ, is born of God ;* and ver. 5. *Who is it that overcometh the World, but he that believeth, that Jesus is the Son of God :* and vers. 13. *These Things have I written unto you that believe in the Name of the Son of God, that ye may know that ye have eternal Life.* Act. 8. 36, 37. *The Eunuch said,*
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Here is Water, what doth lett me to be baptized? And Philip said unto him, If thou believest with all thy Heart, thou mayest. He answered and said, I believe that Jesus Christ is the Son of God. This Point therefore was sufficient for the Reception of Man into Baptism, that is to say, to Christianity. And Act. 16. 30. The Keeper of the Prison fell down before Paul and Syllas, and said, Sirs, What shall I do to be saved? And they said, Believe in the Lord Jesus Christ. And the Sermon of S. Peter, upon the day of Pentecost, was nothing else but an Explication, that Jesus was the Christ. And when they had heard him, they asked him, What shall we do? He said unto them, Act. 2. 38. Amend your Lives, and be baptized every one of you in the Name of Jesus Christ for the Remission of Sins. Rom. 10. 9. If thou shalt confess with thy Mouth the Lord Jesus, and shall believe in thy heart, that God raised him up from the Dead, thou shalt be saved. To These Places may be added, That wheresoever our Saviour Christ doth approve the Faith of any Man, the Proposition believed, (if the same be to be collected out of the Text) is always some of these Fundamental Points before-mentioned, or something equivalent: As the Faith of the Centurion, Matth. 8. 8. Speak the Word only, and my Servant shall be healed; believing he was Omnipotent: The Faith of the Woman, which had an Issue of Blood, Matth. 9. 21. If I may but touch the Hem of his Garment; Implying, He was the Messiah: The Faith required of the blind Men, Matth. 9. 28. Believe you that I am able to do this? The Faith of the Canaanitish Woman, Matth. 15. 22. That he was the Son of David, implying

implying the same. And so it is in every one of those Places (none excepted) where our Saviour commendeth any Mans Faith, which because they are too many to insert here, I omit, and refer them to his Inquisition that is not otherwise satisfied. And as there is no other Faith required, so there was no other preaching: for the Prophets of the Old Testament preached no other; and *John* the Baptist preached only the Approach of the Kingdom of Heaven, that is to say, of the Kingdom of Christ. The same was the Commission of the Apostles, *Matt.* 10. 7. *Go preach, saying, The Kingdom of Heaven is at hand.* And *Paul* preaching amongst the Jews, *Acts*, 18. 5. did but testifie unto the Jews, that *Jesus was the Christ*. And the Heathens took notice of Christians no otherwise, but by this Name, that they believed *Jesus to be a King*, crying out, *Acts* 17. 6. *These are they that have subverted the State of the World, and here they are, whom Jason hath received. And these all do against the Decrees of Caesar, saying, That there is another King, One Jesus.* And this was the Summ of the Predictions, the Summ of the Confessions of them that believed, as well Men as Devils. This was the Title of his Cross, *Jesus of Nazaret, King of the Jews*; This the Occasion of the Crown of Thorns, Scepter of Reed, and a Man to carry his Cross; This was the Subject of the *Hosanna's*; and this was the Title, by which our Saviour, commanding to take another Mans Goods, bad them say, *The Lord hath Need*; And by this Title he purged the Temple of the profane Market kept there. Nor did the Apostles themselves believe any more than that *Jesus was the Messiah*, nor under-

understand so much; for they understood the Messiah to be no more than a Temporal King till after our Saviours Resurrection. Furthermore, this Point, that *Christ is the Messiah*, is particularly set forth for *Fundamental* by that Word, or some other equivalent thereunto in divers Places. Upon the Confession of *Peter*, Matth. 16. 16. *Thou art the Christ the Son of the living God*, Our Saviour, ver. 18. saith, *Upon this Rock will I build my Church*. This Point therefore is the whole Foundation of Christs Church. Rom. 15. 20. S. Paul saith, *I so enforced my self to preach the Gospel, not where Christ was named, lest I should have built upon another Mans Foundation*, 1 Cor. 3. 10. S. Paul, when he had reprehended the *Corinthians* for their Sects, and curious Doctrines and Questions, he distinguisheth between *Fundamental* Points, and *Superstruction*; and saith, *I have laid the Foundation, and another buildeth thereupon; but let every Man take heed how he buildeth upon it. For other Foundation can no Man lay than that which is laid, which is Jesus Christ*. Coloss. 2. 6 *As you have received Christ Jesus the Lord, so walk in him, rooted and builded in him, and stablished in the Faith*.

8. Having shewed this Proposition, *Jesus is the Christ*, to be the only Fundamental and necessary Point of Faith, I shall set down a few Places more, to shew, that other Points, though they may be true, are not so necessary to be believed, as that a Man may not be saved, though he believe them not. And first, If a Man could not be saved without Assent of the Heart to the Truth of all Controversies, which are now in Agitation concerning Religion, I cannot see, how any Man living can be saved; so full of Subtily, and curious

curious Knowledge it is to be so great a Divine. Why therefore should a Man think that our Saviour, who *Matt. 11. 30.* saith, that His Yoke is easie, should require a Matter of that Difficulty? or how are little Children said to believe, *Matt. 18. 6.* or how could the good Thief be thought sufficiently catechized upon the Cross? or S. Paul so perfect a Christian presently upon his Conversion? and though there may be more Obedience required in him that hath the Fundamental Points explicated unto him, than in him that hath received the same but implicitly, yet there is no more Faith required for Salvation in one Man, than in another. For if it be true, that *Whosoever shall confess with his Mouth the Lord Jesus, and believe in his heart, that God raised him from the Dead, shall be saved*; as it is, *Rom. 10. 9.* and that *Whosoever believeth that Jesus is the Christ, is born of God*; the Belief of that Point is sufficient for the Salvation of any Man whosoever he be, for as much as concerneth Faith. And seeing he that believeth not that *Jesus is the Christ*, whatsoever he believe else, cannot be saved; it followeth, that there is no more required of the Salvation of one Man, than another, in Matter of Faith.

9. About these Points Fundamental, there is little Controversie amongst Christians, though otherwise of different Sects amongst themselves. And therefore the Controversies of Religion, are altogether about Points unnecessary to Salvation; whereof some are Doctrines raised by Humane Ratiocination, from the points Fundamental. As for Example; such Doctrines as concern the Manner of the Real Presence, wherein are mingled

led Tenets of Faith concerning the Omnipotency and Divinity of Christ, with the Tenets of *Aristotle* and the *Peripateticks*, concerning Substance and Accidents, Species, Hypostasis, and the Subsistence and Migration of Accidents from Place to Place; Words some of them without Meaning, and nothing but the Canting of *Grecian* Sophisters. And these Doctrines are condemned expressly, Col. 2. 8. where after *S. Paul* had exhorted them to be rooted and builded in Christ, he giveth them this farther Caveat; *Beware lest there be any Man that spoil you through Philosophy and vain Deceits, through the Traditions of Men, according to the Rudiments of the World.* And such, are such Doctrines, as are raised out of such Places of the Scriptures, as concern not the Foundation, by Mens natural Reason; as about the Concatenation of Causes, and the Manner of Gods Predestination; which are also mingled with Philosophy: as if it were possible for Men that know not in what Manner God seeth, heareth, or speaketh, to know nevertheless the Manner how he intendeth, and predestineth. A Man therefore ought not to examine by Reason any Point, or draw any Consequence out of Scripture by Reason, concerning the Nature of God Almighty, of which Reason is not capable. And therefore *S. Paul*, Rom. 12. 3. giveth a good Rule, *That no Man presume to understand above that which is meet to understand, but that he understand according to Sobriety:* which they do not, who presume out of Scripture, by their own Interpretation, to raise any Doctrine to the Understanding, concerning those Things which are incomprehensible. And this whole Controversie concerning

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the Predestination of God, and the Free-Will of Man, is not peculiar to Christian Men. For we have huge Volumes of this Subject, under the Name of *Fate*, and *Contingency*, disputed between the *Epicureans* and the *Stoicks*, and consequently it is not Matter of Faith, but of Philosophy: and so are also all the Questions concerning any other Point, but the Foundation before named; and God receiveth a Man, which Part of the Question soever he holdeth. It was a Controversie in *S. Paul's* Time; Whether a Christian Gentile might eat freely of any Thing which the Christian *Jews* did not; and the *Jew* condemned the Gentile that he did eat, to whom *S. Paul* saith, *Rom. 14. 3. Let not him that eateth not, judge him that eateth; for God hath received him.* And *vers. 6.* in the Question concerning the observing of Holy Days, wherein the Gentiles and *Jews* differed, he saith unto them, *He that observeth the Day, observeth it to the Lord; and he that observeth not the Day, observeth it not to the Lord.* And they who strive concerning such Questions, and divide themselves into Sects, are not therefore to be accounted zealous of the Faith, their strife being but carnal, which is confirmed by *S. Paul, 1 Cor. 3. 4. When one saith, I am of Paul, and another, I am of Apollos, are ye not carnal?* For they are not Questions of Faith, but of Wit, wherein carnally Men are inclined to seek the Mastery one of another. For nothing is truly a Point of Faith, but that *Jesus is the Christ*; as *S. Paul* testifieth, *1 Cor. 2. 2. For I esteemed not the Knowledge of any Thing amongst you, save Jesus Christ, and him crucified.* And *1 Tim. 6. 20. O Timotheus, keep that which is committed*

mitted unto thee, and avoid prophane and vain Babblings, and Opposition of Science falsely so called, which while some profess, they have erred concerning the Faith.

*2 Tim. 2. 16. Stay prophane and vain Babblings, &c. Vers. 17. Of which Sort is Hymeneus and Philletus, which as concerning the Truth, have erred, saying, That the Resurrection is past already. Whereby S. Paul shewed, that the Raising of Questions by Humane Ratiocination, though it be from the Fundamental Points themselves, is not only not necessary, but most dangerous to the Faith of a Christian. Out of all these Places, I draw only this Conclusion in general, That neither the Points now in Controversie amongst Christians of different Sects, or in any Point that ever shall be in Controversie, excepting only those that are contained in this Article, *Jesus is the Christ*, are necessary to Salvation, as of Faith; though in Matter of Obedience, a Man may be bound not to oppose the same.*

10. Although to the obtaining of Salvation, there be required no more, as hath been already declared, out of the Holy Scriptures, as Matter of Faith, but the Belief of those Fundamental Articles before set forth; nevertheless, there are required other Things, as Matter of Obedience. For, as it is not enough in Temporal Kingdoms (to avoid the Punishment which Kings may inflict) to acknowledge the Right and Title of the King, without Obedience also to his Laws: So also it is not enough, to acknowledge our Saviour Christ to be the King of Heaven, in which consisteth Christian Faith, unless also we endeavour to obey his Laws, which are the Laws of the King-

dom of Heaven, in which consisteth Christian Obedience. And forasmuch as the Laws of the Kingdom of Heaven, are the Laws of Nature, as hath been shewed, Part 1. Chap. 5. not only Faith, but also the Observation of the Law of Nature, which is that for which a Man is called Just or Righteous, (in that Sense, in which Justice is taken not for the Absence of Guilt, but for the Endeavour and constant Will to do that which is Just) not only Faith, but this Justice, which also from the Effect thereof, is called Repentance, and sometimes Works, is necessary to Salvation. So that Faith and Justice do both concur thereto ; and in the several Acceptation of this Word [Justification] are properly said both of them to justifie ; and the Want of either of them is properly said to condemn. For not only he that resisteth a King upon doubt of his Title, but also he that doth it upon the inordinateness of his Passions, deserveth Punishment. And when Faith and Works are separated, not only the Faith is called Dead without Works, but also Works are called Dead Works without Faith. And therefore S. James, Chap. 2. 17. saith, *Even so the Faith, if it have no Works, is dead in it self* ; and vers. 26. *For as the Body without the Spirit is dead, even so Faith without works is dead.* And S. Paul, Heb. 6. 1. calleth Works without Faith, *Dead Works*, where he saith, *Not laying again the Foundation of Repentance from Dead Works.* And by these Dead Works, is understood not the Obedience and Justice of the inward Man, but the *Opus operantur*, or external Action, proceeding from Fear of Punish-

Punishment, or from Vain-Glory, and Desire to be honoured of Men: and these may be separated from Faith, and conduce no way to a Mans Justification. And for that Cause, *S. Paul*, Rom. 4. excludeth the Righteousness of the Law, from having Part in the Justification of a Sinner. For by the Law of *Moses*, which is applyed to Mens Actions, and requireth the Absence of Guilt, all Men living are liable to Damnation; and therefore no Man is justified by Works, but by Faith only. But if Works be taken for the Endeavour to do them, that is, if the Will be taken for the Deed, or Internal, for External Righteousness, then do Works contribute to Salvation. And then taketh Place that of *S. James*, Chap. 2. 24. *Ye see then, how that of Works a Man is justified, and not of Faith only.* And both of these are joyned to Salvation, as in *S. Mark* 1. 5. *Repent and believe the Gospel.* And *Luke* 18. 18. when a certain Ruler asked our Saviour, what he ought to do to inherit eternal Life, he propounded to him the keeping of the Commandments; which when the Ruler said he had kept, he propounded to him the Faith, *Sell all that thou hast, and follow me.* And *John* 3. 36. *He that believeth in the Son, hath everlasting Life.* And *He that obeyeth not the Son, shall not see Life.* Where he manifestly joyneth Obedience and Faith together. And *Rom.* 1. 17. *The just shall live by Faith;* not every one, but *the just.* For also *the Devils believe and tremble.* But though both Faith and Justice (meaning still by Justice, not Absence of Guilt, but the Good Intentions of the Mind, which is called Righteousness by God, that taketh the Will for the

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Deed)

Deed) be both of them said to justifie, yet are their Parts in the Act of Justification to be distinguished. For Justice is said to justifie, not because it absolveth, but because it denominates him Just, and setteth him in an Estate, or Capacity of Salvation, whensoever he shall have Faith. But Faith is said to justifie, that is, to absolve, because by it a Just Man is absolved of, and forgiven his unjust Actions. And thus are reconciled the Places of *S. Paul* and *S. James*, that *Faith only justifieth*, and *a Man is not justified by Faith only*; and shewed how Faith and Repentance must concur to Salvation.

11. These things considered, it will easily appear, That under the Sovereign Power of a Christian Commonwealth, there is no Danger of Damnation from Simple Obedience to Humane Laws; for in that the Sovereign alloweth Christianity, no Man is compelled to renounce that Faith, which is enough for his Salvation, that is to say, the Fundamental Points. And for other Points, seeing they are not necessary to Salvation, if we conform our Actions to the Laws, we do not only what we are allowed, but also what we are commanded by the Law of Nature, which is the Moral Law taught by our Saviour himself. And it is Part of that Obedience which must concur to our Salvation.

12. And though it be true, whatsoever a Man doth against his Conscience, is Sin; yet the Obedience in these Cases, is neither Sin, nor against the Conscience. For the Conscience being nothing else but a Mans settled Judgment
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and Opinion, when he hath once transferre^d his Right of Judging to another, that which shall be commanded, is no less his Judgment, than the Judgment of that other. So that in Obedience to Laws, a Man doth still according to his own Conscience, but not his private Conscience. And whatsoever is done contrary to private Conscience; is then a Sin, when the Laws have left him to his own Liberty, and never else. And then whatsoever a Man doth, not only believing it is ill done, but doubting whether it be ill or not, is done ill, in case he may lawfully omit the doing.

13. And as it hath been proved, that a Man must submit his Opinions in Matter of Controversie to the Authority of the Commonwealth; so also is the same confest by the Practice of every one of them that otherwise deny it. For who is there differing in Opinion from another, and thinking himself to be in the Right, and the other in the Wrong, that would not think it reasonable, if he be of the same Opinion that the whole State alloweth, that the other should submit his Opinion also thereunto; or that would not be content, if not that one or a few Men, yet all the Divines of a whole Nation, or at least an Assembly of all those he liketh, should have the Power to determine all the Controversies of Religion? or, who is there that would not be content, to submit his Opinions, either to the Pope, or to a General Council, or to a Provincial Council, or to a Presbytery of his own Nation? And yet in all these Cases he submitteth himself to

no greater than Humane Authority. Nor can a Man be said to submit himself to Holy Scripture, that doth not submit himself to some or other for the Interpretation thereof. Or, why should there be any Church Government at all instituted, if the Scripture it self could do the Office of a Judge in Controversies of Faith? But the Truth is apparent, by continual Experience, that Men seek not only Liberty of Conscience, but of their Actions; nor that only, but a farther Liberty of perswading others to their Opinions; nor that only, for every Man desireth, that the Sovereign Authority should admit no other Opinions to be maintained, but such as he himself holdeth.

14. The Difficulty therefore of obeying both God and Man in a Christian Commonwealth is none: All the difficulty resteth in this Point, Whether he that hath received the Faith of Christ, having before subjected himself to the Authority of an Infidel, be discharged of his Obedience thereby, or not, in Matters of Religion. In which Case it seemeth reasonable to think, that since all Covenants of Obedience are entered into for the Preservation of a Mans Life, if a Man be content without Resistance to lay down his Life, rather than obey the Commands of an Infidel, in so hard a Case he hath sufficiently discharged himself thereof. For no Covenant bindeth farther than to endeavour; and if a Man cannot assure himself to perform a just Duty, when thereby he is assured of present Death, much less can it be expected that a Man should perform that, for which he believeth in his Heart he shall be damned eternally.

nally. And thus much concerning the Scruple of Conscience, that may arise concerning Obedience to Humane Laws, in them that interpret the Law of God to themselves. It remaineth, to remove the same Scruple from them, that submit their Controversies to others not ordained thereunto by the Sovereign Authority. And this I refer to the Chapter following.

CHAP.

CHAP. VII.

1. *The Question propounded, who are the Magistrates in the Kingdom of Christ.*
2. *The Question exemplified, in the Controversies between Moses and Aaron, and between Moses and Corah.*
3. *Amongst the Jews, the Power Temporal and Spiritual in the same Hand.*
4. *Parallel of the twelve Princes of Israel, and the twelve Apostles.*
5. *Parallel of seventy Elders, and seventy Disciples.*
6. *The Hierarchy of the Church in our Saviours Time, consisted in the Twelve, and in the Seventy.*
7. *Why Christ ordained no Priests for Sacrifices, as Moses did.*
8. *The Hierarchy of the Church in the Apostles Time, Apostles, Bishops, and Priests.*
9. *The Preaching of the Gospel was not Commanding, but Perswading.*
10. *Excommunication. Sovereigns immediate Rulers Ecclesiastical under Christ.*

11. *That*

11. *That no Man hath any just Pretence of Religion against Obedience to Commonwealth. God speaketh to Man by his Vicegerents.*

1. **I**N the former Chapter have been removed those Difficulties opposing our Obedience to Humane Authority ; which arise from misunderstanding of our Saviours Title and Laws: in the former whereof, namely, his Title, consisteth our Faith ; and in the latter, our Justice. Now they who differ not amongst themselves concerning his Title and Laws, may nevertheless have different Opinions concerning his Magistrates, and the Authority he hath given them. And this is the Cause, why many Christians have denyed Obedience to their Princes, pretending that our Saviour Christ hath not given this Magistracy to them but to others. As for Example ; Some say, to the Pope universally ; Some, to a Synod Aristocratical ; Some, to a Synod Democratical in every several Commonwealth ; and the Magistrates of Christ being they by whom he speaketh, the Question is, Whether he speak unto us by the Pope, or by Convocations of Bishops and Ministers, or by Them that have the Sovereign Power in every Commonwealth.

2. This Controversie was the Cause of those two Mutinies, that happened against *Moses* in the Wilderness. The first by *Aaron* and his sister *Miriam*, who took upon them to censure *Moses*, for marrying an *Ethiopian* Woman. And the State of the Question between them and *Moses*,
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they set forth, Numb. 12. 2. in these Words, *What hath the Lord spoken but only by Moses? hath he not spoken also by us? And the Lord heard this, &c.* and punished the same in *Miriam*, forgiving *Aaron* upon his Repentance. And this is the Case of all them that set up the Priesthood against the Sovereignty. The other was of *Corah*, *Dathan* and *Abiram*, who with two hundred and fifty Captains gathered themselves together against *Moses*, and against *Aaron*. The State of their Controversie was this, Whether God were not with the Multitude, as well as with *Moses*, and every Man as holy as He. For Numb. 16. 3. thus they say, *You take too much upon you, seeing all the Congregation is holy; every one of them, and the Lord is amongst them: wherefore then lift ye your selves above the Congregation of the Lord?* And this is the Case of them that set up their private Consciences, and unite themselves to take the Government of Religion out of the Hands of Him or Them, that have the Sovereign Power of the Commonwealth: which how well it pleaseth God, may appear by the hideous Punishment of *Corah* and his Complices.

3. In the Government therefore of *Moses* there was no Power, neither Civil, nor Spiritual, that was not derived from him. Nor in the State of *Israel* under Kings, was there any Earthly Power, by which those Kings were compellable to any Thing, or any Subject allowed to resist them in any Case whatsoever. For though the Prophets by extraordinary Calling, did often admonish and threaten them, yet they had no Authority over them. And therefore amongst the

Jews,

Jews, the Power Spiritual and Temporal, was always in the same Hand.

4. Our Saviour Christ, as he was the rightful King of the *Jews* in particular, as well as King of the Kingdom of Heaven, in the ordaining of Magistrates, received that Form of Policy which was used by *Moses*. According to the Number of the Children of *Jacob*, *Moses* took unto him by the Appointment of God, *Numb.* 1. 4. twelve Men, every one of the chief of their Tribe, which were to assist him in the Muster of *Israel*. And these twelve, *vers.* 24. are called the Princes of *Israel*, *Twelve Men*, every one for the House of their Fathers; which are said also, *Numb.* 7. 2. to be Heads over the Houses of their Fathers, and Princes of the Tribes, and over them that were numbered. And these were every one equal amongst themselves. In like Manner our Saviour took unto him Twelve Apostles to be next unto him in Authority, of whom he saith, *Matth.* 19. 28. *When the Son of Man shall sit in the Throne of his Majesty, ye which follow me in the Regeneration, shall sit also upon Twelve Thrones, and judge the Twelve Tribes of Israel.* And concerning the Equality of the Twelve Apostles amongst themselves, our Saviour saith, *Matth.* 20. 25. *Ye know that the Lords of the Gentiles have Domination over them, &c. vers.* 26. *But it shall not be so amongst you; but whosoever will be greatest among you, let him be your Servant.* And *Matth.* 23. 11. *He that is greatest among you, let him be your Servant.* And a little before, *verse* 8. *Be not called Rabbi; for one is your Doctor, Christ, and all ye are Brethren.* And *Act.* 1. In the chusing of *Matthias* to be an Apostle, though

though S. Peter used the Part of a *Prolocutor*, yet did no Man take upon him the Authority of Election, but referred the same to Lot.

5. Again *Moses* had the Command of God, Num. 11. 16. *Gather to me seventy Men of the Elders of Israel, whom thou knowest that they are the Elders of the People, and Governours over them, and bring them unto the Tabernacle, &c.* And *Moses* did accordingly, *vers.* 24. And these were chosen to help *Moses* in bearing the Burthen of the Government, as appeareth, *vers.* 17. of the same Chapter. And as the Twelve Princes of the Tribes were according to the Number of *Jacob's* Children; so were the seventy Elders according to the Number of the Persons that went down with *Jacob* into *Egypt*. In like Manner our Saviour in his Kingdom of Heaven the Church, out of the whole Number of those that believed in him, ordained seventy Persons, which peculiarly were called the seventy Disciples, to whom he gave Power to preach the Gospel and Baptize.

6. In our Saviours Time therefore, the Hierarchy of the Church consisted (besides Himself that was the Head) of Twelve Apostles, who were equal amongst themselves, but ordained over others, as were the twelve Heads of the Tribes, and seventy Disciples, who had every one of them Power to Baptize and Teach, and help to govern the whole Flock.

7. And whereas in the Commonwealth instituted by *Moses*, there was not only an High-Priest for the present, but also a Succession and Order of Priests; it may be demanded, Why our Saviour Christ did not ordain the like? To which

which may be answered, That the High-Priesthood, forasmuch as concerneth the Authority thereof, was in the Person of Christ, as he was Christ, that is King. So also was it in *Moses*, *Aaron* having the Ministerial Part only. For notwithstanding that *Aaron* was the High-Priest, yet the Consecration of him belonged to *Moses*, *Exod.* 29. 1. All the Utensils of Sacrifice, and other holy Things, were ordered by *Moses*; and in Summ, the whole Levitical Law was delivered by God by the Hand of *Moses*, who was to *Aaron* a God, and *Aaron* to him a Mouth. And for the Ministerial Part, there could no High-Priest be ordained but himself; for seeing our Saviour was himself the Sacrifice, who but himself could offer him up? And for the Celebration of that Sacrifice for ever after, our Saviour annexed the Priesthood to those whom he had appointed to govern in the Church.

8. After the Ascension of our Saviour, the Apostles dispersed themselves for the spreading of the Gospel, and continually as they converted any Number of Men, in any City, or Region, to the Faith; they chose out such as they thought fittest, to direct them in Matter of Conversation and Life, according to Christ's Law, and to explicate unto them, that Mystery of Christ come in the Flesh, that is to say, to unfold unto them at large, the Office of the Messiah. And of those Elders, some were subordinate to others, according as the Apostles, who ordained them, thought meet. So *S. Paul* gave Power unto *Titus*, to ordain Elders in *Creet*, and to redress Things that were amiss. So that *Titus* was both an Elder, and ordained Elders: *Tic.* 1. 5. *For this cause I left thee*

thee in Creet, that thou shouldest continue to redress the Things that remain, and ordain Elders in every City; where the Word is *καταστήσεις*, that is constitute; whereby it appeareth, that in the Apostles Times, one Elder had Authority over another, to ordain and rule them. For 1 Tim. 5. 16. Timothy an Elder, is made Judge of Accusations against other Elders And Acts 14. 23. The Disciples are said to ordain Elders, for all the Congregations of the Cities they had preached in. And though the Word there be *καταστήσαντες*, yet it signifieth not Election by holding up of Hands, but simply and absolutely Ordination. For the ordinary Chusing of Magistrates amongst the *Grecians*, which were all either popularly governed, or else by *Oligarchy*, being performed by holding up of Hands, made that Word be taken simply, for an Election or Ordination, howsoever made. And thus in the Primitive Church, the Hierarchy of the Church, was Apostles, Elders that governed other Elders, and Elders that ruled not, but their Office was to preach, to administer the Sacraments, to offer up Prayers and Thanksgiving in the Name of the People. But at that Time there appeared no Distinction between the Names of Bishop and Elder. But immediately after the Apostles Time, the Word Bishop was taken to signifie such an Elder as had the Government of Elders; and other Elders, were called by the Name of Priests, which signifieth the same that Elder doth. And thus the Government of Bishops hath a Divine Pattern in the twelve Rulers, and seventy Elders of *Israel*, in the twelve Apostles and seventy Disciples of our Saviour, in the Ruling-
Elders,

Elders, and not Ruling Elders in the Time of the Apostles.

9. And thus much of the Magistrates over Christ's Flock in the Primitive Church. For the Office of a Minister, or Ministress was to be Subject to the Flock, and to serve them in those Things which appertained to their temporal Business. The next Thing to be considered is the Authority which our Saviour gave to them, either over those whom they had converted, or those whom they were about to convert. And for these latter, which as yet were without the Church, the Authority which our Saviour gave to his Apostles was no more but this, To preach unto them that Jesus was the Christ, and to explicate the same in all Points, that concern the Kingdom of Heaven, and to perswade Men to embrace our Saviours Doctrine, but by no Means to compel any Man to be Subject to them: for seeing the Laws of the Kingdom of Heaven, as hath been shewed, *Par. 1. Chap. 5. Sect. 10.* are dictated to the Conscience only, which is not subject to Compulsion and Constraint, it was not congruent to the Style of the King of Heaven to constrain Men to submit their Actions to him, but to advise them only; nor for him that professeth the Summ of his Law to be Love, to extort any Duty from us with Fear of temporal Punishment. And therefore as the mighty Men in the World, that hold others in Subjection, by Force, are called in Scripture by the Name of Hunters; so our Saviour calleth those whom he appointed to draw the World unto him, by subduing their Affections, *Fishers.* And

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therefore

therefore he saith to *Peter* and *Andrew*, *Matth.* 4. 19. *Follow me, and I will make yee Fishers of Men* And *Luke* 10. 3. *Behold (saith Christ) I send yee forth as Lambs amongst Wolves.* And it were to no end to give them the Right of compelling without strengthening the same with greater Power than of *Lambs* amongst *Wolves*. Moreover, *Matth.* 10. where our Saviour giveth a Commission to his twelve Apostles, to go forth and convert the Nations to the Faith, he giveth them no Authority of Coercion and Punishment, but only saith, *vers.* 14. *Whosoever shall not receive you, nor hear your Words, when ye depart out of that House, or that City, shake off the Dust of your Feet. It shall be easier for the Land of Sodom and Gomorrha in the Day of Judgment, than for that City.* Whereby it is manifest, that all that the Apostles could do by their Authority, was no more than to renounce Communion with them, and leave their Punishment to God Almighty, in the Day of Judgment. Likewise the Comparisons of the Kingdom of Heaven to the Seed, *Matth.* 13. 3. and to the Leaven, *Matth.* 13. 33. doth intimate unto us that the Increase thereof ought to proceed from internal Operation of God's Word preached, and not from any Law or Compulsion of them that preach it. Moreover our Saviour himself saith, *Joh.* 18. 36. *That his Kingdom is not of this World;* and consequently his Magistrates derive not from him any Authority of punishing Men in this World. And therefore also, *Matth.* 26. 52. After St. *Peter* had drawn his Sword in his Defence, our Saviour saith, *Put up thy Sword into his Place. For all that take the*
Sword,

Sword, shall perish by the Sword. And, verse 54. How then shall the Scriptures be fullfilled, which say, That it must be so? shewing out of the Scriptures, that the Kingdom of Christ was not to be defended by the Sword.

10. But concerning the Authority of the Apostles or Bishops over those who were already converted and within the Church, there be that think it greater than over them without. For some have said, *Though the Law of Christ deprive no Prince of his Dominion, and Paul did rightly appeal unto Caesar, whilst Kings were Infidels and out of the Church; yet when they became Christians, and of their own accord underwent the Laws of the Gospel, presently as Sheep to a Shepherd, and as Members to the Head, they became subject to the Prelate of the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy.* Bell. Lib. de Rom. Pont. Cap. 29. Which whether it be true or not, is to be considered by that Light which we have from the holy Scripture, concerning the Power of our Saviour and his Apostles, over such as they had converted. But our Saviour, as he imitated the Commonwealth of the Jews in his Magistrates, the Twelve and the Seventy; so did he also in the Censure of the Church, which was *Excommunication*; but amongst the Jews, the Church did put the Excommunicated Persons from the Congregation, which they might do by their Power Temporal; but our Saviour and his Apostles, who took upon them no such Power, could not forbid the Excommunicated Person to enter into any Place and Congregation, into which he was permitted to enter, by the Prince, or Sovereign of the Place. For that had been to deprive the

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Sovereign

Sovereign of his Authority. And therefore the Excommunication of a Person subject to an Earthly Power, was but a Declaration of the Church, which did excommunicate, that the Person so excommunicated was to be reputed still as an Infidel, but not to be driven by their Authority, out of any Company, he might otherwise lawfully come into. And this is it our Saviour saith, Matth. 18. 17. *If he refuse to hear the Church, let him be unto thee as an heathen Man and a Publican.* So that the whole Effect of excommunicating a Christian Prince, is no more than he or they that so excommunicate him depart and banish themselves out of his Dominion. Nor can they thereupon discharge any of his Subjects of their Obedience to him; for that were to deprive him of his Dominion; which they may not do, for being out of the Church. It is confessed by them that make this Objection, and proved in the former Section, that our Saviour gave no Authority to his Apostles to be Judges over them. And therefore in no Case can the Sovereign Power of a Commonwealth be subject to any Authority Ecclesiastical, besides that of Christ himself. And though he be informed concerning the Kingdom of Heaven, and subject himself thereto at the Perswasions of Persons Ecclesiastical, yet is he not thereby subject to their Government and Rule. For if it were by their Authority he took that Yoke upon him, and not by their Perswasion, then by the same Authority he might cast it off. But this is unlawful. For if all the Churches in the World should renounce the Christian Faith, yet is not this sufficient Authority for any of the Members

Members to do the same. It is manifest therefore, that they who have Sovereign Power, are Immediate Rulers of the Church under Christ, and all other but subordinate to them. If that were not, but Kings should command one Thing upon Pain of Death, and Priests another, upon Pain of Damnation, it would be impossible that Peace and Religion should stand together.

II. And therefore there is no just Cause for any Man to withdraw his Obedience from the Sovereign State, upon Pretence that Christ hath ordained any State Ecclesiastical above it. And though Kings take not upon them the Ministerial Priesthood, yet are they not so meerly Laick, as not to have Sacerdotal Jurisdiction. To conclude this Chapter; Since God speaketh not in these Days to any Man by his private Interpretation of the Scriptures, nor by the Interpretation of any Power above, or not depending on the Sovereign Power of every Commonwealth, it remaineth, that he speaketh by his Vice-Gods, or Lieutenants here on Earth, that is to say, by Sovereign Kings, or such as have Sovereign Authority as well as they.

CHAP. VIII.

- 1 *The Things that dispose to Rebellion, Discontent, Pretence, and Hope of Success.*
- 2 *Discontent that disposeth to Sedition, consisteth partly in Fear of Want, or Punishment :*
3. *Partly in Ambition.*
4. *Six Heads of Pretences to Rebellion.*
5. *The first of them, That Men ought to do nothing against Conscience, confuted.*
6. *The second, That Sovereigns are subject to their own Laws, confuted.*
7. *The third, That the Sovereignty is divisible, confuted.*
8. *The fourth, That Subjects have a Propriety distinct from the Dominion of the Sovereign, confuted.*
9. *The fifth, That the People is a Person distinct from the Sovereign, confuted.*
10. *The sixth, That Tyrannicide is lawful, confuted.*
11. *Four Heads of Hope of success in Rebellion.*
12. *Two Things necessary to an Author of Rebellion, much Eloquence, and little Wisdom.*
13. *That the Authors of Rebellion necessarily, are to be Men of little Wisdom.*
14. *That the same are necessarily Eloquent.*
15. *In what Manner they concur to their common Effects.*

2. **H**itherto of the Causes why, and the Manner how, Men have made Commonwealth. In this Chapter I shall shew briefly by what Causes, and
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in what Manner they be again destroyed; Not meaning to say any Thing concerning the Dissolution of a Commonwealth, from foreign Invasions, which is as it were the violent Death thereof. I shall speak only of Sedition, which is also the Death of the Commonwealth, but like to that which happeneth to a Man from Sickness and Distemper. To dispose Men to Sedition, three Things concur. The first is Discontent; for as long as a Man thinketh himself well, and that the present Government standeth not in his Way to hinder his Proceeding from well to better, it is impossible for him to desire the Change thereof. The second is Pretence of Right; for though a Man be discontent, yet if in his own Opinion there be no just Cause of stirring against, or resisting the Government established, nor any Pretence to justify his Resistance, and to procure Aid, he will never shew it. The third is Hope of Success: For it were Madness to attempt without Hope, when to fail, is to dye the Death of a Traytor. Without these three, Discontent, Pretence and Hope, there can be no Rebellion: and when the same are all together, there wanteth Nothing thereto, but a Man of Credit to set up the Standard, and to blow the Trumpet.

2. And as for Discontent, it is of two Sorts: For it consisteth either in Bodily Pain present or expected, or else in Trouble of the Mind; (which is the general Division of Pleasure and Pain, Part 1. Chap. 7. Sect. 9.) The Presence of Bodily Pain disposeth not to Sedition; The Fear of it doth. As for Example; When a great Multitude, or Heap of People, have concurred to a Crime

worthy of death, they joyn together, and take Arms to defend themselves for Fear thereof. So also the Fear of Want, or in present Want, the Fear of Arrests and Imprisonment dispose to Sedition. And therefore great Exactions, though the Right thereof be acknowledged, have caused great Seditions. As in the Time of *Hen. 7.* the Seditions of the *Cornish Men*, that refused to pay a Subsidy, and under the Conduct of the Lord *Audley*, gave the King Battel upon *Black Heath*; and that of the *Northern People*, who in the same Kings Time, for demanding a Subsidy granted in Parliament, murdered the Earl of *Northumberland* in his House.

3. Thirdly, the other Sort of Discontent, which troubleth the Mind of them who otherwise live at Ease, without Fear of Want, or Danger of Violence, ariseth only from a Sense of their Want of that Power, and that Honour and Testimony thereof, which they think is due unto them. For all Joy and Grief of Mind consisting (as hath been said Part 1. Chap. 9. Sect 21.) in a Contention for Precedence to them with whom they compare themselves; such Men must needs take it ill, and be grieved with the State, as find themselves postposed to those in Honour, whom they think they excell in Virtue and Ability to govern. And this is it for which they think themselves regarded but as Slaves. Now seeing Freedom cannot stand together with Subjection, Liberty in a Commonwealth is nothing but Government and Rule, which because it cannot be dividied, Men must expect in Common; and that can be no where but in the Popula: State,

or

or Democracy. And *Aristotle* saith well, Lib. 6. C. 2. of his *Politicks*, *The Ground or Intention of a Democracy, is Liberty*. Which he confirmeth in these Words; *For Men ordinarily say this, That no Man can partake of Liberty, but only in a Popular Commonwealth*. Whosoever therefore in a Monarchical Estate, where the Sovereign Power is absolutely in one Man, claimeth Liberty, claimeth (if the hardest Construction should be made thereof) either to have the Sovereignty in his Turn, or to be Colleague with him that hath it, or to have the Monarchy changed into a Democracy. But if the same be construed (with Pardon of that unskilful Expression) according to the Intention of him that claimeth, then doth he thereby claim no more but this, That the Sovereign should take notice of his Ability and Deserving, and put him into Employment and Place of subordinate Government, rather than others that deserve less. And as one claimeth, so doth another, every Man esteeming his own Desert greatest. Amongst all those that pretend to, or are ambitious of such Honour, a few only can be served, unless it be in a *Democracy*; the rest therefore must be Discontent. And so much of the first Thing that disposeth to Rebellion, namely, Discontent, consisting in Fear and Ambition.

4. The second Thing that disposeth to Rebellion, is *Pretence of Right*. And that is when Men have an Opinion, or pretend to have an Opinion, That in certain Cases they may lawfully resist Him or Them that have the Sovereign Power,

or deprive him or them of the Means to execute the same. Of which Pretences, there be six special Cases. One is, when the Command is against their Conscience, and they believe it is unlawful for a Subject at the Command of the Sovereign Power to do any Action, which he thinketh in his own Conscience not lawful for him to do, or to omit any Action, which he thinketh not Lawful for him to omit. Another is, when the Command is against the Laws, and they think the Sovereign Power in such Sort obliged to his own Laws, as the Subject is; and that when he performeth not his Duty, they may resist his Power. A Third is, when they receive Commands from some Man or Men, and a *Supersedeas* to the same from Others, and think the Authority is equal, as if the Sovereign Power were divided. A fourth is, when they are commanded to contribute their Persons or Mony to the Publick Service, and think they have a Propriety in the same distinct from the Dominion of the Sovereign Power; and that therefore they are not bound to contribute their Goods and Persons, no more than every Man shall of himself think fit. A Fifth, when the Commands seem hurtful to the People; and they think every one of them, that the Opinion and Sense of the People, is the same with the Opinion of himself, and those that consent with him; calling by the Name of People, any Multitude of his own Faction. The sixth is, when the Commands are grievous; and they account him that commandeth grievous Things a Tyrant; and Tyrannicide, that is, the killing of a Tyrant, not only Lawful, but also Laudable.

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5. All these Opinions are maintained in the Books of the *Dogmaticks*, and divers of them taught in Publick Chairs, and nevertheless are most incompatible with Peace and Government, and contradictory to the necessary and demonstrable Rules of the same. And for the first, namely, That a Man may lawfully do or omit any thing against his Conscience, and from whence arise all seditions concerning Religion and Ecclesiastical Government, it hath been plainly declared in the two last Chapters, that such Opinion is erroneous. For those two Chapters have been wholly spent, to prove, That Christian Religion not only forbiddeth not, but also commandeth, that in every Commonwealth, every Subject should in all Things to the uttermost of his Power obey the Commands of him or them that is the Sovereign thereof, and that a Man in so obeying, doth according to his Conscience and Judgment, as having deposited his Judgment in all Controversies in the Hands of the Sovereign Power; and that this Errour proceedeth from the Ignorance of What and by Whom God Almighty speaketh.

6. As for the second Opinion, which is this, That the Sovereign is in such Sort obliged to his own Laws, as the Subject is; the contrary thereof hath been shewed, Par. 2. Ch. 1. Sect. 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12. by which it appeareth, That the Sovereign Power is not to be resisted; That it carrieth the Sword both of War and Justice; That it hath the Right of deciding all Controversies, both Judicial, and Deliberative; That it hath the making of all the Laws Civil; That it appointeth Magistrates and Publick Mini-

Ministers, and That it implyeth an Universal Impunity. How can He or They be said to be subject to the Laws which they may abrogate at their Pleasure, or break without Fear of Punishment? And this Errour seemeth to proceed from this, That Men ordinarily understand not aright, what is meant by this Word Law, confounding Law and Covenant, as if they signifie the same Thing. But Law implyeth a Command; Covenant is but a Promise. And not every Command is a Law, but only (Part 1. Chap. 13. Sect. 6.) when the Command is the Reason we have of doing the Action commanded. And then only is the Reason of our Actions in the Command, when the Omitting is therefore Hurtful, because the Action was commanded, not because it was hurtful of it self; and doing contrary to a Command, were not at all Hurtful, if there were not a Right in him that commandeth to punish him that so doth. He or They that have all Punishments in their own disposing, cannot be so commanded, as to receive Hurt for disobeying, and consequently no Command can be a Law unto them. It is an Errour therefore to think, That the Power which is virtually the whole Power of the Commonwealth, and which in whomsoever it resideth, is usually called Supream or Sovereign, can be subject to any Law but that of God Almighty.

7. The third Opinion, *That the Sovereign Power may be divided*, is no less an Errour than the former, as hath been proved, Part 2. Chap. 1 Sect. 15. And if there were a Commonwealth, where-
in the Rights of Sovereignty were divided,

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we must confess with *Bodin*, Lib. 2. Chap. 1. *de Repub.* That they are not rightly to be called Commonwealths, but the Corruption of Commonwealths. For if one Part should have Power to make the Laws for all, they would by their Laws at their Pleasure, forbid others, To make Peace or War, To levy Taxes, or To yield Fealty and Homage without their Leave; and they that had the Right to make Peace and War, and command the *Militia*, would forbid the making of other Laws, than what themselves liked. And though Monarchies stand long, wherein the Right of Sovereignty hath seemed so divided, because Monarchy of it self is a durable Kind of Government, yet Monarchs have been thereby divers times thrust out of their Possession. But the truth is, that the Right of Sovereignty is such, as He or They that have it, cannot (though they would) give away any Part thereof, and retain the Rest. As for Example; If we should suppose the People of *Rome* to have had the absolute Sovereignty of the *Roman* State, and to have chosen them a Council by the Name of the Senate, and that to this Senate they had given the Supream Power of Making Laws, reserving nevertheless to themselves in direct and expresse Terms, the whole Right and Title of the Sovereignty; (which may easily happen amongst them that see not the inseparable Connexion between the Sovereign Power, and the Power of making Laws): I say, this Grant of the People to the Senate is of no Effect, and the Power of making Laws in the People still. For the Senate understanding it to be the Will, in intention of the People, to retain

tain the Sovereignty, ought not to take that for granted, which was contradictory thereto, and passed by Errour. For Part 1. Chap. 13. Sect 9. In contradictory Promises, that which is directly promised, is preferred before that which is opposite thereunto by Consequence; because the Consequence of a Thing is not always obscured, as is the Thing it self. The Errour concerning Mixt Government hath proceeded from Want of Understanding of what is meant by this Word *Body Politick*, and how it signifieth not the Concord, but the Union of many Men. And though in the Chapters of subordinate Corporations, a Corporation being declared to be one Person in Law, yet the same hath not been taken notice of in the Body of a Commonwealth or City, nor have any of those innumerable Writers of Politicks, observed any such Union.

8. The Fourth Opinion, to wit, That Subjects have their *Meum, Tuum*, and *Suum*, in Property, not only by Virtue of the Sovereign Power over them all, distinct from one another, but also against the Sovereign himself, by which they would pretend to contribute nothing to the Publick, but what they please, hath been already confuted, by proving the Absoluteness of the Sovereignty, and more particularly, Part 1. Chap. 5. Sect 2. and ariseth from this, That they understand not ordinarily that before the Institution of Sovereign Power, *Meum* and *Tuum*, implied no Propriety, but a Community, where every Man had Right to every Thing, and was in State of War with every Man.

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9. The Fifth Opinion, *That the People is a distinct Body from Him or Them that have the Sovereignty over them*, is an Errour already confuted Part 2. Chap. 2. Sect. 11. where is shewed, that when Men say, *The People rebelleth*, it is to be understood of those particular Persons only, and not of the whole Nation. And when the People claimeth any Thing otherwise than by the Voice of the Sovereign Power, it is not the Claim of the People, but only of those particular Men, that claim in their own Persons. And this Errour ariseth from the Equivocation of the Word *People*.

10. Lastly, for the Opinion, *That Tyrannicide is Lawful*, meaning by a Tyrant, any Man in whom resideth the Right of Sovereignty, is no less false and pernicious to Humane Society, than frequent in the Writings of those Moral Philosophers, *Seneca* and others, so greatly esteemed amongst us. For when a Man hath the Right of Sovereignty, he cannot justly be punished, as hath been often shewed already, and therefore much less deposed, or put to Death. And howsoever he might deserve Punishment, yet Punishment is unjust without Judgment preceding, and Judgment unjust without Power of Judicature, which a Subject hath not over a Sovereign. But this Doctrine proceedeth from the Schools of *Greece*, and from those that writ in the *Roman State*, in which not only the Name of a Tyrant, but of a King, was hateful.

11. Besides *Discontent* to the Disposing of a Man to Rebellion, and Pretence, there is required in the third Place, *Hope of Success*, which consisteth in four Points : 1. That the Discontented have

have mutual Intelligence. 1. That they have sufficient Number. 3. That they have Arms. 4. That they agree upon an Head. For these four must concur to the making of one Body of Rebellion, in which Intelligence is the Life, Number the Limbs, Arms the Strength, and an Head the Unity, by which they are directed to one and the same Action.

12. The Authours of Rebellion, that is, the Men that breed these Dispositions to rebel in others, of Necessity must have in them these three Qualities. 1. To be discontented themselves. 2. To be Men of mean Judgment and Capacity. And 3, to be Eloquent Men, or Good Orators And as for their Discontent, from whence it may proceed, hath been already declared. And for the second and third, I am to shew now, first, how they may stand together; for it seemeth a Contradiction, to place small Judgment and great Eloquence, or (as they call it) Powerful Speaking, in the same Man. And then in what Manner they concur, to dispose other Men to Sedition.

13. It was noted by *Salust*, That in *Catiline* (who was Author of the greatest Sedition that ever was in *Rome*) there was *Eloquentia satis, Sapientia parum*; Eloquence sufficient, but little Wisdom. And perhaps this was said of *Catiline*, as he was *Catiline*: But it was true of him as an Author of Sedition. For the Conjunction of these two Qualities made him not *Catiline*, but Seditious. And that it may be understood, how Want of Wisdom, and Store of Eloquence, may stand together, we are to consider, what it is we call Wisdom, and what Eloquence. And therefore I shall here again

again remember some Things, that have been said already, Part 1. Chap. 5. 6. It is manifest that Wisdom consisteth in Knowledge. Now of Knowledge there are two Kinds; whereof the one is the Remembrance of such Things, as we have conceived by our Senses, and of the Order, in which they follow one another. And this Knowledge is called *Experience*; and the Wisdom that proceedeth from it, is that Ability to conjecture by the present, of what is past, and to come, which Men call *Prudence*. This being so, it is manifest presently, that the Author of Sedition, whosoever he be, must not be Prudent. For if he consider and take his Experiences aright, concerning the Success which they have had, who have been the Movers and Authors of Sedition, either in this or any other State, he shall find, that for one Man that hath thereby advanced himself to Honour, twenty have come to a Reproachful end. The other Kind of Knowledge, is the Remembrance of the Names or Appellations of Things, and how every Thing is called, which is in Matters of common Conversation, a Remembrance of Pacts and Covenants of Men made amongst themselves, concerning how to be understood of one another. And this Kind of Knowledge is generally called Science, and the Conclusions thereof Truth. But when Men remember not how Things are named, by general agreement, but either mistake and mis-name Things, or name them aright by chance, they are not said to have Science, but Opinion, and the Conclusions thence proceeding, are uncertain, and for the most part erroneous. Now that Science in particular, from which

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proceed the true and evident Conclusions of what is Right and Wrong, and what is Good and Hurtful to the Being, and Well-being of Mankind, the Latines call *Sapientia*, and we by the general Name of Wisdom. For generally, not he that hath Skill in Geometry, or any other Science Speculative, but only he that understandeth what conduceth to the Good and Government of the People, is called a Wise Man. Now that no Author of Sedition can be Wise in this Acceptation of the Word, is sufficiently proved, in that it hath been already demonstrated, that no Pretence of Sedition can be Right or Just. And therefore the Authors of Sedition must be ignorant of the Right of State, that is to say, Unwise. It remaineth therefore, that they be such, as name Things, not according to their true and generally agreed upon Names, but call Right and Wrong, Good and Bad, according to their Passions, or according to the Authorities of such, as they admire, as *Aristotle*, *Cicero*, *Seneca*, and others of like Authority, who have given the Names of Right and Wrong, as their Passions have dictated; or have followed the Authority of other Men, as we do theirs. It is required therefore in an Author of Sedition, that he think Right, that which is Wrong; and Profitable, that which is Pernicious; and consequently that there be in him *Sapientia parum*, little Wisdom.

14. Eloquence is nothing else but the Power of winning Belief of what we say. And to that end we must have Aid from the Passions of the Hearer. Now to Demonstration and Teaching of the Truth, there are required Long Deductions,

ctions, and Great Attention, which is unpleasant to the Hearer. Therefore they which seek not Truth, but Belief, must take another Way, and not only derive what they would have to be believed, from somewhat believed already, but also by Aggravations and Extenuations, make Good and Bad, Right and Wrong, appear Great or Less, according as shall serve their Turns. And such is the Power of Eloquence, as many times a Man is made to believe thereby, that he sensibly feeleth Smart and Damage, when he feeleth none, and to enter into Rage and Indignation, without any other Cause, than what is in the Words and Passion of the Speaker. This considered, together with the Business that he hath to do, who is the Author of Rebellion, namely to make Men believe, that their Rebellion is just, their Discontents grounded upon great Injuries, and their Hopes great; There needeth no more to prove, there can be no Author of Rebellion, that is not an Eloquent and Powerful Speaker, and withal, (as hath been said before) a Man of little Wisdom. For the Faculty of Speaking powerfully, consisteth in an Habit gotten of putting together passionate Words, and applying them to the present Passions of the Hearer.

15. Seeing then Eloquence and Want of Discretion concur to the stirring of Rebellion, it may be demanded, What Part each of these acteth therein? The Daughters of *Pelias* King of *Thessaly*, desiring to restore their old decrepit Father to the Vigour of his Youth, by the Counsel of *Medea*, chopped him in Pieces, and set him

a boiling with I know not what Herbs in a Cauldron, but could not revive him again. So when Eloquence and Want of Judgment go together, Want of Judgment like the Daughters of *Pelias*, consenteth through Eloquence, which is as the Witchcraft of *Medea*, to cut the Commonwealth in Pieces, upon Pretence, or Hope of Reformation, which when Things are in Combustion, they are not able to effect.

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CHAP. IX.

1. *The Law over Sovereigns, Salus Populi.*
2. *That Sovereigns ought to establish the Religion they hold, for best.*
3. *That to forbid unnatural Copulation, promiscuous Use of Women, &c. is the Law of Nature.*
4. *That to leave Man as much Liberty as may be, &c. is the Duty of a Sovereign by the Law of Nature.*
5. *Meum and Tuum, to be set out to the Subjects, distinct from one another, &c. a Duty of Sovereigns by the Law of Nature.*
6. *An extraordinary Power for Judging the Abuses of Magistrates, necessary, &c.*
7. *The Suppressing of Popularity, &c. necessary, &c.*
8. *The Institution of Youth, &c. necessary, &c.*
9. *Avoiding of unnecessary War, a necessary Duty of the Sovereign, &c.*

1. **H**AVING hitherto set forth how a Body Politick is made, and how it may be destroyed, this Place requireth to say something concerning the preservation of the same, not purposing to enter into the particulars of the Art of Government,

ment, but to sum up the general Heads, wherein such Art is to be imployed, and in which consisteth the Duty of Him or Them that have the Sovereign Power. For the Duty of a Sovereign consisteth in the Good Government of the People. And although the Acts of Sovereign Power be no Injuries to the Subjects who have consented to the same by their implicate Wills, yet when they tend to the Hurt of the People in general, they be Breaches of the Law of Nature, and of the Divine Law; and consequently, the contrary Acts are the Duties of Sovereigns, and required at their Hands to the utmost of their Endeavour, by God Almighty, under the Pain of Eternal Death. And as the Art and Duty of Sovereigns consist in the same Acts, so also doth their Profit. For the End of Art, is Profit; and Governing to the Profit of the Subjects, is Governing to the Profit of the Sovereign, as hath been shewed Part 2. Chap. 5. Sect. 1. And these three: 1. The Law over them that have Sovereign Power: 2. Their Duty: 3. Their Profit, are one and the same Thing contained in this Sentence, *Salus Populi Suprema Lex*. By which must be understood, not the meer Preservation of their Lives, but generally their Benefit and Good. So that this is the general Law for Sovereigns, *That they procure to the uttermost of their Endeavour, the Good of the People.*

2. And forasmuch as Eternal is better than Temporal Good, it is evident, that they who are in Sovereign Authority, are by the Law of Nature obliged to further the establishing of all such

such Doctrines and Rule, and the Commanding of all such Actions, as in their Conscience they believe to be the true Way thereunto. For unless they do so, it cannot be said truly, that they have done the uttermost of their Endeavour.

3. For the Temporal Good of the People, it consisteth in four Points: 1. Multitude: 2. Commodity of Living: 3. Peace amongst themselves: 4. Defence against Foreign Power. Concerning Multitude, It is the Duty of them that are in Sovereign Authority, to increase the People, in as much as they are Governours of Mankind under God Almighty, who having created but One Man, and One Woman, declared, That it was his Will they should be multiplied and increased afterwards. And seeing this is to be done by Ordinances concerning Copulation, they are by the Law of Nature bound to make such Ordinances concerning the same, as may tend to the Increase of Mankind. And hence it cometh, that in them who have Sovereign Authority, not to forbid such Copulations as are against the Use of Nature; not to forbid the promiscuous Use of Women, not to forbid one Woman to have many Husbands, not to forbid Marriages within certain Degrees of Kindred and Affinity, are against the Law of Nature. For though it be not evident, that a private Man living under the Law of Natural Reason only, doth break the same, by doing any of the Things aforesaid; yet it is manifestly apparent, that being so prejudicial as they are to the Improvement

of Mankind, that not to forbid the same, is against the Law of Natural Reason, in him that hath taken into his Hands any Portion of Mankind to improve.

4. The Commodity of Living consisteth in Liberty and Wealth. By Liberty, I mean, that there be no Prohibition without Necessity of any Thing to any Man, which was lawful to him in the Law of Nature; that is to say, That there be no Restraint of Natural Liberty, but what is necessary for the Good of the Commonwealth, and that well meaning Men may not fall into the Danger of Laws, as into Snares, before they be aware. It appertaineth also to this Liberty, That a Man may have commodious Passage from Place to Place, and not be imprisoned or confined with the Difficulty of Ways, and Want of Means for Transportation of Things necessary. And for the Wealth of People, it consisteth in three Things, The well Ordering of Trade, Procuring of Labour, and Forbidding the superfluous Consuming of Food and Apparel. All those therefore that are in Sovereign Authority, and have taken upon them the Government of People, are bound by the Law of Nature to make Ordinances consisting in the Points afore-named, as being contrary to the Law of Nature, unnecessarily, either for ones own Fancy, to inthral, or tye Men so, as they cannot move without Danger; or to suffer them whose maintenance is our Benefit, to want any Thing necessary for them, by our Negligence.

5. For maintaining of Peace at Home, there be so many Things necessarily to be considered, and taken order in, as there be several Causes concurring to Sedition. And first, it is necessary to set out to every Subject, his Propriety, and distinct Lands and Goods, upon which he may exercise, and have the Benefit of his own Industry, and without which, Men would fall out amongst themselves, as did the Herdsmen of *Abraham* and *Lot*, every Man incroaching and usurping as much of the common Benefit as he can, which tendeth to Quarrel and Sedition. Secondly, to divide the Burthens and Charges of the Commonwealth proportionably. Now there is a *Proportionably* to every Mans Ability, and there is a *Proportionably* to his Benefit by Commonwealth: And this latter is it, which is according to the Law of Nature. For the Burdens of the Commonwealth being the Price that we pay for the Benefit thereof, they ought to be measured thereby. And there is no Reason, when two Men equally enjoying by the Benefit of the Commonwealth, their Peace and Liberty, to use their Industry to get their Livings, whereof one spareth, and layeth up somewhat, the other spendeth all he gets, why they should not equally contribute to the common Charge. That seemeth therefore to be the most equal Way of dividing the Burden of publick Charge, when every Man shall contribute according to what he spendeth, and not according to what he gets. And this is then done, when Men pay the Commonwealths Part in the Payments they make for their own Provision. And this seemeth not only

ly most equal, but also least sensible, and least to trouble the Mind of them that pay it. For there is nothing so aggravateth the Grief of parting with Money to the Publick, as to think they are over-rated, and that their Neighbours whom they envy, do thereupon insult over them, and this disposeth them to Resistance, and (after that such Resistance hath produced a Mischief) to Rebellion.

6. Another Thing necessary for the Maintaining of Peace, is the due Execution of Justice, which consisteth principally in the right Performance of their Duties, which are the Magistrates, ordained for the same by and under the Authority of the Sovereign Power, which being private Men in Respect of the Sovereign, and consequently such as may have private Ends, whereby they may be corrupted with Gifts, or Intercession of Friends, ought to be kept in Awe by an higher Power, lest People (grieved by their Injustice) should take upon them to make their own Revenges, to the Disturbance of the common Peace; which can by no Way be avoided in the principal and immediate Magistrates, without the Judicature of the Sovereign himself, or some extraordinary Power delegated by him. It is therefore necessary, that there be a Power Extraordinary, as there shall be Occasion from Time to Time, for the Syndication of Judges and other Magistrates, that shall abuse their Authority, to the Wrong and Discontent of the People; and a free and open Way for the presenting of Grievances to Him or Them that have the Sovereign Authority.

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7. Besides these Considerations, by which are prevented the Discontents that arise from Oppression, there ought to be some Means for the keeping under of those, that are disposed to Rebellion by Ambition; which consist principally in the Constancy of him that hath the Sovereign Power, who ought therefore constantly to grace and encourage such, as being able to serve the Commonwealth, do nevertheless contain themselves within the Bounds of Modesty, without repining at the Authority of such as are employed, and without aggravating the Errours, which (as Men) they may commit, especially, when they suffer not in their own particular; and constantly to shew Displeasure, and Dislike of the Contrary. And not only so, but also to ordain severe Punishments for such, as shall by Reprehension of publick Actions, affect Popularity and Applause amongst the Multitude, by which they may be enabled to have a Faction in the Commonwealth at their Devotion.

8. Another Thing necessary, is the Rooting out of the Consciences of Men, all those Opinions which seem to justifie and give Pretence of Right to Rebellious Actions; such as are the Opinions, That a Man can do nothing lawfully against his private Conscience; That they who have the Sovereignty, are subject to the civil Laws; That there is any Authority of Subjects, whose Negative may hinder the Affirmative of the Sovereign Power; That any Subject hath a Propriety distinct from the Dominion of the Commonwealth; That there is a Body of the People without Him or Them that have the Sovereign Power; and that
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any Lawful Sovereign may be resisted under the Name of a Tyrant; which Opinions are they, which, Part 2. Chap. 8. Sect. 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10. have been declared, to dispose Men to Rebellion. And because Opinions which are gotten by Education, and in Length of Time, are made Habitual, cannot be taken away by Force, and upon the sudden; they must therefore be taken away also by Time and Education. And seeing the said Opinions have proceeded from private and publick Teaching, and those Teachers have received them from Grounds and Principles, which they have learned in the Universities, from the Doctrine of *Aristotle*, and others, who have delivered nothing concerning Morality and Policy demonstratively, but being passionately addicted to Popular Government, have insinuated their Opinions by eloquent Sophistry. There is no doubt, if the true Doctrine concerning the Law of Nature, and the Properties of a Body Politick, and the Nature of Law in general, were perspicuously set down and taught in the Universities, but that Young Men, who come thither void of Prejudice, and whose Minds are as white Paper, capable of any Instruction, would more easily receive the same, and afterward reach it to the People, both in Books and otherwise, than now they do the Contrary.

9. The last Thing contained in that Supreme Law, *Salus Populi*, is their Defence, and consisteth partly in the Obedience and Unity of the Subjects, of which hath been already spoken, and in which consisteth the Means of levying Souldiers, and of having Money, Arms, Ships

Ships and Fortified Places in Readiness for Defence ; and partly , in the avoiding of unnecessary Wars. For such Commonwealths , or such Monarchs , as affect War for it self , that is to say , out of Ambition , or of Vain-Glory , or that make account to revenge every little Injury , or Disgrace done by their Neighbours , if they ruine not themselves , their Fortune must be better than they have Reason to expect.

CHAP.

C H A P. X.

1. *All Expressions, &c. concerning future Actions, are either Covenant, Counsel, or Command.*
2. *The Difference between a Law and a Covenant.*
3. *The Command of him whose Command is Law in one Thing, is Law in every Thing.*
4. *The Difference between Law and Counsel.*
5. *The Difference between Jus and Lex.*
6. *The Division of Laws, &c.*
7. *That the Divine Moral Law, and the Law of Nature, is the same.*
8. *That the Civil Laws are the Common Measure of Right and Wrong, &c.*
9. *Martial Law is Civil Law.*
10. *Written Laws, &c. Unwritten, &c. Customs and Opinions, &c.*

1. **T**HUS far concerning the Nature of Man, and the Constitution and Properties of a Body Politick. There remaineth only for the last Chapter, to speak of the Nature and Sorts of Law. And first it is manifest, that all Laws are Declarations of the Mind, concerning some Action future to be done, or omitted. And all Declarations and Expressions of the Mind concerning Future Actions and Omissions, are either *Promissive*, as *I will do, or not do*; or *Provisive*, As for example, *If this be done or not done, This will follow*; or *Imperative*, as *Do this, or do it not*. In the first Sort of these

these Expressions, consisteth the Nature of a Covenant; in the second, consisteth Counsel; in the Third, Command.

2. It is evident when a Man doth, or forbear-eth to do any Action, if he be moved thereto by this only Consideration, that the same is Good or Evil in it self; and that there be no Reason why the Will or Pleasure of another, should be of any Weight in his Deliberation, that then neither to do nor omit the Action deliberated, is any Breach of Law. And consequently, whatsoever is a Law to a Man, respecteth the Will of another, and the Declaration thereof. But a Covenant is a Declaration of a Mans own Will. And therefore a Law and a Covenant differ: and though they be both obligatory, and a Law obligeth no otherwise than by Vertue of some Covenant made by him who is subject thereunto, yet they oblige by several Sorts of Promises. For a Covenant obligeth by Promise of an Action, or Omission especially named and limited; but a Law bindeth by a Promise of Obedience in general, whereby the Action to be done, or left undone, is referred to the Determination of him, to whom the Covenant is made. So that the Differences between a Covenant and a Law, standeth thus: In Simple Covenant, the Action to be done, or not done, is first limited and made known, and then followeth the Promise to do or not do; but in a Law, the Obligation to do or not to do, preceedeth, and the Declaration what is to be done, or not done, followeth after.

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3. And from this may be deduced, that which to some may seem a *Paradox*, That the Command of him, whose Command is a Law in one Thing, is a Law in every Thing. For seeing a Man is obliged to Obedience before what he is to do be known, he is obliged to obey in general, that is to say, in every Thing.

4. That the Counsel of a Man is no Law to him that is counselled, and that he who alloweth another to give him Counsel, doth not thereby oblige himself to follow the same, is manifest enough. And yet Men usually call Counselling, by the Name of Governing, not that they are not able to distinguish between them, but because they envy many Times those Men that are called to Counsel, and are therefore angry with them that they are counselled. But if to Counsellours there should be given a Right to have their Counsel followed, then are they no more Counsellours, but Masters of them whom they counsel; and their Counsels no more Counsels, but Laws. For the Difference between a Law and a Counsel being no more but this, that in Counsel the Expression is, *Do, because it is best*; in a Law, *Do, because I have a Right to compel you*; or *Do, because I say, Do*; when Counsel should give the Reason of the Action it adviseth to, because the Reason thereof it self is no more Counsel, but a Law.

5. The Names *Lex* and *Jus*, that is to say, Law and Right, are often confounded, and yet scarce are there any two Words of more contrary Signification. For Right is that Liberty which Law leaveth us, and Laws those Restraints by which we agree mutually to abridge one anothers Liberty.

Liberty. Law and Right therefore are no less different than Restraint and Liberty, which are contrary; and whatsoever a Man doth, that liveth in a Commonwealth *Jure*, he doth it *Jure Civili*, *Jure Naturæ*, and *Jure Divino*. For whatsoever is against any of these Laws, cannot be said to be *Jure*. For the Civil Law cannot make that to be done *Jure*, which is against the Law *Divine*, or of *Nature*. And therefore whatsoever any Subject doth, if it be not contrary to the Civil Law, and whatsoever a Sovereign doth, if it be not against the Law of Nature, he doth it *Jure divino*, by *Divine Right*. But to say *Lege divinâ*, by *Divine Law*, is another Thing. For the Laws of God and Nature allowing greater Liberty than is allowed by the Law Civil; (for subordinate Laws do still bind more than superior Laws, the Essence of Law being not to loose, but to bind) A Man may be commanded that by a Law Civil, which is not commanded by the Law of Nature, nor by the Law Divine. So that of Things done *Lege*, that is to say, by Command of the Law, there is some Place for a Distinction between *Lege Divinâ*, and *Lege Civili*. As when a Man giveth an Alms, or helpeth him that is in need, he doth it not *Lege Civili*, but *Lege Divinâ*, by the Divine Law, the Precept whereof is *Charity*. But for Things that are done *Jure*, nothing can be said to be done *Jure Divino*, that is not also *Jure Civili*, unless it be done by them that having Sovereign Power, are not subject to the Civil Law.

6. The Differences of Laws, are according to the Differences, either of the Authors and Law-makers,

makers, or of the Promulgation, or of those that are subject to them. From the Difference of the Authors, or Lawmakers, cometh the Division of Law into *Divine*, *Natural*, and *Civil*. From the Difference of Promulgation, proceedeth the Division of Laws into *written* and *unwritten*. And from the Difference of the Persons to whom the Law appertaineth, it proceedeth, that some Laws are called simply Laws, and some Penal. As for example, *Thou shalt not steal*, is simply a Law; but this, *He that stealeth an Oxe, shall restore four-fold*, is a Penal, or as others call it, A Judicial Law. Now in those Laws which are simply Laws, the Commandment is addresssed to every Man; but in Penal Laws the Commandment is addresssed to the Magistrate, who is only guilty of the Breach of it, when the Penalties ordained, are not inflicted; To the rest appertaineth Nothing, but to take notice of their Danger.

7. As for the first Division of Law into *Divine*, *Natural*, and *Civil*, the first two Breaches are one and the same Law. For the Law of Nature, which is also the Moral Law, is the Law of the Author of Nature, God Almighty; and the Law of God taught by our Saviour Christ, is the Moral Law. For the Summ of Gods Law is, *Thou shalt love God above all, and thy Neighbour as thy self*; and the same is the Summ of the Law of Nature, as hath been shewed, Part 1. Chap. 5 And although the Doctrine of our Saviour be of three Parts, *Moral Theological*, and *Ecclesiastical*; the former Part only, which is the Moral, is of the Nature of a Law Universal; the latter Part is a Branch of the Law

Law Civil; and the Theological, which containeth those Articles concerning the Divinity and Kingdom of our Saviour, without which there is no Salvation, is not delivered in the Nature of Laws, but of Counsel and Direction, how to avoid the Punishment, which by the Violation of the Moral Law, Men are subject to. For it is not Infidelity that condemneth, (though it be Faith that saveth) but the Breach of the Law and Commandments of God, written first in Mans Heart, and afterwards in Tables, and delivered to the Jews by the Hands of *Moses*.

8. In the State of Nature where every Man is his own Judge, and differeth from other concerning the Names and Appellations of Things, and from those Differences arise Quarrels and Breach of Peace, it was necessary there should be a common Measure of all Things, that might fall in Controversie. As for Example; Of what is to be called Right, what Good, what Virtue, what Much, what Little, what *Meum* and *Tuum*, what a Pound, what a Quart, &c. For in these Things Private Judgments may differ, and beget Controversie. This common Measure, some say, is *Right Reason*, with whom I should consent, if there were any such Thing to be found or known in *Rerum Natura*. But commonly they that call for *Right Reason* to decide any Controversie, do mean their own. But this is certain, seeing *Right Reason* is not existent, the Reason of some Man or Men must supply the Place thereof; and that Man or Men is He or They, that have the Sovereign Power, as hath been already proved; and consequently the Civil Laws are to all Subjects the Measures

tures of their Actions, whereby to determine, whether they be Right or Wrong, Profitable, or Unprofitable, Virtuous, or Vicious; and by them the Use and Definition of all Names not agreed upon, and tending to Controversie, shall be established. As for Example, When upon the Occasion of some strange and deformed Birth, it shall not be decided by *Aristotle*, or the Philosophers, whether the same be a Man, or no, but by the Laws, the Civil Law containing in it the Ecclesiastical, as a part thereof, proceeding from the Power of Ecclesiastical Government, given by our Saviour to all Christian Sovereigns, as his immediate Vicars, as hath been said Part 2. Chap. 7. Sect. 10.

9. But seeing it hath been said, That all Laws are either Natural, or Civil, it may be demanded, to which of these shall be referred that Law, which is called Martial Law, and by the *Romans*, *Disciplina Militaris*? And it may seem to be the same with the Law of Nature; because the Laws by which a Multitude of Souldiers are governed in an Army are not constant, but continually changing with the Occasion; and that is still a Law, which is Reason for the present, and Reason is the Law of Nature. It is nevertheless true, that Martial Law is Civil Law, because an Army is a Body Politick, the whole Power whereof is in the General, and the Laws thereof made by him; and though they still follow and change as Reason requireth, yet it is not, as the Reason of every private Man, but as the Reason of the General requireth.

10. When He or They in whom is the Sovereign Power of a Commonwealth, are to ordain Laws
for

for the Government and good Order of the People, it is not possible they should comprehend all Cases of Controversie that may fall out, or perhaps any considerable Diversity of them; but as Time shall instruct them by the Rising of new Occasions, so are also Laws from Time to Time to be ordained: and in such Cases where no special Law is made, the Law of Nature keepeth its Place, and the Magistrates ought to give Sentence according thereunto, that is to say, according to Natural Reason. The Constitutions therefore of the Sovereign Power, by which the Liberty of Nature is abridged, are written, because there is no other way to take notice of them, whereas the Laws of Nature are supposed to be written in Mens Hearts. Written Laws therefore are the Constitutions of a Commonwealth expressed; and Unwritten, are the Laws of Natural Reason. Custom of it self maketh no Laws. Nevertheless when a Sentence hath been once given, by them that judge by their Natural Reason, whether the same be Right or Wrong, it may attain to the Vigour of a Law; not because the like Sentence hath of Custom been given in the like Case, but because the Sovereign Power is supposed tacitely to have approved such Sentence for Right, and thereby it cometh to be a Law, and numbred amongst the Written Laws of the Commonwealth. For if Custom were sufficient to introduce a Law, then it would be in the Power of every one that is deputed to hear a Cause, to make his Errours Laws. In the like manner, those Laws that go under the Title of *Responsa Prudentum*, that is to say, the Opinions of Lawyers, are not

therefore Laws, because *Responsa Prudentum*, but because they are admitted by the Sovereign; and from this may be collected, That when there is a Case of Private Contract between the Sovereign and the Subject, a Precedent against Reason shall not prejudice the Cause of the Sovereign; no Precedent being made a Law, but upon Supposition that the same was Reasonable from the Beginning. And thus much concerning the Elements and general Grounds of Laws Natural and Politick. As for the Law of Nations, it is the same with the Law of Nature. For that which is the Law of Nature between Man and Man before the Constitution of Commonwealth, is the Law of Nations between Sovereign and Sovereign after.

F I N I S.

OF
LIBERTY
AND
NECESSITY:
A
TREATISE,

WHEREIN

All Controversie concerning
*Predestination, Election, Free-will,
Grace, Merits, Reprobation, &c.* is
fully decided and cleared.

By *Tho. Hobbs* of *Malmsbury*.

LONDON, Printed for *Matthew Gilliflower*,
Henry Rogers, and *Tho. Fox*, Booksellers in *Westminster-*
Hall. MDCLXXXIV.

TO THE
Sober and Discreet
R E A D E R.

I*T made S. Chrystom tremble when ever he reflected on the Proportion, which those that went the narrow Way, bore to those which marched in the broad, how many were the Called, and how few the Chosen, how many they were that were created for and in a Capacity of eternal Beatitude, and how few attained it. This Consideration certainly would make a Man look upon the Holy Scriptures, among Christians, as the greatest Indulgence of Heaven, being all the Directions it hath been pleased to afford poor Man in so difficult a Journey as that of his eternal Bliss or Misery. But when a Man cometh to look into those transcendent Writings, he finds them to be the Works of a Sort of innocent harmless Men, that had little Acquaintance or Familiarity with the World, and consequently not much interested in the troubles and Quarrels of several Countries; That though they are all but necessary, yet were they written occasionally, rather than out of Design; and lastly, that their*
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The Epistle to the Reader.

main Business is, to abstract Man from this World, and to perswade him to prefer the bare Hope of what he can neither see, hear, nor conceive, before all the present Enjoyments this World can afford. This beget a Reverence and Esteem to them in all those who endeavour to work out their Salvation out of them. But if a Man, not weighing them in themselves, shall consider the Practices of those, who pretend to be the Interpreters of them, and to make them fit Meat for the People, how that instead of renouncing the World, they endeavour to raise themselves into the greatest Promotions, Leisure and Luxury; that they make them the Deceits of the People, to carry on Designs and Intrigues of State, and study the Enjoyments of this World more than any other People, he will find some Grounds to conclude, the Practices of such Men to be the greatest Disturbance, Burden, and Vexation of the Christian Part of the World. The Complaint is as true as sad; Instead of acquainting the credulous Vulgar, with the main End of their Functions, and the great Business of their Embassy, what a great Measure of Felicity is prepared for them, and how easily it may be forfeited? they involve their Consciences in the Bryars of a thousand needless Scruples, they spin out Volumes out of half Sentences, nay, out of Points and Accents, and raise endless Controversies about Things (were Men free from Passion and Prejudice) in themselves clear enough, and when they have canvas'd their Questions, till they are weary themselves, and have wearied Hearers, and Readers, and all they have to do with, every one sits down under his own Vine, and hugs his own Apprehensions, so that after all their Pains, Bandings, and implacable Adhesion to Parties, the Inconvenience remains still, and we as far from any solid Conviction, as at first setting out.

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The Controversies betwixt Rome and the Reformation are long since beaten out of the Pit, by other Combatants of their own Brood, so that if we speak of Protestant and Catholick, they are in a Manner content to sit down with their present Acquests; for as to Conviction he certainly is a rare Profelyte, at whose Conversion, Interest, Humour, Discontent, Inclination, are not admitted to the Debate.

But to come yet nearer our Purpose, Let us consider our own Fractions, of Fractions of Religion here in England, where if that Saying, That It is better to live where nothing is Lawful, than where all Things, be as true in Religion as Policy, Posterity may haply feel the sad Consequence of it. What I pray, is the Effect of so many Sermons, Teachings, Preachings, Exercises and Exercising of Gifts, Meetings, Disputations, Conferences Conventicles, Printed Books, written with so much Distraction and Presumption upon God Almighty, and Abuse of his Holy Word? Marry this, It is the Seminary of a many vexations, endless and fruitless Controversies, the Consequence whereof, are jealousies, Heart-burnings, Exasperation of Parties, the Introduction of Factions, and National Quarrels into Matters of Religion, and consequently all the Calamities of War and Devastation. Besides, they are good lawful Diversions for the duller Sort of Citizens, who contract Diseases for Want of Motion; They supply the Building of Pyramids among the Egyptians by diverting the Thoughts of the People from Matters of State, and consequently from Rebellion.

They find Work for Printers, &c. if the Parties interested are troubled with the Itch of Popularity, and will suffer themselves to be scratch'd out of somewhat by way

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way of Contribution to the Impression. Hence are the Stationer's Shop furnished, and thence the Minister's Study in the Countrey, who having found out the Humour of his Auditory, consults with his Stationer, on what Books his Money is best bestowed, who very gravely, it may be, will commend Cole upon the Philippians before the excellent (but borrowed) Caryll upon Job. But as to any Matter of Conviction, we see every one acquiesces in his own Sentiments, every one hears the Teacher who is most to his Humour, and when he hath been at Church, and pretends to have sat at his Feet, comes Home and censures him as he pleases.

To be yet a little more particular, what shall we think of those vast and inviolable Volumes concerning Predestination, Free-will, Free-grace, Election, Reprobation, &c. which fill not only our Libraries, but the World with their Noise and Disturbance, whereof the least Thing we are to expect is Conviction; every Side endeavouring to make good their own Grounds, and keep the Cudgels in their Hands as long as they can? What Stir is there between the Molinists and Jansenists about Grace and Merits, and yet both pretend S. Augustin?

Must we not expect, that the Jesuits will, were it for no other end but to vindicate that Reputation of Learning they have obtained in the World, endeavour to make good their Tenets, though the other were the truer Opinion? Is Truth then retired to that inaccessible Rock that admits no Reproaches? or are we all turn'd Ixions and instead of enjoying that Juno, entertain our selves with the Clouds of our own Perswasions, of which unnatural Coition, what other Issue can there be but Centaures and monstrous Opinions? To these Questions

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stions I shall not presume to answer, but in the Words of this great Author, who answering the charge of Impiety laid upon the holding of Necessity, says thus; If we consider the greatest Part of Mankind, not as they should be, but as they are, that is as Men, whom either the Study of acquiring Wealth and Preferment, or whom the Appetite of sensual Delights, or the Impatience of meditating, or the rash Embracing of wrong Principles, have made unapt to discuss the Truth of Things, I must confess, &c.

Certainly we have some Reason to expect an effectual Cure from this Man, since he hath so fortunately found out the Disease. Now if he in so few Sheets hath performed more than all the voluminous Works of the Priests and Ministers, and that in Points of Soul-Concernment and Christian Interest, as Predestination, Free-will, Grace, Merits, Election, Reprobation, Necessity, and Liberty of Actions, and others, the main Hinges of Human Salvation; and to do this, being a Person, whom not only the Aversness of his Nature to engage himself in Matters of Controversie of this Kind, but his severer Study of the Mathematicks, might justly exempt from any such Skirmishes: We may not stick to infer, that the Black-Coats, generally taken, are a Sort of ignorant Tinkers, who in Matters of their own Profession, such as is the mending and soldering of Mens Consciences, have made more Holes than they found; nay, what makes them more pardonable, they have neither the Gratitude nor Ingenuity to acknowledge this Repairer of their Breaches, and Assertor of their Reputation, who hath now effected what they all this while have been tampering about. I know this Author is little beholding to the Ministers, and they

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they make a great Part of the Nation ; and besides them, I know there are a many illiterate, obstinate, and unconvincible Spirits, yet I dare advance this Proposition, how bold soever it may seem to some ; That this Book, how little and contemptible soever it may seem, contains more Evidence and Conviction in the Matters it treats of, than all the Volumes, nay Libraries which the Priests, Jesuits, and Ministers have, to our great Charge, Distraction, and Loss of precious Time, furnished us with. Which if so, I shall undertake for any rational Man, That all the controversial Labours concerning Religion in the World, all the Polemical Treatises of the most Antient or Modern, shall never breed any Maggots of Scruples, or Dissatisfactions in his Brains, nor shall his Eyes or Head ever ache with turning them over, but he shall be so resolved in Mind, as never to importune God Almighty with impertinent Addresses, nor ever become any of those Enthusiastical Spiritati, who, as the most Learned Mr. White says, expound Scripture without Sence or Reason (and are not to be disputed with, but with the same Success as Men write on Sand) and trouble their Neighbours with their Dreams, Revelations, and Spiritual Whimsies. No ; here is solid Conviction, at least, so far as the Metaphysical Mysteries of our Religion will admit. If God be omnipotent, he is irresistible ; if so, just in all his Actions, though we (who have as much Capacity to measure the Justice of Gods Actions as a Man born blind to judge of Colours) haply may not discern it. What then need any Man trouble his Head whether he be predestinated or no ? Let him live justly and honestly according to the Religion of his Countrey, and refer himself to God for the rest, since he is the Porter, and may do what he please with the Vessel. But I leave the Reader to find his Satisfaction in the Treatise

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it self, since it may be I derogate from it by saying so much before it. This Book, I doubt not will find no worse Entertainment than the Leviathan, both in Regard of its Bulk, and that it doth not strike so Home at the Ministers and Catholick Party as that did. And yet here we must complain of Want of Sufficiency or Ingenuity, to acknowledge the Truths, or confute the Errors of that Book, which till it is done, we shall not count the Author an Heretick. On this side the Sea, besides the Dirt and Slander cast on him in Sermons and Private Meetings, none hath put any Thing in Print against him, but Mr. Rolfe, one who may be said to have had so much Learning as to have been perpetually barking at the Works of the most learned. How he hath been received beyond Seas I know not, but certainly, not without the Regret of the Catholicks, who building their Church on other Foundations than those of the Scriptures, and pretending Infallibility, Certitude, and Unity in Religion, cannot but be discontented that these Prerogatives of Religion are taken away, not only from Tradition, that is to say, from the Church, but also from the Scriptures, and are invested in the Supreme Power of the Nation, be it of what Perswasion it will.

Thus much, Reader, I have thought fit to acquaint thee with, that thou mightest know what a Jewel thou hast in thy Hands, which thou must accordingly value, not by the Bulk, but the Preciousness. Thou hast here in a few Sheets what might prove Work enough for many thousand Sermons and Exercises; and more than the Catechisms and Confessions of a thousand Assemblies could furnish thee with: Thou hast what will cast an Eternal Blemish on all the Corner'd Caps of the Priests and Jesuits, and all the Black and White
Caps

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Capt of the Canting Tribe; so be short, Thou art now acquainted with that Man, who, in Matters of so great Importance as those of thy Salvation, furnishes thee with better Instructions, than any thou hast ever yet been acquainted with, what Profession, Perswasion, Opinion, or Church soever thou art of; of whom and his Works make the best Use thou canst, &c. Farewell.

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TO THE
 Lord Marquess
 OF
 NEW-CASTLE.

Right Honourable,

I Had once resolved to answer my *Lord Bishops* Objections to my Book *De CIVI* in the first Place, as that which concerns me most, and afterwards to examine his Discourse of LIBERTY and NECESSITY, which (because I had never uttered my Opinion of it) concerned me the less. But seeing it was your Lordship's and my Lord Bishop's Desire that I should begin with the *latter*, I was contented so to do, and here I present and submit it to your Lordship's Judgement.

And first I assure your Lordship I find in it no new Argument neither from *Scripture* nor from *Reason*, that I have not often heard before, which is as much as to say, I am not surprized.

The *Preface* is a handsome one; but it appear-

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eth even in that, that he hath mistaken the Question. For whereas he sayes thus, *If I be free to write this Discourse, I have obtained the Cause*: I deny that to be true, for 'tis enough to his Freedom of Writing, that he had not written it, unless he would himself. If he will obtain the Cause, he must prove that before he writ it, it was not necessary he should prove it afterward. It may be his Lordship thinks it all one to say, *I was free to write it, and, It was not necessary I should write it*; but I think otherwise: for he is *free* to do a Thing, that may do it if he have the *Will* to do it, and may forbear, if he have the *Will* to forbear. And yet if there be a *Necessity* that he shall have the *Will* to do it, the Action is necessarily to follow: and if there be a *Necessity* that he shall have the *Will* to forbear, the Forbearing also will be necessary. The Question therefore is not, Whether a *Man* be a *Free Agent*, that is to say, Whether he can write or forbear, speak or be silent according to his *Will*; but, Whether the *Will* to write, and the *Will* to forbear, come upon him according to his *Will*, or according to any Thing else in his own Power. I acknowledge this *Liberty* that I *can* do if I *will*; but to say, I *can will* if I *will*, I take to be an absurd Speech, wherefore I cannot grant my Lord the Cause upon his *Preface*.

In the next Place he maketh certain Distinctions of *Liberty*, and saies he meaneth not *Liberty* from *Sin*, nor from *Servitude*, nor from *Violence*, but, from *Necessity*, *Necessitation*, *Inevitability*, and *Determination*, to one.

It had been better to *define Liberty*, than thus to *distinguish*; for I understand never the more what he

he means by *Liberty*, and though he say he means *Liberty* from *Necessitation*, yet I understand not how such a *Liberty* can be, and 'tis a taking of the Question without Proof: for what is else the Question between us, but whether *such* a *Liberty* be possible or not?

There are in the same Place other Distinctions, as a *Liberty of Exercise only* (which he calls a *Liberty of Contradiction*, namely of doing not Good or Evil *simply*, but of doing this or that good, or this or that evil *respectively*) and a *Liberty of Specification and Exercise also* (which he calls a *Liberty of Contrariety*) namely a *Liberty* not only to do Good or Evil, but also to do or not do this or that Good or Evil,

And with these *Distinctions* his Lordship saies he *clears the Coast*, whereas in Truth, he darkeneth his own Meaning and the Question, not only with the Jargon of *Exercise only*, *Specification also*, *Contradiction*, *Contrariety*, but also with pretending Distinction where none is: For how is it possible that the *Liberty* of doing or not doing this or that Good or Evil, can consist (as he saies it does in God and good Angels) without a *Liberty* of doing or not doing Good or Evil?

The next Thing his Lordship does, after clearing of the Coast, is the Dividing of his Forces (as he calls them) into two Squadrons, one of Places of *Scriptures*, the other of *Reasons*, which Allegory he useth. I suppose, because he addresseth the Discourse to your Lordship, who is a military Man. All that I have to say touching this, is, that I observe a great Part of those his *Forces* do look and march another way, and some of them *fight* amongst themselves. T 2 And

And the first Place of *Scripture* taken from *Numb.* 30. 14. is one of those that look another Way; the Words are, *If a Wife make a Vow, it is left to her Husband's Choice either to establish it or make it void.* For it proves no more but that the Husband is a free and voluntary Agent, but not that his Choice therein is not necessitated or determined to what he shall chuse, by precedent necessary Causes.

For if there come into the Husband's Mind greater Good by establishing than abrogating such a Vow, the Establishing will follow necessarily; and if the Evil that will follow in the Husband's Opinion outweigh the Good, the Contrary must needs follow: and yet in this following of ones Hopes and Fears, consisteth the Nature of Election. So that a Man may both choose this, and cannot but choose this, and consequently Choosing and Necessity are joyned together.

The Second Place of *Scripture* is *Joshua* 24. 15. The third is 2 *Sam.* 24. 12. whereby 'tis clearly proved, that there is Election in Man, but not proved that such Election was not necessitated by the Hopes, and Fears, and Considerations of Good and Bad to follow, which depend not on the Will, nor are subject to Election. And therefore one Answer serves all such Places, if there were a thousand.

But his Lordship supposing, it seems, I might answer, as I have done, that Necessity and Election might stand together, and instance in the Actions of Children, Fools, or brute Beasts, whose Fancies, I might say, are necessitated and determined to one; before these his Proofs out of *Scripture*, desires to prevent that Instance, and therefore saies that the Actions of Children, Fools, Madmen, and Beasts, are

are indeed *determined*, but that they proceed not from *Election*, nor from *free*, but from *spontaneous Agents*. As for example, that the *Bee*, when it maketh Honey, does it *spontaneously*; and when the *Spider* makes his Web, he does it *spontaneously*, but not by *Election*.

Though I never meant to ground my Answer upon the Experience of what *Children*, *Fools*, *Madmen*, and *Beasts* do; yet that your Lordship may understand what can be meant by *spontaneous*, and how it differeth from *voluntary*, I will answer that *Distinction*, and shew that it *fighteth* against its fellow Arguments.

Your Lordship therefore is to consider, that all *voluntary* Actions, where the Thing that induceth the *Will* is not *Fear*, are called also *spontaneous*, and said to be done by a Mans *own* Accord. As when a Man giveth Money voluntarily to another for Merchandise, or out of Affection, he is said to do it of his *own* Accord, which in *Latine* is *Sponse*, and therefore the Action is *spontaneous* (though to give ones Money willingly to a Thief to avoid Killing, or throw it into the Sea to avoid Drowning, where the Motive is *Fear*, be not called *spontaneous*.) But every *spontaneous* Action is not therefore *voluntary*, for *voluntary* presupposes some precedent *Deliberation*, that is to say, some *Consideration*, and *Meditation*, of what is likely to *follow*, both upon the Doing, and abstaining from the Action deliberated of; whereas many Actions are done of our *own* Accord, and are therefore *spontaneous*; for which nevertheless, as my Lord thinks, we never *consulted* nor *deliberated* in our selves. As

when making no Question nor any the least Doubt in the World, but the Thing we are about is good, we *eat and walk*, or in Anger *strike or revile*, which my Lord thinks *spontaneous*, but not *voluntary* nor *elective* Actions, and with *such* Kind of Actions, he saies *Necessitation* may stand, but not with such as are *voluntary*, and proceed upon *Election* and *Deliberation*. Now if I make it appear to your Lordship, that those Actions, which, he saies, proceed from *Spontaneity*, and which he ascribes to *Children, Fools, Madmen* and *Beasts*, proceed from *Election* and *Deliberation*, and that Actions *inconsiderate, rash, and spontaneous*, are ordinarily found in those, that are by themselves and many more thought as *wise*, or wiser than ordinarily Men are, then my Lord Bishop's Argument concludeth, that *Necessity* and *Election* may stand together, which is contrary to that which he intendeth by all the rest of his Arguments to prove.

And first your Lordship's own Experience furnishes you with Proof enough, that *Horses, Dogs*, and other brute *Beasts*, do *demur* oftentimes upon the Way they are to take, the Horse retiring from some strange Figure that he sees, and coming on again to avoid the Spur. And what else doth a Man that *deliberateth*, but one while proceed toward Action, another while retire from it, as the *Hope* of greater Good draws him, or the *Fear* of greater Evil drives him away.

A Child may be so young as to do what it does without all *Deliberation*, but that is but till it have the Chance to be hurt by doing of somewhat, or till it be of Age to understand the Rod : for the Actions, wherein he hath once had

a Check, shall be *deliberated* on the second Time.

Fools and *Madmen* manifestly *deliberate* no less than the *wisest* Men, though they make not so good a *Choice*, the Images of Things being by Dis-ease altered.

For *Bees* and *Spiders*, if my Lord Bishop had had so little to do as to be a Spectatour of their Actions, he would have confessed not only *Election* but *Art*, *Prudence* and *Policy* in them, very near equal to that of Mankind. Of *Bees*, *Aristotle* saies, *their Life is Civil*.

Again, his Lordship is deceived if he think any *spontaneous* Action after once being checked in it, differs from an Action *voluntary* and *elective*: for even the setting of a Mans Foot, in the Posture for *walking*, and the Action of ordinary *Eating*, was once *deliberated* of how and when it should be done, and though afterward it became *easie* and *habitual*, so as to be done without *Forethought*; yet that does not hinder but that the Act is *voluntary*, and proceedeth from *Election*. So also are the *rashest* Actions of *Cholerick* Persons *voluntary* and upon *Deliberation*: for who is there but very young Children, that hath not *considered* when and how far he *ought*, or *safely may* strike or revile? Seeing then his Lordship agrees with me, That such Actions are *necessitated*, and the *Fancy* of those that do them *determined* to the Action they do, it follows, out of his Lordship's own Doctrine, That the Liberty of *Election* does not take away the *Necessity* of *electing* this or that *individual* Thing. And thus one of his Arguments fights against another.

The second Argument from *Scripture* consisteth in

Histories of Men that did one Thing, when if they would, they might have done another; the Places are two: One is 1 Kings 3. 11. where the History saies, God was pleased that Solomon, who might, if he would, have asked *Riches*, or *Revenge*, did nevertheless ask *Wisdom* at Gods Hands; the other is the Words of S. Peter to Ananias, Acts 5. 4. *After it was sold, was it not in thine own Power?*

To which the Answer is the same with that I answered to the former Places, that they prove there is *Election*, but do not disprove the *Necessity*, which I maintain, of what they so elect.

The fourth Argument (for to the third and fifth I shall make but one Answer) is to this Effect; *If the Decree of God, or his Foreknowledge, or the Influence of the Stars, or the Concatenation of Causes, or the Physical or Moral Efficacy of Causes, or the last Dictate of the Understanding, or whatsoever it be, do take away true Liberty, then Adam before his Fall had no true Liberty.* *Quicquid ostendes mihi sic incredulus odi.*

That which I say necessitateth and determinateth every Action (that his Lordship may no longer doubt of my Meaning) is the *Summ of all Things*, which being now existent, conduce and concur to the Production of that Action hereafter, whereof if any one Thing now were wanting, the Effect could not be produced. This Concourse of Causes, whereof every one is determined to be such as it is by a like Concourse of former Causes, may well be called (in Respect they were all set and ordered by the Eternal Cause of all Things, God Almighty) the *Decree of God*.

But that the *Foreknowledge* of God should be a Cause

Cause of any Thing, cannot be truly said, seeing Foreknowledge is Knowledge, and Knowledge depends on the Existence of the Things known, and not they on it.

The *Influence of the Stars* is but a small Part of the whole Cause, consisting of the Concourse of all Agents.

Nor does the *Concourse of all Causes* make one simple Chain or Concatenation, but an innumerable Number of Chains, joyned together, not in all Parts, but in the first Link God Almighty; and consequently the whole Cause of an Event, doth not always depend on one single Chain, but on many together.

Natural Efficacy of Objects does determine voluntary Agents, and necessitates the Will, and consequently the Action; but for *Moral Efficacy*, I understand not what he means.

The last Dictate of the Judgement, concerning the Good or Bad, that may follow on any Action, is not properly the whole Cause, but the last Part of it, and yet may be said to produce the Effect necessarily, in such Manner as the last Feather may be said to break a Horses Back, when there were so many laid on before as there wanted but that one to do it.

Now for his Argument, that if the Concourse of all the Causes necessitate the Effect, that then it follows, Adam had no true Liberty: I deny the Consequence; for I make not only the Effect, but also the Election, of that particular Effect necessary, in as much as the Will it self, and each Propension of a Man during his Deliberation, is as much necessitated, and depends on a sufficient Cause

as

as any Thing else whatsoever. As for Example, it is no more necessary that Fire should burn, than that a Man or other Creature, whose Limbs be moved by Fancy, should have *Election*, that is *Liberty*, to do what he hath a Fancy to do, though it be not in his *Will* or *Power* to choose his *Fancy*, or choose his *Election* and *Will*.

This Doctrine, because my Lord Bishop saies he hates, I doubt had better been suppressed, as it should have been, if both your Lordship and he had not pressed me to an Answer.

The Arguments of greatest Consequence, are the third and the fifth, and they fall both into one, namely, ; *If there be a Necessity of all Events, that it will follow, That Praise and Reprehension, and Reward and Punishment are all vain, and unjust, and that if God should openly forbid, and secretly necessitate the same Action, punishing Men for what they could not avoid, there would be no Belief among them of Heaven and Hell.*

To oppose hereunto I must borrow an Answer from S. Paul, Rom. 9. 17. From the 11. Verse of the Chapter to the 18. is laid down the very same Objection in these Words: *When they (meaning Esau and Jacob) were yet unborn, and had done neither Good nor Evil, that the Purpose of God according to Election, not by Works, but by him that calleth, might remain firm, it was said unto her (viz Rebecca) That the elder should serve the younger, &c. What then shall we say? Is there Injustice with God? God forbid. It is not therefore in him that willeth, nor in him that runneth, but in God that sheweth Mercy. For the Scripture saith to Pharaoh, I have stirred thee up that I might shew my Power in thee, and that my Name might be set forth in all the Earth. Therefore whom God willeth,*
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he hath Mercy on, and whom he willeth he hardeneth. Thus you see the Case put by S. Paul, is the same with that of my Lord Bishop, and the same Objection in these Words following :

Thou wilt ask me then, Why does God yet complain, for who hath resisted his Will?

To this therefore the Apostle answers, not by denying it was God's Will, or that the Decree of God concerning Esau was not before he had sinned, or that Esau was not necessitated to do what he did; but thus; *Who art thou O Man, that interrogatest God? shall the Work say to the Workman, Why hast thou made me thus? Hath not the Potter Power over the Clay, of the same Stuff to make one Vessel to Honour, another to Dishonour?* According therefore to this Answer of S. Paul, I answer my Lord's Objection, and say, the Power of God alone without other Helps is sufficient Justification of any Action he doth. That which Men make amongst themselves here by Pacts and Covenants, and call by the Name of Justice, and according whereunto Men are accounted and termed rightly just or unjust, is not that by which God Almighty's Actions are to be measured or called just, no more than his Counsels are to be measured by Humane Wisdom. That which he does, is made just by his doing it; just, I say, in him, though not always just in us.

For a Man that shall command a Thing openly, and plot secretly the Hinderance of the same, if he punish him that he so commandeth, for not doing it, it is unjust. So also, his Counsels are therefore not in vain, because they be his, whether we see the Use of them or not. When God afflicted

afflicted *Job*, he did object no Sin unto him, justified his afflicting of him, by telling him of his Power. *Hast thou, saith God, an Arm like mine? Where wert thou when I laid the Foundations of the Earth?* and the like. So our Saviour, concerning the Man that was born blind, said, it was not for his Sin, or for his Parents Sin, but that the Power of God might be shewn in him. *Beasts* are subject to Death and Torments, yet they cannot sin, it was Gods will they should be so. *Power irresistible justifies all Actions, really and properly*, in whomsoever it be found, less Power does not, and because such Power is in God only, he must needs be just in all Actions, and we, that not comprehending his Counsels, call him to the Barr, commit Injustice in it.

I am not ignorant of the usual Reply to his Answer, by distinguishing between *Will* and *Permission*, as that God Almighty does indeed sometimes *permit* Sins, and that he also foreknoweth that the Sin he permitteth, shall be committed, but does not *will* it, nor *necessitate* it.

I know also they distinguish the Action from the Sin of the Action, saying, that God Almighty does indeed cause the Action, whatsoever Action it be, but not the *Sinfulness* or *Irregularity* of it, that is, the *Discordance* between the Action and the Law. Such Distinctions as these dazzle my Understanding; I find no Difference between the *Will* to have a Thing done, and the *Permission* to do it, when he that permitteth can hinder it, and knows that it will be done unless he hinder it. Nor find I any Difference between an Action and the Sin of that Action; as for Example, be-
tween

tween the killing of *Uriah*, and the Sin of *David* in killing *Uriah*, nor when *one* is *Cause* both of the *Action* and of the *Law*, how *another* can, because of the *Disagreement* between them, no more than how one Man making a longer and a shorter Garment, another can make the Inequality that is between them. This I know; God cannot sin, because his doing a Thing makes it just, and consequently, no Sin; as also because whatsoever can sin, is subject to anothers Law, which God is not. And therefore 'tis Blasphemy to say, God can sin; but to say, that God can so order the World, as a Sin may be necessarily caused thereby in a Man, I do not see how it is any Dishonour to him. Howsoever, if such or other *Distinctions* can make it clear, that S. *Paul* did not think *Esaú's* or *Pharaoh's* Actions proceeded from the *Will* and *Purpose* of *God*, or that proceeding from his Will, could not therefore without Injustice be blamed or punished, I will, as soon as I understand them, turn unto my Lord's Opinion; for I now hold nothing in all this Question betwixt us, but what seemeth to me, not obscurely, but most expressly said in this place by S. *Paul*. And thus much in Answer to his Places of Scripture.

To the Arguments from Reason.

OF the Arguments from *Reason*, the first is that which his Lordship saith, is drawn from *Zeno's* beating of his Man, which is therefore called *Argumentum baculinum*, that is to say, a wooden Argument: The Story is this, *Zeno* held, That all Actions were necessary; his Man therefore being for some Fault beaten, excused himself upon the Necessity of it: to avoid this Excuse, his Master pleaded likewise the Necessity of beating him. So that not he that maintained, but he that derided the Necessity, was beaten, contrary to that his Lordship would infer. And the Argument was rather withdrawn than drawn from the Story.

The second Argument is taken from certain Inconveniences which his Lordship thinks would follow such an Opinion. It is true that ill use might be made of it, and therefore your Lordship and my Lord Bishop, ought, at my Request, to keep private what I say here of it. But the Inconveniences are indeed none, and what Use soever he made of Truth, yet Truth is Truth, and now the Question is not, What is fit to be preached, but, What is true.

The first Inconvenience he saies, is this; *That*
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the *Laws*, which prohibit any *Action*, will be *unjust*.

2. That all *Consultations* are *vain*.

3. That *admonitions* to *Men of Understanding*, are of no more *Use*, than to *Children*, *Fools*, and *Madmen*.

4. That *Praise*, *Dispraise*, *Reward* and *Punishment*, are in *vain*.

5, 6. That *Counsels*, *Acts*, *Arms*, *Books*, *Instruments*, *Study*, *Tutors*, *Medicines*, are in *vain*.

To which Arguments his Lordship expecting I should answer, by saying, the Ignorance of the Event were enough to make us use the Means, adds (as it were a Reply to my Answer foreseen) these Words: *Alas! how should our not knowing the Event be a sufficient Motive to make us use the Means?* Wherein his Lordship saies right, but my Answer is not that which he expecteth: I answer,

First, that the necessity of an *Action* doth not make the *Laws* that prohibit it, *unjust*. To let pass, that not the *Necessity*, but the *Will* to break the *Law*, maketh the *Action* *unjust*, because the *Law* regardeth the *Will*, and no other precedent Causes of *Action*. And to let pass, that no *Law* can possibly be *unjust*, in as much as every Man maketh (by his Consent) the *Law* he is bound to keep, and which consequently must be just, unless a Man can be unjust to himself. I say, what necessary Cause soever precede an *Action*, yet if the *Action* be *forbidden*, he that doth it *willingly* may justly be punished. For Instance, suppose the *Law* on Pain of Death prohibit *Stealing*, and that there be a Man, who by the Strength of Temptation is *necessitated* to steal, and is thereup-

on put to Death, does not this Punishment deter others from Theft? Is it not a Cause that others steal not? Doth it not frame and make their Wills to Justice?

To make the *Law*, is therefore to make a *Cause* of *Justice*, and to *necessitate* Justice; and consequently, 'tis no Injustice to make such a *Law*.

The Intention of the *Law* is not to grieve the *Delinquent*, for that which is past, and not to be undone; but to make him and others *just*, that else would not be so, and respecteth not the evil *Act* past, but the *Good to come*, in so much as without the good Intention for the future, no past *Act* of a *Delinquent* could justify his Killing in the Sight of God. But you will say, How is it just to kill one Man to amend another, if what were done were *necessary*? To this I answer, that Men are justly killed, not for that their *Actions* are not *necessitated*, but because they are *noxious*, and they are spared and preserved whose *Actions* are not *noxious*. For where there is no *Law*, there no Killing nor any thing else can be unjust; and by the Right of Nature, we destroy (without being unjust) all that is *noxious*, both *Beasts* and *Men*; and for *Beasts* we kill them justly, when we do it in order to our own Preservation, and yet my Lord himself confesseth, that their *Actions* as being only *spontaneous*, and not *free*, are all *necessitated* and determin'd to that one Thing they shall do. For *Men*, when we make *Societies* or *Commonwealths* we lay not down our Right to kill, excepting in certain Cases, as *Murder*, *Theft* or other offensive *Action*; so that
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the Right, which the *Commonwealth* hath to put a Man to Death for Crimes, is not created by the *Law*, but remains from the first Right of *Nature*, which every Man hath to preserve himself; for that the *Law* doth not take the Right away in the Case of Criminals, who were by the *Law* excepted. Men are not therefore put to Death, or punished, for that their Theft proceedeth from *Election*; but because it was *noxious* and contrary to Mens Preservation, and the Punishment conducing to the Preservation of the rest, in as much as to punish those that do voluntary Hurt, and none else, frameth and maketh Mens *Wills* such as Men would have them. And thus it is plain, that from the *Necessity* of a *voluntary* Action, cannot be inferred the *Injustice* of the *Law* that forbiddeth it, or the Magistrate that punisheth it.

Secondly, I deny that it maketh *Consultations* to be in *vain*, 'tis the *Consultation* that causeth a Man, and *necessitateth* him to *choose* to do one Thing rather than another: so that unless a Man say that that Cause is in vain which *necessitateth* the Effect, he cannot infer the Superfluouſness of Consultation out of the *Necessity* of the Election proceeding from it. But it seemeth his Lordship reasons thus, If I must do this rather than that, I shall do this rather than that, though I consult not at all; which is a false Proposition and a false Consequence, and no better than this, If I shall live till to morrow, I shall live till to morrow, though I run my self through with a Sword to day. If there be a *Necessity* that an Action shall be done, or that any Effect shall be brought to
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pass, it does not therefore follow, that there is nothing necessarily requisite as a Means to bring it to pass; and therefore when it is determined, that one Thing shall be chosen before another, 'tis determined also for what *Cause* it shall so be chosen, which Cause, for the most part is *Deliberation* or *Consultation*, and therefore Consultation is not in vain, and indeed the less in vain by how much the Election is more necessitated, if *More* and *Less* had any Place in *Necessity*.

The same Answer is to be given to the third supposed Inconvenience, namely, that *Admonitions* are in vain; for the Admonitions are Parts of Consultation, the Admonitor being a Counsellour for the Time to him that is admonished.

The fourth pretended Inconvenience is, that *Praise*, *Dispraise*, *Reward* and *Punishment* will be in vain. To which I answer, that for *Praise* and *Dispraise*, they depend not at all on the *Necessity* of the Action praised or dispraised. For what is it else to *praise*, but to say a Thing is good? Good I say for me, or for some Body else, or for the State and Commonwealth? And what is it to say an Action is good, but to say it is as I would wish? or as another would have it, or according to the Will of the State? that is to say, according to the Law. Does my Lord think that no Action can please me, or him, or the Commonwealth, that should proceed from *Necessity*? Things may be therefore *necessary*, and yet *Praise-worthy*, as also *necessary*, and yet *dispraised*, and neither of them both in vain, because *Praise* and *Dispraise*, and likewise *Reward* and *Punishment*, do by Example make and conform the Will to Good
and

and Evil. It was a very great Praise in my Opinion, that *Velleius Paterculus* gives *Caeso*, where he saies that he was Good by *Nature*, & *quid aliter esse non potuit*.

To the fifth and sixth Inconveniences, that *Counsels, Arts, Arms, Instruments, Books, Study, Medicines*; and the like would be *superfluous*, the same Answer serves as to the former, that is to say, that this Consequence, *If the Effect shall necessarily come to pass, then it shall come to pass without its Causes*, is a false one, and those things named Counsels, Arts, Arms, &c. are the Causes of these Effects.

His Lordship's *third* Argument consisteth in other *Inconveniences*, which he saith will follow; namely, *Impiety* and *Negligence* of religious Duties, as *Repentance*, and *Zeal* to God's Service, &c.

To which I answer as to the rest, that they follow not. I must confess, if we consider the greatest Part of Mankind, not as they should be, but as they are, that is, as Men, whom either the Study of acquiring Wealth, or Preferment; or whom the Appetite of sensual Delights, or the Impatience of meditating, or the rash Embracing of wrong Principles have made unapt to discuss the Truth of Things: I must, I say, confess that the Dispute of this Question will rather hurt than help their Piety; and therefore if his Lordship had not desired this Answer, I should not have written it, nor do I write it but in Hopes your Lordship and His will keep it private. Nevertheless in very Truth, the *Necessity* of Events does not of it self draw with it any *Impiety* at all. For *Piety* consisteth only in *two* Things; one that

we honour God in our Hearts, which is, that we think as highly of his *Power* as we can, (for to honour any Thing is nothing else but to think it to be of great Power.) The other is, that we signifie that Honour and Esteem by our Words and Actions, which is called *Cultus*, or *Worship of God*. He therefore that thinketh that all Things proceed from God's *Eternal Will*, and consequently are *necessary*, does he not think God *Omnipotent*? Does he not esteem of his *Power* as highly as is possible? which is to honour God as much as may be in his Heart. Again, he that thinketh so, is he not more apt by *external Acts* and Words to acknowledge it, than he that thinketh otherwise? yet is this external Acknowledgment the same Thing which we call *Worship*. So that this Opinion fortifies *Piety* in both Kinds, external and internal, therefore is far from destroying it. And for *Repentance*, which is nothing else but a glad Returning into the right Way, after the Grief of being out of the Way; though the Cause that made him go astray were necessary, yet there is no Reason why he should not grieve; and again though the Cause why he returned into the Way were necessary, there remained still the Causes of Joy. So that the *Necessity* of the Actions taketh away neither of those Parts of *Repentance*, Grief for the Errour, and Joy for Returning.

And for *Prayer*, whereas he saith that the *Necessity* of Things destroy *Prayer*, I deny it; for though *Prayer* be none of the *Causes* that *move* Gods *Will* (his Will being unchangeable) yet since we find in God's Word, he will not give his Blessings but to those that ask, the Motive of
Prayer

Prayer is the same. *Prayer* is the Gift of God no less than the *Blessing*, and the Prayer is decreed together in the same Decree wherein the Blessing is decreed. 'Tis manifest that *Thanksgiving* is no cause of the Blessing past, and that which is past is sure and necessary, yet even amongst Men Thanks is in Use as an Acknowledgment of the Benefit past, though we should expect no new Benefit for our Gratitude. And Prayer to God Almighty is but Thanksgiving for Gods Blessings in general, and though it precede the particular Thing we ask, yet it is not a Cause or Means of it, but a Signification that we expect nothing but from God, in such Manner, as he, not as we, will; and our Saviour by Word of Mouth bids us pray, *Thy Will*, not our Will, *be done*, and by Example teaches us the same, for he prayed thus, *Father if it be thy Will, let this Cup pass*, &c. The End of Prayer, as of Thanksgiving, is not to move but to honour God Almighty, in acknowledging that what we ask can be effected by him only.

The fourth Argument from Reason is this, The Order, Beauty and Perfection of the World requireth that in the Universe should be Agents of all Sorts; some necessary, some free, some contingent. He that shall make all Things necessary, or all Things free, or all Things contingent, doth overthrow the Beauty and Perfection of the World.

In which Argument I observe first a *Contradiction*; for seeing he that *maketh* any Thing, in that he maketh it, maketh it to be *necessary*; it followeth that he that maketh all Things, maketh all Things necessarily to be: As if a Work-man make a Garment, the Garment

must necessarily be ; so if God make every Thing, every Thing must necessarily be. Perhaps the Beauty of the World requireth (though we know it not) that some Agents should work without Deliberation (which his Lordship calls *necessary Agents*) and some Agents with Deliberation (and those both he and I call *free Agents*) and that some Agents should work, and we not know how (and their Effects we both call *Contingents*) but this hinders not but that he that electeth may have his *Election* necessarily determined to *one* by *former Causes*, and that which is *contingent* and imputed to Fortune , be nevertheless *necessary* and depend on *precedent necessary Causes*. For by *contingent*, Men do not mean that which hath *no Cause*, but that which hath not for Cause, any Thing that we perceive : As for Example , when a Traveller meets with a Showre, the Journey had a Cause, and the Rain had a Cause sufficient to produce it ; but because the Journey caused not the Rain, nor the Rain the Journey, we say they were contingent one to another. And thus you see that though there be three sorts of Events, *necessary*, *contigent*, and *free*, yet they may be *all necessary* without Destruction of the Beauty or Perfection of the Universe.

To the first Argument from Reason , which is, *that if Liberty be taken away , the Nature and formal Reason of Sin is taken away* ; I answer by denying the Consequence : The Nature of Sin consisteth in this, that the *Action* done proceed from our *Will* and be against the *Law*. A Judge in judging whether it be Sin or no, which is done against the Law, looks at no higher Cause of the Action,

Action, than the Will of the Doer. Now when I say the Action was *necessary*, I do not say it was done *against* the Will of the Doer, but *with* his Will, and *necessarily*, because Mans Will, that is every Volition or Act of the Will and Purpose of Man had a *sufficient*, and therefore a *necessary* Cause, and consequently every *voluntary* Action was *necessitated*. An Action therefore may be *voluntary* and a *Sin*, and nevertheless be *necessary*; and because God may afflict by a Right derived from his *Omnipotence*, though Sin were not, and because the Example of Punishment on voluntary Sinners, is the Cause that produceth Justice, and maketh Sin less frequent, for God to punish such Sinners (as I have said before) is no Injustice. And thus you have my Answer to his Lordship's Objections both out of Scripture, and from Reason.

Certain Distinctions which his Lordship supposing might be brought to evade his Arguments, are by him removed.

HE saies a Man may perhaps answer, that the *Necessity* of Things held by him, is not a *Stoical Necessity*, but a *Christian Necessity*, &c. But this *Distinction* I have not used, nor indeed ever heard before, nor could I think any Man could make *Stoical* and *Christian* two Kinds of *Necessity*, though they may be two Kinds of *Doctrine*. Nor have I drawn my Answer to his Lordship's Arguments from the Authority of any Sect, but from the Nature of the Things themselves.

But here I must take Notice of certain Words of his Lordships in this Place, as making against his own Tenet. *Where all the Causes*, saith he, *being joyned together, and subordinate one to another, do make but one total Cause, if any one Cause (much more the first) in the whole Series or Subordination of Causes, be necessary, it determines the rest, and without Doubt maketh the Effect necessary.* For that which I call the *necessary Cause* of any Effect, is the *joyning* together of all Causes subordinate to the first, into one total Cause. *If any of these*, saith he, *especially the first, produce its Effect necessarily, then all the rest are determined.* Now it is mani-

manifest, that the first Cause is a necessary Cause of all the Effects that are next and immediate to it, and therefore by his Lordship's own Reason all Effects are necessary.

Nor is that Distinction of Necessary in Respect of the *first Cause*, and Necessary in Respect of *second Causes*, mine ; it does (as his Lordship well notes) imply a Contradiction. But the Distinction of *free* into *free from Compulsion*, and *free from Necessitation*, I acknowledge. For to be *free from Compulsion* is to do a Thing so as *Terrour* be not the Cause of his *Will* to do it ; for a Man is then only said to be compelled, when Fear makes him willing to it: As when a Man willingly throws his Goods into the Sea to save himself, or submits to his Enemy for Fear of being killed. Thus all Men that do any Thing for *Love*, or *Revenge*, or *Lust*, are *free from Compulsion*, and yet their Actions may be as necessary as those that are done by *Compulsion* ; for sometimes other Passions work as forcibly as Fear. But *free from Necessitation*, I say, no Man can be, and 'tis that which his Lordship undertook to disprove.

This *Distinction*, his Lordship says, uses to be fortified by two Reasons (but they are not mine.) The first he says, is, that it is granted by all Divines, that an *Hypothetical Necessity*, or Necessity upon Supposition, may stand with *Liberty*. That you may understand this, I will give you an Example of *Hypothetical Necessity*. If I shall live, I shall eat. This is an *Hypothetical Necessity*. Indeed it is a necessary Proposition, that is to say, it is necessary that that Proposition should be true whensoever uttered, but 'tis not the

the Necessity of the Thing, nor is it therefore necessary that the Man should live, nor that the Man should eat. I do not use to *fortifie* my Distinctions with such Reasons, let his Lordship confute them how he will, it contents me; But I would have your Lordship take Notice hereby, how easie and plain a Thing, (but withal false) with the grave Usage of such Terms as *Hypothetical Necessity*, and *Necessity upon Supposition*, and such like, Terms of School-Men may be obscured and made to seem *profound Learning*.

The second Reason that may confirm the Distinction of *free from Compulsion*, and *free from Necessitation*, he sayes is, that God and good Angels do Good necessarily, and yet are more free than we. This Reason, though I had no need of, yet I think it so far forth Good, as it is true that God and good Angels do Good necessarily, and yet are free; but because I find not in the Articles of our Faith, nor in the Decrees of our Church, set down in what Manner I am to conceive God and good Angels to work by Necessity, or in what Sence they work *freely*, I suspend my Sentence in that Point, and am content that there be a *Freedom from Compulsion*, and yet no *Freedom from Necessitation*, as hath been proved, in that a Man may be necessitated to some Action without Threats and without Fear of Danger. But how my Lord can avoid the Consisting together of *Freedom* and *Necessity*, supposing God and good Angels are freer than Men, and yet do Good necessarily, that we must examine: *I confess, saith he, that God and good Angels are more free than we, that is, intensively in Degree of Freedom,*

Freedom, not extensively in the Latitude of the Object, according to a Liberty of Exercise not of Specification.

Again, we have here two Distinctions that are no Distinctions, but made to seem so by Terms invented by I know not whom to cover Ignorance, and blind the Understanding of the Reader: For it cannot be conceived that there is any Liberty greater, than for a Man to do what he will. One Heat may be more intensive than another, but not one Liberty than another; he that can do what he will, hath all Liberty possible, and he that cannot hath none at all. Also *Liberty* (as his Lordship says the Schools call it) of *Exercise*, which is as I have said before, a Liberty to do or not to do, cannot be without a *Liberty* (which they call) of *Specification*, that is to say, a Liberty to do, or not to do this or that in particular. For how can a Man conceive he hath Liberty to do any Thing, that hath not Liberty to do this, or that, or somewhat in particular? If a Man be forbidden in Lent to eat this, and that, and every other particular Kind of Flesh, how can he be understood to have a Liberty to eat Flesh, more than he that hath no Licence at all? You may by this again see the Vanity of Distinctions used in the *Schools*, and I do not doubt but that the Imposing of them, by Authority of *Doctors* in the *Church*, hath been a great Cause that Men have laboured, though by Sedition and evil Courses, to shake them off; for nothing is more apt to beget Hatred, than the Tyrannizing over Mens Reason and Understanding, especially when it is done, not by the Scriptures, but by the
the

the Pretence of Learning, and more Judgement than that of other Men.

In the next Place his Lordship bringeth two Arguments against Distinguishing between *free from compulsion* and *free from Necessitation*.

The first is, that *Election* is opposite not only to *Coaction* or *Compulsion*, but also *Necessitation* or Determination to one. This is it he was to prove from the Beginning, and therefore bringeth no new Argument to prove it, and so those brought formerly, I have already answered. And in this Place I deny again, that Election is opposite to either; For when a Man is compelled, for Example, to subject himself to an Enemy or to dye, he hath still Election left him, and a Deliberation to bethink which of the Two he can better endure. And he that is led to Prison by Force, hath Election, and may deliberate whether he will be hal'd and train'd on the Ground, or make use of his own Feet: Likewise when there is no *Compulsion*, but the Strength of *Temptation* to do an evil Action, being greater than the Motives to *abstain*, it necessarily determines him to the Doing of it; yet he deliberates while, sometimes, the Motives to do, sometimes the Motives to forbear are working on him, and consequently he *electeth* which he will. But commonly when we see and know the Strength that moves us, we acknowledge *Necessity*; but when we see not, or mark not the Force that moves us, we then think there is none, and that it is not *Causes* but *Liberty* that produceth the Action. Hence it is that they think he does not choose this, that of Necessity

cessity chooses it; but they might as well say, Fire doth not burn, because it burns of Necessity.

The second Argument is not so much an Argument as a Distinction, to shew in what Sence it may be said that *voluntary Actions* are *necessitated*, and in what Sence not. And therefore his Lordship alledgeth, as from the Authority of the *Schools*, (and that which rippeth up the Bottom of the *Question*) that there is a double Act of the *Will*. The one, he sayes, is *Actus imperatus*, an Act done at the Command of the Will, by some inferiour Faculty of the Soul; As to open or shut ones Eyes, and this Act may be compell'd, the other, he saies, is *Actus elicited*, an Act allured or drawn forth by Allurement out of the Will, as to *will*, to *choose*, to *elect*, this he saies cannot be compelled. Wherein (letting pass that metaphorical Speech of attributing Command and Subjection to the Faculties of the Soul, as if they made a Commonwealth or Family within themselves, and could speak one to another, which is very improper in searching the Truth of a Question) you may observe, first, that to compel a *voluntary Act*, is nothing else but to will it; for it is all one to say, my Will commands the Shutting of my Eyes, or the Doing of any other Action; and to say, I have the Will to shut my Eyes: so that *Actus imperatus*, here, might as easily have been said in English a *voluntary Action*, but that they that invented the Term, understood not any Thing it signified.

Secondly, you may observe, that *Actus elicited*,
is

is exemplified by these Words, to *will*, to *elect*, to *choose*, which are all one, and so to will is here made an Act of the Will ; and indeed as the Will is a Faculty or Power in a Mans Soul, so to will is an Act of it according to that Power ; but as it is absurdly said, that to dance is an Act allured or drawn by fair Means out of the Ability to dance ; so is it also to say, that to will is an Act allured or drawn out of the Power to will, which Power is commonly called the Will. Howsoever it be, the Summ of his Lordship's Distinction, is, that a *voluntary* Act may be done by *Compulsion*, that is to say, by foul Means, but to will that or any Act cannot be but by *Allurement*, or fair Means. Now seeing fair Means, Allurements, and Enticements produce the Action which they do produce, as *necessarily* as foul Means and Threatning ; it follows, that to *will* may be made as *necessary* as any Thing that is done by *Compulsion*. So that Distinction of *Actus imperatus*, and *Actus elicited* are but Words, and of no Effect against Necessity.

His Lordship in the rest of his Discourse, reckoneth up the Opinion of certain Professions of Men, touching the Causes wherein the Necessity of Things (which they maintain) consisteth. And first he saith, the *Astrologer* deriveth his *Necessity* from the *Stars* ; Secondly, that the *Physician* attributeth it to the *Temper* of the Body. For my part, I am not of their Opinion, because, neither the Stars alone, nor the Temperature of the Patient alone is able to produce any Effect, without the Concurrence of all
other

other Agents. For there is hardly any one Action, how casual soever it seem, to the causing whereof concur not whatsoever is in *Rerum Natura*, which because it is a great Paradox, and depends on many antecedent Speculations, I do not press in this Place. Thirdly, he disputeth against the Opinion of them that say, *External Objects* presented to Men of such and such Temperatures, do make their Actions *necessary*, and says, the Power such Objections have over us, proceeds from our own Fault, but that is nothing to the Purpose, if such Fault of ours proceedeth from Causes not in our own Power, and therefore that Opinion may hold true for all that Answer.

Further he says, *Prayer, Fasting, &c.* may alter our *Habits*; 'tis true, but when they do so, they are *Causes* of the contrary *Habit*, and make it *necessary*, as the former Habit had been necessary, if *Prayer, Fasting, &c.* had not been. Besides, we are not moved or disposed to Prayer or any other Action, but by outward Objects, as pious Company, godly Preachers, of something equivalent. Fourthly, he says a resolved Mind is not easily surpris'd, as the Mind of *Ulysses*, who when others wept, alone wept not; and of the *Philosopher*, that abstained from Striking, because he found himself angry; and of him that poured out the Water when he was thirsty, and the like. Such Things I confess have, or may have been done, and do prove only that it was not necessary for *Ulysses* then to weep, nor for that *Philosopher* to strike, nor for that other Man to drink; but it does not prove that it was not
 necessary

necessary for *Ulysses* then to abstain (as he did) from Weeping, nor for the *Philosopher* to abstain (as he did) from Striking, nor for the other Man to forbear Drinking, and yet that was the Thing his Lordship ought to have proved: Lastly his Lordship confesses, that the *Dispositions* of Objects may be *dangerous* to *Liberty*, but cannot be *destructive*. To which I answer, it is impossible: for *Liberty* is never in any other Danger than to be lost; and if it cannot be lost (which he confesses) I may infer, it can be in no Danger at all.

The fourth Opinion his Lordship rejecteth, is of them that make the Will necessarily to follow the last Dictate of the Understanding; but it seems his Lordship understands that Tenet in another Sence than I do; for he speaketh as if they that held it, did suppose Men must dispute the Sequel of every Action they do, great and small, to the least Grain, which is a Thing his Lordship (with Reason) thinks untrue. But I understand it to signifie, that the *Will* follows the *last* Opinion or *Judgement* immediately preceding the *Action*, concerning whether it be Good to do it or not, whether he have weighed it long before, or not at all, and that I take to be the Meaning of them that hold it. As for Example, when a Man strikes, his Will to strike follows necessarily that Thought he had of the Sequel of his Stroke, immediately before the Lifting up of his Hand. Now if it be understood in that Sence, the *last* Dictate of the Understanding does *necessitate* the *Action*, though not as the whole Cause, yet as the last Cause, as the last Feather

Feather necessitates the Breaking of a Horse's Back, when there are so many laid on before, as there needed but the Addition of one to make the Weight sufficient.

That which his Lordship alledgeth against this, is, First, out of a *Poet*, who in the Person of *Medea* says,

— — *Video meliora, proboque,
Deteriora sequor.*

but that Saying (as pretty as it is) is not true: for though *Medea* saw many Reasons to forbear killing her Children, yet the last Dictate of her Judgement was, that the present Revenge on her Husband out-weighed them all, and thereupon the wicked Action necessarily followed. Then the Story of the *Roman*, who of two Competitors, said, one had the better Reason, but the other must have the Office. This also marketh against his Lordship, for the last Dictate of his Judgement that had the Bestowing of the Office, was this, That it was better to take a great Bribe, than reward a great Merit.

Thirdly, he objects that Things nearer the Sence, move more powerfully than Reason; What followeth thence but this, The Sence of the present Good is commonly more immediate to the Action, than the Foresight of the evil Consequence to come? Fourthly, whereas his Lordship saies, that do what a Man can, he shall sorrow more for the Death of his Son than for the Sin of his Soul, makes nothing to the last Dictate of the Understanding; but it argues plainly

ly that Sorrow for Sin is not *voluntary*, and by Consequence, that *Repentance* proceedeth from *Causes*.

The last Part of this Discourse containeth his Lordships Opinion about reconciling *Liberty* with the *Prescience* and *Decree* of God, otherwise than some *Divines* have done, against whom, he saies, he had formerly written a Treatise, out of which he repeateth only two Things: One is, *That we ought not to desert a certain Truth, for not being able to comprehend the certain Manner of it.* And I say the same, as for Example, that his Lordship ought not to desert this certain Truth, *That there are certain and necessary Causes which make every Man to will what he willob, though he do not yet conceive in what Manner the Will of Man is caused.* And yet I think the Manner of it is not very hard to conceive, seeing we see daily, that *Praise Dispraise, Reward and Punishment, good and evil Sequels of Mens Actions* retained in *Memory*, do frame and make us to the *Election* of whatsoever it be that we elect, and that the *Memory* of such Things proceeds from the *Senses*, and *Sense* from the Operation of the *Objects* of Sense (which are external to us, and governed only by God Almighty) and by Consequence all *Actions*, even of *free* and *voluntary* Agents, are *necessary*.

The other Thing that he repeateth, is, that the best Way to reconcile *Contingence* and *Liberty* with *Prescience* and the *Decrees* of God, is to subject future *Contingencies* to the *Aspect* of God. The same is also my Opinion, but contrary to what his Lordship all this while laboured to prove. For
hitherto

hitherto he held *Liberty* and *Necessity*, that is to say, *Liberty* and the *Decrees* of *God* irréconcilable, unless the *Aspect* of *God* (which Word appeareth now the first Time in this Discourse) signifie somewhat else besides *Gods Will* and *Decree*, which I cannot understand. But he adds that we must subject them, according to that *Presentiality* which they have in *Eternity*, which he saies cannot be done by them that conceive *Eternity* to be an *everlasting Succession*, but only by them that conceive it as an *indivisible Point*. To which I answer, that assoon as I can conceive *Eternity* to be an *indivisible Point*, or any Thing, but an *everlasting Succession*, I will renounce all that I have written on this subject. I know *S. Thomas Aquinas* calls *Eternity*, *Nunc stans*, an *ever-abiding now*; which is easie enough to say, but though I fain would, yet I could never conceive it, they that can, are more happy than I. But in the mean Time his Lordship alloweth all Men to be of my Opinion, save only those that can conceive in their Minds a *Nunc stans*, which I think are none. I understand as little how it can be true his Lordship saies, that *God* is not *just* but *Justice* it self; not *wise*, but *Wisdom* it self; not *Eternal*, but *Eternity* it self; nor how he concludes thence, that *Eternity* is a *Point indivisible*, and not a *Succession*, nor in what Sence it can be said, that an *infinite Point*, and wherein is no *Succession*, can comprehend all *Time*, though *Time* be *successive*. These Phrases I find not in the *Scripture*, I wonder therefore what was the Design of the *School-men* to bring them up, unless they

thought a Man could not be a true *Christian* unless his Understanding be first strangled with such hard Sayings. And thus much for Answer to his Lordship's Discourse, wherein I think not only his *Squadrons of Arguments*, but also his *Reserve of Distinctions* are defeated. And now your Lordship shall have my Doctrine concerning the same Question, with my *Reasons* for it, positively, and as briefly as I can, without any Terms of *Art*, in plain *English*.

MY
O P I N I O N
ABOUT
LIBERTY
AND
NECESSITY.

First I conceive, that when it cometh into a Mans Mind to do or not to do some certain Action, if he have no Time to *deliberate*, the Doing it or Abstaining necessarily follow the *present* Thought he hath of the *good* or *evil* Consequence thereof to himself. As for Example, In sudden *Anger*, the *Action* shall follow the Thought of *Revenge*; in sudden *Fear*, the Thought of *Escape*. Also when a Man hath Time to *deliberate*, but deliberates not, because never any Thing appeared that could make him

X 2

doubt

doubt of the Consequence, the *Action* follows his Opinion of the *Goodness* or *Harm* of it. These *Actions* I call **VOLUNTARY**, (My Lord) if I understand him aright that calls them **SPONTANEOUS**. I call them *Voluntary*, because those *Actions* that follow immediately the *last* Appetite, are *Voluntary*, and here where is one only Appetite, that one is the *last*. Besides, I see 'tis reasonable to punish a *rash* Action, which could not be justly done by Man to Man, unless the same were *Voluntary*. For no *Action* of a Man can be said to be without *Deliberation*, though never so sudden, because it is supposed he had Time to *deliberate* all the precedent Time of his Life, whether he should do that Kind of Action or not. And hence it is, that he that killeth in a sudden Passion of *Anger*, shall nevertheless be justly put to *Death*, because all the Time, wherein he was able to consider whether to kill were Good or Evil, shall be held for one continual *Deliberation*, and consequently the Killing shall be judged to proceed from *Election*.

Secondly, I conceive when a Man *deliberates*, whether he shall do a Thing or not do it, that he does nothing else but consider whether it be better for himself to do it or not to do it. And to consider an Action, is to imagine the *Consequences* of it both good and evil. From whence is to be inferred, that *Deliberation* is nothing else but alternate Imagination of the good and evil Sequels of an Action, or (which is the same Thing) alternate *Hope* and *Fear*, or alternate Appetite to do or quit the Action of which he *deliberateth*.

Thirdly,

Thirdly, I conceive that in all *Deliberations*, that is to say, in all alternate *Succession* of contrary *Appetites*, the last is that which we call the *WILL*, and is immediately next before the Doing of the Action, or next before the Doing of it become impossible. All other *Appetites* to do, and to quit, that come upon a Man during his *Deliberations*, are called *Intentions*, and *Inclinations*, but not *Wills*, there being but one Will, which also in this Case may be called the *last* Will, though the *Intentions* change often.

Fourthly, I conceive that those *Actions*, which a Man is said to do upon *Deliberation*, are said to be *Voluntary*, and done upon *Choice* and *Election*, so that *Voluntary* Action, and Action proceeding from *Election* is the same Thing; and that of a *Voluntary Agent*, it is all one to say, he is free, and to say, he hath not made an End of *Deliberating*.

Fifthly, I conceive *Liberty* to be rightly defined in this Manner; *Liberty is the Absence of all the Impediments to Action that are not contained in the Nature and intrinsecal Quality of the Agent.* As for Example, the Water is said to descend *freely*, or to have *Liberty* to descend by the Chancel of the River, because there is no Impediment that Way, but not a-cross, because the Banks are Impediments. And though the Water cannot ascend, yet Men never say it wants the *Liberty* to ascend, but the *Faculty* or Power, because the Impediment is in the Nature of the Water, and intrinsecal. So also we say, he that is tied, wants the *Liberty* to go, because the Impediment is not

in him, but in his Bands; whereas we say not so of him that is sick or lame, because the Impediment is in himself.

Sixthly, I conceive that nothing taketh Beginning from *it self*, but from the *Action* of some other immediate *Agent* without it. self. And that therefore, when first a Man hath an *Appetite* or *Will* to something, to which immediately before he had no Appetite nor Will, the *Cause* of his *Will*, is not the *Will* it self but *something* else not in his own Disposing. So that whereas it is out of Controversie, that of *Voluntary* Actions the *Will* is the *necessary* Cause, and by this which is said, the *Will* is also *caused* by other Things whereof it disposeth not, it followeth, that *Voluntary* Actions have all of them *necessary* Causes, and therefore are *necessitated*.

Seventhly, I hold that to be a *sufficient* Cause, to which nothing is wanting that is needful to the Producing of the *Effect*. The same also is a *necessary* Cause. For if it be possible that a *sufficient* Cause shall not bring forth the *Effect*, then there wanteth somewhat which was needful to the Producing of it, and so the *Cause* was not *sufficient*; but if it be impossible that a *sufficient* Cause should not produce the *Effect*, then is a *sufficient* Cause a *necessary* Cause (for that is said to produce an *Effect* *necessarily* that cannot but produce it.) Hence it is manifest, that whatsoever is produced, is produced *necessarily*: for whatsoever is produced hath had a *sufficient* Cause to produce it, or else it had not been; and therefore also *Voluntary* Actions are *necessitated*.

Lastly,

Lastly, Should that ordinary Definition of a free Agent, namely, *That a free Agent is that, which, when all Things are present which are needful to produce the Effect, can nevertheless not produce it,*] implies a Contradiction, and is Non-sence; being as much as to say, The Cause may be sufficient, that is to say, necessary, and yet the Effect shall not follow.

M Y

My Reasons.

FOR the first five Points, wherein it is explicated 1. what *Spontaneity* is ; 2. what *Deliberation* is ; 3. what *Will*, *Propension* and *Appetite* are ; 4. what a *free Agent* is ; 5. what *Liberty* is, there can no other Proof be offered but every Mans own Experience, by Reflection on himself, and remembring what he useth in his Mind, that is, what he himself meaneth when he saith an Action is *spontaneous*, a Man *deliberates* ; such is his *Will*, that *Agent* or that *Action* is *free*. Now he that reflecteth so on himself, cannot but be satisfied, that *Deliberation* is the *Consideration of the good and evil Sequels of an Action to come*, that by *Spontaneity* is meant *inconsiderate Action* (or else nothing is meant by it) ; that *Will* is the *last Act of our Deliberation* ; that a *free Agent* is he that can do if he will, and forbear if he will ; and that *Liberty* is the *Absence of external Impediments*. But, to those that out of Custom speak not what they conceive, but what they hear, and are not able, or will not take the Pains to consider what they think when they hear such Words, no Argument can be sufficient, because *Experience* and *Matter of Fact* is not verified by other Mens Arguments, but by every Mans own *Sense* and *Memory*. For Example, How can it be proved that to love a Thing and to think it good is all one, to a Man that

that doth not mark his own Meaning by those Words? Or how can it be proved that *Eternity* is not *Nunc scans* to a Man that says those Words by Custom, and never considers how he can conceive the Thing in his Mind?

Also the sixth Point, that a Man cannot imagine any Thing to begin *without a Cause*, can no other Way be made known, but by trying how he can imagine it; but if he try, he shall find as much Reason (if there be no Cause of the Thing) to conceive it should begin at one Time as another, that he hath equal Reason to think it should begin at all Times, which is impossible, and therefore he must think there was some special Cause why it began then, rather than sooner or later; or else that it began never, but was *eternal*.

For the seventh Point, which is, that all *Events* have *necessary Causes*, it is there proved, in that they have *sufficient Causes*. Further let us in this Place also suppose any Event never so casual, as the Throwing (for Example) *Ames Ace* upon a pair of Dice, and see, if it must not have been *necessary* before 'twas thrown. For seeing it was thrown, it had a *Beginning*, and consequently a *sufficient Cause* to produce it, consisting partly in the *Dice*, partly in outward Things, as the Posture of the Parts of the *Hand*, the Measure of *Force* applied by the *Caster*, the Posture of the Parts of the *Table*, and the like. In Summ there was nothing wanting which was necessarily requisite to the Producing of that particular *Cast*, and consequently the *Cast* was necessarily thrown; for if it had not been thrown, there had wanted somewhat requisite

to the throwing of it, and so the Cause had not been *sufficient*. In the like Manner it may be proved that every other Accident how *contingent* soever it seem, or how *Voluntary* soever it be, is produced *necessarily*, which is that that my Lord Bishop disputes against. The same may be proved also in this manner. Let the Case be put, for Example, of the Weather. *'Tis necessary that to morrow it shall rain or not rain.* If therefore it be not *necessary* it shall rain, it is *necessary* it shall not rain, otherwise there is no Necessity that the Proposition, *It shall rain or not rain*, should be true. I know there be some that say, it may necessarily be true that one of the two shall come to pass, but not, singly that it shall rain, or that it shall not rain, which is as much as to say, *one* of them is *necessary*, yet neither of them is *necessary*; and therefore to seem to avoid that Absurdity, they make a Distinction, that neither of them is true *determinate*, but *indeterminate*; which Distinction either signifies no more but this, One of them is true, but we know not which, and so the Necessity remains, though we know it not; or if the Meaning of the Distinction be not that, it hath no Meaning, and they might as well have said, One of them is true *Titirice* but neither of them, *Tu patulice*.

The last Thing in which also consisteth the whole Controversie, namely that there is no such Thing as an Agent, *which when all Things requisite to Action are present, can nevertheless forbear to produce it*; or (which is all one) that there is no such Thing as *Freedom from Necessity*, is easily inferred from that which hath been before alledged. For if it be an Agent it can work, and if it work, there

there is nothing wanting of what is requisite to produce the *Action*, and consequently the Cause of the *Action* is *sufficient*, and if *sufficient*, then also *necessary*, as hath been proved before.

And thus you see how the *Inconveniences*, which his Lordship objecteth must follow upon the holding of *Necessity*, are avoided, and the *Necessity* it self *demonstratively* proved. To which I could add, if I thought it good *Logick*, the *Inconvenience* of denying *Necessity*, as that it destroyeth both the *Decrees* and the *Prescience* of God *Almighty*; for whatsoever God hath *purposed* to bring to pass by *Man*, as an Instrument, or foreseeeth shall come to pass; a Man, if he have *Liberty* (such as his Lordship affirmeth) from *Necessitation*, might frustrate, and make not to come to pass, and God should either not *foreknow* it, and not *decree* it, or he should *foreknow* such Things shall be, as shall never be, and *decree* that which shall never come to pass.

This is all hath come into my Mind touching this Question since I last considered it. And I humbly beseech your Lordship to communicate it only to my Lord Bishop. And so praying God to prosper your Lordship in all your Designs, I take leave and am,

My most Noble and most obliged Lord,

Roven Aug. 20.

1652.

Your most humble

Servant,

Thomas Hobbs.

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